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This dissertation focuses on when and how children learn about the meanings of the
propositional attitude verbs know and think. Know and think both express belief. But they
differ in their veridicality: think is non-veridical and can report a false belief; but know
can only report true beliefs because it is a veridical verb. Furthermore, the verbs differ in
their factivity: uses of x knows p, but not uses of x thinks p, typically presuppose the truth
of p, because know is factive and think is not. How do children figure out these subtle
differences between the verbs, given that they are so similar in the grand scheme of word
meaning? Assuming that this consists in figuring out which of an existing store of mental
state concepts (such as belief) to map to each word, this dissertation highlights the role
of children’s linguistic experiences, or input, with the verbs in homing in on an adult-like
understanding of them.
To address the when question, this dissertation uses behavioral experiments to test
children’s understanding of factivity and show that some children can figure out the con-
trast by their third birthday, while other children still have not figured it out by 4.5 years
of age. This is earlier than was once thought, but means that there is a lot of individual
variation in age of acquisition that must be explained. And it means that children do not
just get better at the contrast as they get older, which leaves room for us to ask what role
linguistic experiences play, if we can explore how these experiences are related to the
variation in when children uncover the contrast.
In order to address the how question, the dissertation lays out potential routes to
uncovering the contrast via observing direct consequences of it or via syntactic and prag-
matic bootstrapping approaches which exploit indirect consequences of the contrast. Af-
ter laying out these potential routes, the dissertation uses corpus analyses to provide ar-
guments for which routes are most likely, given children’s actual experiences with the
verbs. In particular, trying to track the direct consequences of the contrast will not get
the learner very far. But alternative routes that rely on indirect consequences such as the
syntactic distributions of the verbs or their discourse functions, provide clear signal about
the underlying contrast.
Finally, the dissertation discusses the consequences of this picture for the seman-
tic representation of know and think, as well as the linguistic, conceptual, and socio-
pragmatic competence that children must bring to the table in order to uncover the con-
trast.
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This dissertation focuses on when and how children learn about the meanings of the
propositional attitude verbs know and think. Know and think both express belief. But they
differ in their veridicality: think is non-veridical and can report a false belief; but know
can only report true beliefs because it is a veridical verb. Furthermore, the verbs differ in
their factivity: uses of x knows p, but not uses of x thinks p, typically presuppose the truth
of p, because know is factive and think is not. How do children figure out these subtle
differences between the verbs, given that they are so similar in the grand scheme of word
meaning? Assuming that this consists in figuring out which of an existing store of mental
state concepts (such as belief) to map to each word, this dissertation highlights the role
of children’s linguistic experiences, or input, with the verbs in homing in on an adult-like
understanding of them.
To address the when question, this dissertation uses behavioral experiments to test
children’s understanding of factivity and show that some children can figure out the con-
trast by their third birthday, while other children still have not figured it out by 4.5 years
of age. This is earlier than was once thought, but means that there is a lot of individual
variation in age of acquisition that must be explained. And it means that children do not
just get better at the contrast as they get older, which leaves room for us to ask what role
linguistic experiences play, if we can explore how these experiences are related to the
1
variation in when children uncover the contrast.
In order to address the how question, the dissertation lays out potential routes to
uncovering the contrast via observing direct consequences of it or via syntactic and prag-
matic bootstrapping approaches which exploit indirect consequences of the contrast. Af-
ter laying out these potential routes, the dissertation uses corpus analyses to provide ar-
guments for which routes are most likely, given children’s actual experiences with the
verbs. In particular, trying to track the direct consequences of the contrast will not get
the learner very far. But alternative routes that rely on indirect consequences such as the
syntactic distributions of the verbs or their discourse functions, provide clear signal about
the underlying contrast.
Finally, the dissertation discusses the consequences of this picture for the seman-
tic representation of know and think, as well as the linguistic, conceptual, and socio-
pragmatic competence that children must bring to the table in order to uncover the con-
trast.
1.1 The subtle contrast between know and think
When do children figure out that know means KNOW and think means THINK
given the very subtle differences in their meanings? And what kinds of experience do
they have which help them uncover these differences between know and think?
If we consider the entire lexicon, these verbs have very similar meanings. Both
know and think can be used to talk about beliefs because sentences like (1) and (2) both
entail (3a).
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(1) John knows that Mary is home.
(2) John thinks that Mary is home.
(3) a. John has the belief that Mary is home.
b. Mary is home.
However, know differs from think is that it is veridical and in that it is factive1. As a
veridical verb, know sentences entail the truth of their complements (e.g., (1) entails (3b))
and thus can only report on beliefs that are true. On the other hand, think is non-veridical,
so a sentence like (2) does not entail (3b) and think can report on beliefs that are either
true or false.
Furthermore, as a factive verb, uses of know sentences not only entail, but tend to
presuppose, or take for granted, the truth of their complements, and these presuppositions
“project” in entailment-canceling contexts such as in the scope of negation. Thus, a sen-
tence like (4) also presupposes (3b) and should only be used if the speaker can take for
granted that Mary is actually home. In contrast, think is not factive, and when we hear a
sentence like (5) we might even infer that (3b) is false and that Mary is not actually home
because the truth of the complement does not project.
(4) John doesn’t know that Mary is home
(5) John doesn’t think that Mary is home
1Note that these terms tend to refer to different concepts across disciplines. Within philosophy, the term
“factive” is often used to refer to the same phenomena that linguists would call “veridical”.
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1.2 When is the contrast mastered?
At what age do children understand that know presupposes the truth of its comple-
ment while think does not? The most direct tests of their understanding ask whether chil-
dren will infer that the complement of know is true, even under an entailment-canceling
operator like negation, while they will not make the same inference for think. If chil-
dren do this, it suggests that they understand the projective behavior of know and thus
understand it to be factive.
For many years, behavioral studies on children’s understanding of know and think
tended to conclude that children do not successfully map the contrast between the verbs
until late in childhood (Harris 1975, Macnamara et al. 1976, Johnson and Maratsos 1977,
Scoville and Gordon 1980, Wimmer and Perner 1983, Abbeduto and Rosenberg 1985,
Baron-Cohen et al. 1985, Moore and Davidge 1989, Moore et al. 1989, Falmagne et al.
1994, Wellman et al. 2001, Wellman and Liu 2004, Léger 2008, Fabricius et al. 2010).
However, a new body of experimental evidence (which includes the behavioral studies
reported in this dissertation) suggests that these early studies underestimated children’s
abilities. Instead, newer studies suggest that children can comprehend and produce know
in adult-like ways by the time that they are three years old, but that there can be variability
in the age of acquisition because some children still don’t understand the factivity of know
at 4.5 years (Dudley et al. 2015, Hacquard et al. 2016, Harris et al. 2017, as well as
behavioral studies reported in Chapter 4).
Newer studies suggest that the contrast is mastered earlier than previously thought.
But this is still relatively late in development, at least when we consider the relative fre-
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quency of know and think in the everyday conversations that children are exposed to.
Naively, one might assume that the age of acquisition of some word would be related
to how often the learner gets experience with that word. But know and think are prime
examples of words that seem challenging for learners because they are acquired so much
later than other, less frequent words.
At the earliest, know and think are mastered around three years of age, and, at the
outside, they are mastered around 4-5 years. Now consider the word apple. According to
normed parent report data, over 90% of children understand this word by 18 months and
over 90% produce this word by 23 months (Dale and Fenson 1996). With respect to the
frequency of the words, tokens of the lexeme apple occurred 37 times while tokens of the
lexemes know and think occurred 1608 and 1300 times respectively, in one representative
corpus of parent-child conversations (MacWhinney 2000, Gleason 1980). So words like
know and think are approximately 40 times more frequent than words like apple, but they
are mastered about 2-3 years later than words like apple. Of course, this is not a precise
empirical investigation of differences in age of acquisition, but these back-of-the-envelope
calculations immediately raise some questions. What makes mastery of words like know
and think so much harder than words like apple?
1.3 Why such ‘hard’ words?
In the past, theorists have pinned the difficulty of learning these words on either (i)
the late acquisition of their underlying concepts or (ii) the difficulty of observing their
referents in the environment. But recent advances in developmental psychology have
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upturned both of these perspectives on the source of difficulty.
The first perspective draws on findings from the Theory of Mind literature suggest-
ing that children do not represent false beliefs as measured by so-called “explicit” false
belief tasks (see Wimmer and Perner 1983, Wellman et al. 2001, and more details in
Chapter 3). Children do not represent false beliefs—on this account—because they lack
the relevant mental state concepts (such as beliefs) to do so. Thus the delay in mastery
of words like know and think as compared to words like apple has to do with the nature
of the concepts that these words token, and the concept APPLE is in place before the
concepts KNOW and THINK.
The second perspective instead assumes that the concepts are in place, and that the
difficulty actually lies in successfully mapping KNOW to know and THINK to think. In
general, mapping problems involve identifying a form and a meaning and relating the two,
for example relating apple to APPLE. The idea is that there is a stock of concepts that
the learner has access to and that learning a new word involves mapping a linguistic form
to one of these concepts. Experiences are always vital to language acquisition, but when
framing word learning as mapping, learners do not “acquire” or “build” word meanings
through experience. Instead, they use this experience to determine which of an existing
stock of concepts is the meaning of a new word, thereby “uncovering” or “discovering”
what the underlying concept is. Experience allows the learner to rule out different possi-
bilities and home in on a narrower and narrower set of candidates for mapping. But why
would mapping KNOW to know be harder than mapping APPLE to apple? There are at
least a couple different possibilities on the market.
Traditionally, mapping problems like these were considered difficult because it was
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thought to be “hard” to observe the physical correlates of mental states (Gleitman 1990).
So children would struggle to realize when mental state concepts were tokened within a
conversation, and, as a consequence, they would not entertain these concepts as candi-
dates for word meaning.
Another, newer idea would be that children do not entertain these concepts as can-
didates for mapping to word meaning, but not because they cannot observe mental states.
Instead, they would fail to realize that these concepts are good candidates for mapping
because they are not salient within everyday conversations (see Westra 2017, Westra and
Carruthers 2017). But this leaves open the question of why such concepts would not be
salient, so it is not very explanatory beyond being a more precise characterization of the
phenomenon. As developed more fully later in this dissertation, one possibility would
be that beliefs and knowledge—and attributions of them in order to explain the behavior
of others—are not salient because they are so ubiquitous within the context of everyday
interactions. Thus, aspects of children’s experience will need to highlight the salience of
these concepts in order to help solve the mapping problem for words like know and think.
Recent experimental advances have upturned the conceptual and observability per-
spectives, suggesting that the saliency perspective is the best of the three. While children
traditionally fail explicit or elicited-response measures of Theory of Mind (see Wellman
et al. 2001 for a meta-analysis), the new literature on children’s spontaneous belief track-
ing in implicit Theory of Mind tasks (see Scott and Baillargeon 2017 for a recent review)
suggests that even infants have some level of sensitivity to the mental states of others
(such as beliefs) and their contents—as early as the first or second year of life. Perhaps
these representational capacities continue to develop across childhood, but the foundation
7
for belief concepts seems to be in place from very early in development, suggesting that
conceptual explanations of children’s difficulty attributing mental states are not entirely
explanatory. It is not entirely uncontroversial within the developmental psychology liter-
ature to claim that the concepts are in place early on (see, for example, Hutto et al. 2011,
Rakoczy 2012, Carruthers 2013). But let’s grant that the concepts are in place by the
first or second year of life (see Chapter 3 for more discussion). Even if the concepts are
accessible to the child, there is still a non-trivial mapping problem: namely, realizing that
the word refers to this particular concept, because of the salience (or lack thereof) of the
concept within a conversation. Perhaps this is what leads to the acquisition delay?
If infants are capable of spontaneous belief tracking in experimental paradigms,
then it stands to reason that they are able to do so in at least some natural contexts. And if
they can do that, then these concepts cannot be completely “closed to observation” (Gleit-
man, 1990), but are rather part of the vocabulary of concepts that infants have and part
of the store of concepts that they can recognize as tokened in the world around them. So
what does make these words so hard, if not their late-acquired concepts or observability?
Well, our third possibility is still open, and it is consistent with adult performance in hu-
man simulation paradigm tasks. These tasks place adult participants in the shoes of the
learner and ask them to infer the meanings of novel words (Gillette et al. 1996), and it
turns out that adults fail to guess attitude verb meanings even when it would be correct
to do so. We don’t want to infer too much from adults’ performance in these tasks, be-
cause they tend to adopt the strategy of guessing very general words (e.g., thing for novel
nouns), but it is suggestive that attitude meanings are not considered very salient possi-
bilities for novel verbs. And conditions that raise the salience of attitude verb meanings
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lead to an increase in adults correctly guessing them (Gillette et al. 1996, Papafragou et
al. 2007). So we can assume that mapping difficulties originate in the relative salience of
concepts within conversation, and ask which conditions make them more or less salient.
1.3.1 A new explanation of the source of difficulty
Consider the ways that we talk to each other on a daily basis. We often ask each
other questions like Do you have the time? and Can you pass the salt? But we don’t
intend these questions literally; few people, if any, could literally possess the time, or
lack the ability to pass a salt shaker. Instead, we use these questions to perform more
indirect speech acts like request that the addressee tell us the time, or pass us the salt.
But in order to understand these indirect speech acts, we have to be able to reason about
the underlying beliefs, knowledge, abilities, desires and intentions at play. For example,
a speaker probably asks whether an addressee has the time because they want to know
what it is and they think that the addressee knows it, and that the addressee will be able to
reconstruct these goals. So, when a child is asked Can you pick up your toys?, they might
understand this as a directive to tidy up, but in order to do so they would have to attribute
a certain set of beliefs and intentions to the speaker.
Now consider the kinds of discourse functions that we regularly use know and think
sentences for. Saying something like I think that it’s cold in here roughly equates to
asserting It’s cold in here (and can even function as a request to turn down the air con-
ditioner), while asking something like Do you know where the bathrooms are? roughly
equates to asking Where are the bathrooms, at least for all practical purposes. Given that
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the bare complements achieve about the same discourse function as the sentences with the
attitude verbs, how is a child supposed to realize that attitude verb meanings are at play
in one case but not the other? Recall that they are already attributing beliefs, knowledge
and intentions right and left in order to understand the other things that their parents say
to them, so at first blush, nothing would seem that different about these cases.
1.4 How do children solve the mapping problem?
How are mapping problems solved in general? Meanings cannot be learned by
direct observation of them, because they are not the kinds of things we can see in the
world around us. Instead, we can observe some consequences of the meanings and try to
infer back to what the meanings might be. In this way, all evidence about the meanings
of words are indirect, but we can talk about “direct” cues as those from consequences that
are more closely related to the underlying meanings. As an example, consider how we
might learn the meaning of apple via these “direct” cues: we see that it is often used to
talk about apples and infer that it must mean APPLE.
At first blush, mapping problems seem trivial, especially in the case of words like
kick or apple, because we can see kickings and apples in the world around us and we can
map a speaker’s use of kick or apple to them. Upon reflection, the problem seems a lot less
trivial because this mapping between world and word is often more tenuous. Language
exhibits displacement in time and space so we need not talk about things that are present
in the speech situation; we can talk about yesterday’s kick or offer to retrieve an apple
from another room for someone. And the environment around us might be very complex,
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such that it could be difficult to identify the relevant referent in the world; which thing in
a full fridge is an apple and why isn’t kick a name for shoes? Not to mention metaphorical
or idiomatic uses of language (e.g., apple of my eye) or how objects in the environment
can appear different across contexts (e.g., apple pie). We will set aside issues that have
been well-discussed in the literature, such as Quinean underdetermination and Goodman’s
problem of induction (Goodman 1955, Quine 1960, Kripke 1982). But even if we do not
concern ourselves with these problems, the task is still not trivial. Even assuming that
all the relevant concepts and cognitive structures are in place, evidence is still needed to
figure out which concept is tokened in a particular instance.
Recognizing the problems for this theory in these simple concrete cases, there are
other words which seem to be more recalcitrant to mapping because they are acquired
much later in development. Examples of such “hard” words include know, think, hope,
too, the and liberty. Some of these ‘hard’ words are used very frequently in conversation,
including think, know, too and the. But, the underlying meanings of these words will not
be very salient in the context of their use, the way that more ‘concrete’ meanings might
be. For example, consider a scenario when a father is preparing a snack for his child. He
might say something like: Let’s find you a snack. I think there’s an apple in the fridge. I
know the cheese is in there. And the juice is too. In this context, many concepts will be
available to the child, but some will be salient (e.g. snack, cheese, apple, juice, fridge,
dad, hunger, etc) and others will be less salient (e.g. belief, knowledge, truth, uniqueness,
additivity). What would make the child consider these less salient options for the meaning
of a new word? Even adults do not immediately entertain these less salient mental state
meanings for novel words, unless they are given some reason to treat them as relevant
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(Gillette et al. 1999, Papafragou et al. 2007). Why? Mental states underlie all uses of
all words, which makes them poor candidates for the meaning of any particular word.
Consider our lunch-preparation scenario. The father believes that there is an apple in the
fridge and knows that this information would be relevant to his child, the listener. He
could say I think that there’s an apple in the fridge, but he could just as easily say There’s
an apple in the fridge. Beliefs and knowledge underlie what we say and why we say it,
thus belief attributions can serve to help explain behavior. In fact, beliefs and knowledge
might be some of the most commonplace concepts that are tokened in everyday life. As a
result, the learner might assume that beliefs function as the vehicle to get messages across,
and should be factored out of guesses about the content of the message. If so, the learner
would need some kind of cues that beliefs and knowledge would be relevant candidates
for word meaning, in order to know to factor them back in.
If part of the problem in mapping these ‘hard’ meanings consists in realizing that
they are relevant, what evidence can tell the child that they are relevant? In the general
case, several options are available (situational cues, socio-pragmatic cues, lexical cues
and syntactic cues) and they each provide different kinds of information:
• Situational cues from what is salient in the context: mealtime contexts raise the
salience of food, false belief contexts raise the salience of beliefs (Ninio 1983, Yont
et al. 2003, Papafragou et al. 2007)
• Socio-pragmatic cues from inferring a speaker’s intentions, among other things:
when she says the apple she intends to refer to that apple. Knowing that a speaker
is referring to an apple when uttering a sentence that contains apple makes it salient
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that apple means APPLE (Grice 1975, Baldwin et al. 1996, Bloom 2002b).
• Lexical cues from knowledge about the surrounding “easy” words: eat describes a
relation between agents (e.g., I, you, John, Mary, the dog) and edible things (e.g.,
apples, cheese, cookies, pizza). John ate the apple makes salient the possibility
that eat expresses a relationship between agents and edible things (Pinker 1994,
Grimshaw 1994).
• Syntactic cues from the distribution of words: uses of kick in transitive frames
make salient events with two participants, uses of swim in intransitive frames make
salient events with one participant, uses of think with embedded complements make
salient relations between individuals and propositions (Fillmore 1970, Zwicky 1971
Jackendoff 1972, Grimshaw 1979, Pinker 1989, Levin 1993).
To sum up, a learner cannot directly observe what concepts are tokened by an utter-
ance. As a result, all mapping problems are inference problems and require a wide variety
of evidence to try and figure out what that underlying concept may be. Relevant sources
of information include: perceptual abilities to parse the environment, a conceptual reper-
toire, socio-pragmatic abilities to interpret the actions and intentions of others, and the
ability to parse and interpret the linguistic signal. I will argue that the cues that prove
most relevant to learning about know and think are socio-pragmatic cues and syntactic
cues.
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1.5 Possible routes to factivity and veridicality
Children begin to figure out the contrast between know and think around 3 years.
What kind of evidence helps them to figure it out? What are the possible routes to un-
covering this contrast? If you thought learning the meaning of a word like think was
hard, then determining the difference between know and think should be just as hard. The
contrast between know and think hinges on whether the contents of the beliefs that they
are used to discuss are true or common knowledge. If beliefs are not a salient aspect of
interactions where know and think are uttered, then the truth of those beliefs or whether
those beliefs are shared will not be salient either.
Aside from the usual mapping challenges in word learning (Clark 1993), presuppo-
sition triggers present some additional challenges. Children need to identify the content
which is conventionally associated with a word and determine along which dimensions it
should be packaged into their representation of the word. How might children solve the
mapping problem for triggers?
One strategy would be to track the background assumptions that a speaker makes
when using a presupposition trigger:
(6) Pay attention to everything that speakers presuppose and notice that whenever
expression X is used, p is always common knowledge. Conclude that p is a pre-
supposition triggered by X.
This is essentially an extension of the associationist view of how the mapping problem
is solved for non-presupposed content (Locke 1948, Smith 1995, Yu and Smith 2011). It
seems simple and straightforward enough, but there are problems that emerge upon reflec-
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tion. To illustrate, let us recall our basic, non-presuppositional example: children can map
the meaning APPLE to the form apple because it is uttered in the presence of apples. Even
for apple, this is not a trivial task; we often talk about objects when they are not present
(e.g, Would you like an apple for your snack?), and even when present, they are usually
embedded within complex scenes (e.g., We have an apple somewhere in this fridge). Tak-
ing this strategy for presupposition triggers is all the more difficult because the relevant
content is backgrounded, and speakers make all kinds of background assumptions which
are not conventionally associated with the words they use. Are children sensitive to back-
grounded content in solving mapping problems within language acquisition? And how
should they figure out which of the speaker’s background assumptions are systematically
associated with triggering expressions and which are not?
Turning to the specific contrast between know and think, direct cues would need to
be informative about the different patterns of entailment with the two verbs (veridicality)
and/or whether those entailments are backgrounded (presupposition). In order to observe
these differences, the child would need to keep track of the propositions expressed by
the complements of the two verbs, then compare them against what is known within the
discourse context, so we can call direct cues to veridicality and factivity “discourse status”
cues.
1.5.1 Discourse status of complement cues to veridicality
Veridical verbs are those that entail the truth of their complements, so cues about
the veridicality contrast would involve tracking the truth of propositions expressed by the
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verbs’ complements:
(7) Discourse status cues to (non-)veridicality: Pay attention to everything that
speakers say in using know and think, as well as what is true in the context of
utterance. Observe that p is always true when x knows p is uttered, but not nec-
essarily when x thinks p is uttered. Conclude that know entails the truth of its
complement and that think does not.
Given these kinds of cues, what would children’s experiences have to look like in
order to map the appropriate contrast? How would they realize that think isn’t veridi-
cal? In practice it may be hard to understand when something is false in a given context,
so the clearest evidence could come from cases where the belief that is reported on is
contrasted with the perspective within the conversational context. For example, (8) con-
trasts the belief of someone outside the conversation with the beliefs of the conversational
participants. And (9) contrasts the past beliefs of the speaker with their current beliefs.
(8) She thinks that Bill is coming to the party, but we know that he isn’t.
(9) I thought that Bill was coming to the party, but now I realize that he isn’t.
These contrasts could highlight the relative truth of the different beliefs and help children
realize that think is non-veridical, especially if we never see know in similar contexts
(10-11).
(10) She knows that Bill is coming to the party, # but we know that he isn’t.
(11) I knew that Bill was coming to the party, # but now I realize that he isn’t.
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1.5.2 Discourse status of complement cues to factivity
Factive verbs are those that presuppose the truth of their complements, so cues
about the factivity contrast would involve tracking the truth of propositions expressed by
the verbs’ complements and what is already established in the common ground:
(12) Discourse status cues to (non-)factivity: Pay attention to everything that speak-
ers presuppose in using know and think. Notice that whenever x knows p is used,
p is common knowledge but not whenever x thinks p is uttered. Conclude that p
is a presupposition triggered by x knows p but not x thinks p.
1.5.3 Conceptual challenge for routes using discourse status cues
Now that we have laid out these two types of discourse cues, we can consider their
utility, given what we know about the words involved and the kinds of representational
capacities that children have in place by 3 years. In principle, children could keep track
of these cues. They are able to attribute beliefs to others around them. They are able
to recognize what is true, or matches their expectations in a given context, as is needed
for the veridicality cues. They are able to recognize what is part of a shared body of
knowedlge, as is needed for the factivity cues. For more details, see the discussion in
Chapter 3.
But it is not clear that children would do this, in practice. Three issues might make
this challenging: that (i) the relevant evidence is backgrounded; (ii) think is an ‘assertive’
verb and its use can often foreground the proposition expressed in the complement as
the “main point” (Urmson 1952, Hooper 1975, Simons 2007), which could obscure its
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non-veridicality; and (iii) know is a “soft” presupposition trigger (Abusch 2010) because
it does not reliably exhibit the behavior of presupposition triggers, which could obscure
its factivity.
First, the kind of information that children would have to track to figure out the fac-
tivity contrast (i.e. what a speaker presupposes) is often backgrounded by its very nature,
instead of being a salient aspect of their everyday interactions involving the words, and
children might only pay attention to it in solving a particular mapping problem if they
have reason to think that it is relevant to that problem. It is not the topic of discussion and
less attention is drawn to it as a result. Noticing it requires not only keeping track of the
environment, but also the mental states of the conversational participants. Some (and per-
haps all) presuppositions might thus fly under the child’s radar. Moreover, speakers make
all kinds of presuppositions when they speak, and many of these presuppositions are not
conventionally associated with any particular expression (Stalnaker 1974); for example,
writing this dissertation in English presupposes that the audience can read English - no
word or expression would have triggered that presupposition. And even noticing a reli-
able association with speaker presuppositions does not determine that these associations
should be conventionally encoded, given that many reliable associates of word use are not
so encoded (e.g., being made up of molecules is not part of our representation of chair
even if it were true of all chairs that we use the word to describe). Furthermore, nothing
the grammatical form of a trigger reveals its status as a trigger in the same way that being
a noun, for example, reveals that apple might denote an object kind (except perhaps in
the case of a few triggers, such as focus phenomena). Can children sidestep or overcome
these challenges to figure out which background assumptions to associate with particular
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linguistic expressions?
Second, think is an ‘assertive’ predicate (See Chapter 2 for more details). As a
result, the speaker will be committed to the truth of the proposition, and the listener might
conclude that is is true. If this kind of assertive use of think occurs in speech to children
with any frequency, then children might be willing to incorrectly conclude that think is
a veridical verb, or one that entails the truth of its complement. This could effectively
neutralize the veridicality contrast between the verbs. As a consequence, the second
challenge involved in mapping the contrast between think and know would be the noise
obscuring any signal about their (non-)veridicality.
Since both verbs might be regularly used to discuss beliefs which the speaker en-
dorses, a veridicality contrast might be difficult to uncover. Perhaps the way to figure
out the difference rides on the factivity contrast - realizing that the speaker takes the truth
of the complement for granted with know but not think. But, a third challenge would
come from the fact that know is a so-called ‘soft’ presupposition trigger. Speakers can
use know to inform their interlocutors that the proposition expressed in the complement
is true when that information is not already part of the common ground (see Chapter 2
for more details). When this happens, the factivity contrast between know and think can
be neutralized. As competent adult speakers, we don’t have trouble accommodating the
presupposition in such cases because we understand that know is a factive presupposition
trigger and we are able to accommodate the speaker’s presupposition. But if you are a
child who isn’t already aware of know’s factivity, then how would you break in? This
presents a chicken-and-egg problem: the know utterances that would tell the learner that
know is a presupposition trigger tend to be cases that will not look presuppositional unless
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the learner already knew know to be a presupposition trigger (which is not true for all pre-
supposition triggers for that matter). As a result, the learner who tracks whether know’s
complements express information that is already part of the common ground, might con-
clude that know does not occur in a subset of the cases where think occurs. Instead,
they would have to conclude that the verbs differ in their factivity based on relative—or
probabilistic differences—in the distribution of know and think, instead of categorical dif-
ferences. In fact, these informative uses of know could be helpful, but not for this factivity
route to the contrast. Instead, they may help children figure out that the complement is
entailed—that the verb is veridical—but not that it is factive. Thus the third challenge
involved is the potential noise that could obscure any signal about the factivity contrast2.
1.5.4 Some alternatives from indirect consequences of the contrast
Discourse status cues provide one route to the (non-) veridicality or (non-)factivity
of know and think, but there are potential empirical and conceptual challenges to this type
of route. Might there be different, perhaps less direct, cues to the differences between the
verbs that are more readily available in children’s experience? In this section, we discuss
how these differences may provide an indirect route to the (non-)factivity of know and
think.
There are other kinds of consequences of underlying meanings that aren’t so direct.
These alternative cues are more indirect and come from distributional information. For
2Although figuring out that a predicate is factive may be enough to conclude that it is factive, at least if
the veridicality entailment is backgrounded, as in pragmatic accounts of presupposition trigger. See Chapter
2 for more details.
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example, we might infer that eat describes a relation between two individuals (the eater
and the eaten) because it takes two arguments.
Compared to more direct cues from the discourse status of the complement, these
cues can provide a tradeoff in utility. Distributional cues are used in solving mapping
problems more generally, so there is no need to specify why the cues would be relevant
to the contrast between know and think in particular, and we know that children do notice
and use these kinds of cues for other words. But these indirect cues require principled
links between meaning and syntactic distribution, and as discussed in Chapter 2, the field
has not yet come to a consensus on what these principled links would look like for the
case of know and think.
Setting aside the issues of whether these links are principled, there are two candi-
dates for indirect routes to the constrast between know and think: cues from the syntactic
distributions and discourse functions of the two verbs. The syntactic distribution of know
differs from the syntactic distribution of think. For example, both verbs take that-clauses
but only know takes embedded interrogatives (Egre, 2008; Ginzburg, 1995; Hinktikka,
1975; Karttunen 1977). Furthermore, there are differences in the kinds of discourse moves
that speakers use these verbs to make, which might be reflected in the input; think can be
used to hedge assertions, but know is used to make indirect requests for information or
ask indirect questions (Clark, 1979; Searle, 1975; Urmson, 1952).
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1.5.4.1 Cues from syntactic distributions of verbs
Given the recent findings which support syntactic bootstrapping to solve mapping
problems for other meaning contrasts between attitude verbs (Asplin 2002, Hacquard
2014, Hacquard and Lidz under review, Harrigan et al. 2016, Lidz et al. 2016, White et
al. 2016), it seems possible that children could use syntactic distributions from their input
to figure out the difference between know and think, provided that there are principled
links between syntactic distribution and differences in factivity that they would be privy
to.
As discussed in Chapter 2, some authors argue that there is a correlation between
a predicate’s factivity and its ability to take both declarative (13) and interrogative (14)
complements (Hintikka 1975, Ginzburg 1995, Egré 2008, among others). A factive like
know takes both kinds of complements, whereas a non-factive like think only embeds
declarative complements.
(13) John knows/thinks that Mary is home.
(14) John knows/*thinks where Mary is.
Egré (2008), for instance, posits that, for verbs which require their complements to be
true (such as factive verbs), the difference between a declarative and interrogative com-
plement is neutralized (i.e., to know that it’s raining is to know whether it’s raining and
vice versa). Under this kind of account, a child could learn whether a verb is factive by
observing whether it takes both declarative and interrogative complements. However, as
discussed in Chapter 2, there are many counterexamples to the generalization that any
verb which embeds both declaratives and interrogatives is a factive (e.g., tell, decide,
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demonstrate, etc). Thus, the link between question embedding and factivity may not be
entirely principled, or perhaps the picture is more complicated but syntactic distributions
are still informative (see White and Rawlins 2016, as well as discussion in 2).
1.5.4.2 Cues from discourse functions of verbs
Attitude verbs lend themselves to different kinds of indirect speech acts; (15a) can
function as an indirect (weak) assertion about the time, instead of a statement about the
speaker’s beliefs, while (15b) can function as an indirect command instead of a descrip-
tion of the speaker’s desires. And these indirect speech acts are informative about the
meanings of the verbs. Think expresses a judgment of truth and assertions are the expres-
sion of such judgments. Desire verbs like want express preferences, and commands are
the expressions of such preferences.
(15) a. I think it’s time to eat.
b. I want you to eat.
Just as the syntactic distributions of the verbs might be informative, the different
types of discourse moves that the verbs are used to achieve could provide clues as to their
underlying meanings. The meaning of an expression constrains the ways that it can be
used (Grice 1957), so understanding how a speaker uses some word could help one to
understand what it means. Know and think are routinely used to perform different kinds
of indirect speech acts (as introduced in Chapter 2). Know can easily be used to request
information (16) while think can easily be used to make indirect assertions (17).
(16) a. Q: Do you know where my keys are?
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b. A: Sorry, I don’t know
c. A’: In the kitchen
(17) I think it’s raining.
While the literal act performed by the speaker of (16a) is a question about the addressee’s
knowledge state, it can easily be used to ask where the keys are (indirect question). Sim-
ilarly, the literal act in (17) is a mere assertion about a belief state, but it can easily be
used to proffer that it is raining (indirect assertion). An explanation—along the lines of
Searle (1975)—of the naturalness of these indirect speech acts with know and think would
be tied to the different conditions on successful performance of the primary illocutionary
acts (i.e., asking for the location of the keys or claiming that it’s raining). For (16), the
speaker cannot accomplish this request without the expectation that the addressee knows
where the keys are, and for (17), the speaker should not assert that it is raining without
believing it.
Such pragmatic enrichments could hinder the learner in uncovering the underlying
contrast. However, if systematic enough, these indirect speech acts could also help the
learner, as they could provide valuable cues about the underlying meanings of know and
think, provided that children understand enough about what the speaker is trying to get
across to understand the illocutionary force of the indirect speech acts in (16a) and (17),
which we have reason to believe given the discussion in Chapter 3.
Here is how such pragmatic bootstrapping could go in the case of know and think.
Imagine that the child hears an utterance like I VERB1 that it’s raining. If the child
understands that the speaker is putting forward the proposition that it’s raining, she might
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infer that (i) VERB1 expresses some kind of commitment (perhaps a belief) of the subject
(the speaker) to the proposition expressed by the complement (it’s raining) and (ii) that the
content of the complement is presented as new information, and hence not presupposed. If
she hears an utterance like Do you VERB2 what time it is? and understands the speaker to
be requesting an answer to the question What time is it?, she may not understand exactly
what VERB2 means, but she may assume both that the speaker wants the true answer to
this question and that the speaker believes that the subject (the addressee) has the desired
true answer. These assumptions would allow the child to infer that VERB2 is a kind of
predicate which relates an individual (e.g., the child) to the true answer to the question
expressed by the complement (e.g., What time is it?).
According to such pragmatic bootstrapping, a possible entryway into the factivity
of know would be via its interrogative complement. How would this knowledge extend
to uses of know with a declarative complement? This depends in part on how the two
types of complements are related. Three options have been discussed in the literature for
predicates like know: (i) ambiguous accounts that posit two lexical item which take dif-
ferent complements (Karttunen 1977, George 2011); (ii) reductive accounts that posit one
lexical item which takes one kind of complement, where interrogative complements are
reduced to declarative complements or vice versa (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984, Spec-
tor and Egre 2015, Uegaki 2015); and (iii) uniform accounts where the two complement
types are posited to have the same denotation (Ciardelli et al. 2013, 2015, Theiler 2014,
Theiler et al. 2016). If the two complements are underlyingly related, as in the reductive
or ambiguity accounts, knowledge about instances of know Q would be informative about
instances of know p and vice versa.
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1.5.5 Utility of indirect cues
Now that we have seen what these “indirect” cues entail, how useful are they in
comparison to the more “direct” discourse status cues? For indirect cues there are perhaps
two big challenges. The first would be the requirements that they place upon the child and
the kind of child-internal linking principles between syntax and semantics or between
pragmatics and semantics that must be brought to bear if children can use these cues
to infer anything about the meaning of know and think from their distributions. The
second would be that for pragmatic bootstrapping to work, the child would need to be
sensitive to the intended illocutionary force of their interlocutors’ utterances. But this
could potentially backfire. Indeed, know and think can sometimes be used for other kinds
of indirect speech acts, such as indirect commands (e.g., Don’t you know I just cleaned
that up? and I think it’s time for bed). What would prevent the child from inferring that
the underlying meanings of know and think express some kind of preference given that
they can be used for indirect commands (in the same way they might infer want expresses
a preference via its routine usage in indirect requests such as I want you to go to bed!, see
Hacquard and Lidz (under review) and discussion in Chapter 2)?
Following proposals by Hacquard (2014) and Hacquard and Lidz (under review), I
would like to suggest that pragmatic and syntactic bootstrapping might work in tandem,
and mutually constrain the kinds of hypotheses that learners will entertain for the mean-
ings of know and think. Generally, we know that the meaning of an expression is related
to both (i) what kinds of sentences that expression occurs in and (ii) what speakers use
that expression to achieve. Either of these links can be error-prone, but when interpreted
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in conjunction, any particular counterexample may be distinguishable from truly infor-
mative data. What could be particularly powerful in the case of know and think is that
there is an alignment across different aspects of the signal that children are exposed to.
According to the pragmatic-syntactic bootstrapping hypothesis for attitude verb meanings
(Hacquard 2014, Hacquard and Lidz under review), the learner makes use of both syn-
tactic and pragmatic cues to home in on an attitude verb meaning. Different classes of
attitude predicates take different types of complements, and this syntactic/semantics map-
ping is principled, in accordance with the traditional syntactic bootstrapping view. Verbs
that express belief (think, know, say, etc.) in English take finite complements, verbs that
express preferences take non-finite complements (want, order, tell, etc.). But the same
belief/desire split is tracked differently in different languages (e.g., mood selection in Ro-
mance, word order in German), in a way that could be challenging for a learner using
syntactic cues to figure out verb meaning (how does a learner of German know to pay at-
tention to word order cues, as opposed to mood?). Here is where pragmatic bootstrapping
comes in handy: these different syntactic cues all converge at a more abstract level: belief
verbs, but not desire verbs, in these various languages all take complements that have
syntactic hallmarks of declarative clauses in the respective languages (e.g., finiteness in
English, indicative mood in Romance, verb second in German), the clause type typically
associated with assertions.
How would this pragmatic-syntactic approach work for know and think? Know
often occurs in utterances like Do you know Q which function as indirect questions and
that have embedded questions as complements. These pragmatic and syntactic cues would
converge to suggest that know is the kind of verb which relates the attitude holder to the
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true answer to Q. In contrast, think often occurs in utterances like I think p which function
as indirect assertions and have complements that express propositions. These cues could
converge to tell the learner that think is the kind of verb which expresses the commitment
of the attitude holder to the embedded proposition. But, when the indirect speech act and
the syntactic complement do not line up (as in indirect requests uses of think sentences),
the learner may know to refrain from making conclusions about the verbs’ meaning.
1.6 This dissertation
To sum up, this dissertation pursues the idea that indirect speech act uses of attitude
verbs both hinder and help the learner, depending on the grain size at which they approach
the mapping problem. In order to do this, I first develop hypotheses about which types of
information would in principle be informative about the factivity/veridicality distinction.
With respect to the relevant contrasts between know and think, there are at least three
possible sources of information:
• Direct cues from the status of the complements in a discourse (Do they express
information which is true or false? Do they express information which is part of the
common ground or not? Does this differ between the verbs?)
• Indirect cues from the syntactic distributions (What kinds of complements do the
verbs embed? Do they differ?)
• Indirect cues from the pragmatic distributions (What kinds of conversational goals
do speakers have in using the verbs? Do they differ?)
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In Chapter 2, I describe the target knowledge of know and think that children must
acquire and describe the semantic, syntactic and pragmatic properties of the two verbs and
related words. I discuss different theories of how presuppositions are related to triggers
and whether there are syntactic and pragmatic correlates of the factivity and veridicality
distinctions.
In Chapter 3, I review evidence which suggests that, in principle, children have in
place by three years the requisite conceptual knowledge, abilities and mechanisms that
they would need in order to observe the direct consequences of the contrasts, or indirect
consequences of them.
In Chapter 4, I ask when children finally figure out the factivity distinction, so that
we know which ages we need to explore the input for. I find that children start to master
this distinction as early as 3, but there is a lot of individual variation in when this occurs,
so we will have plenty of room to look at which input differences, if any, are related.
In Chapter 5, I investigate which types of evidence are potential cues in children’s
actual experience, through the first corpus study which examines these aspects of chil-
dren’s experience with know and think. This corpus study finds that although the verbs
occur relatively frequently, discourse status cues are relatively infrequent. Additionally,
the discourse status differences between the complements of know and think are essen-
tially neutralized. This neutralization comes from the fact that know is often used to
introduce information that is not already part of the common ground and that think is
often used “assertively”. As a result, discourse status cues are sparse in the input, and
could even lead children to map KNOW to think. In contrast, indirect cues from syntactic
distributions and discourse functions are found to be prevalent and clearly distinguish the
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verbs. Know embeds both interrogative and declarative complements, while think embeds
only declaratives. And know is used to ask and answer questions while think is used to
proffer information. Evidence from multiple corpora are considered and, on average, even
children with different input receive the same kinds of evidence underlyingly, on average.
In Chapter 6, I develop methods for examining the relationship between input cues
and children’s ultimate understanding of the verbs. Getting away from average input,
what is the nature of the relationship between input and children’s understanding of the
contrast? Is individual variation in children’s input related to individual variation in chil-
dren’s understanding of know’s factivity?
In Chapter 7, I summarize the findings of the empirical studies reported in the dis-
sertation, and what implications they have for the acquisition of know and think.
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Chapter 2
Semantics, syntax and pragmatics background
2.1 Semantics of know and think
When we ask when and how children begin to uncover the subtle contrast between
know and think, what is it that they are uncovering? In the grand scheme of word mean-
ings, know and think are quite similar; both can be used to describe a subject’s beliefs
(18-19). But they differ in two subtle dimensions: their veridicality and their factivity.
Know is a veridical verb and think is not: only x thinks p sentences such as (18) can be
used to describe false beliefs, while x knows p sentences like (19) necessarily describe
“true” beliefs. Factive verbs like know furthermore presuppose the truth of the proposi-
tion expressed by their complements. Thus, while the speaker of both (18) and (19) can be
taken to assert (20a), only the speaker of (19) must assume that (20b) is also true. Thus, in
acquiring a word like know and its non-veridical and non-factive counterpart think, chil-
dren face a complex task; they must determine that know both entails and backgrounds
the truth of its complement, while think does not.
(18) John thinks that Mary is home.
(19) John knows that Mary is home.
(20) a. John has the belief that Mary is home.
b. Mary is home.
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2.1.1 Presuppositions
Speaker presuppositions arise when a “speaker takes something for granted in per-
forming an illocutionary act” (Karttunen and Peters 1979). Certain expressions known
as presupposition triggers are conventionally associated with presupposed content: their
use seems to consistently trigger a particular presupposition. Presupposition triggers in-
clude clefts (Delin and Oberlander 1995, Prince 1986), aspectual verbs (Simons 2001,
Abusch 2002), factives (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1970), definite descriptions (Strawson,
1950), and names (Van der Sandt, 1992).
At first blush, presupposition triggers tend to exhibit the same set of related core
properties (Stalnaker 1973, Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000, Simons 2001, Abusch
2002, Abusch 2010, Abbott 2006, Roberts 2012, Tonhauser et al. 2013). First, presup-
positions typically project out of contexts where other entailments are canceled: the pre-
supposition in (21) survives in (22). Second, triggers are typically infelicitous out of the
blue (e.g., (21) uttered discourse-initially), because of their unsupported presuppositions.
Finally, because presuppositions are backgrounded, their content cannot serve as a felic-
itous answer to a question (e.g., (21) is an infelicitous answer to questions about John’s
dinner but a felicitous answer to a question about John’s breakfast).
(21) John had wine for breakfast too.
(22) a. It’s not true that John had wine for breakfast too.
b. Did John have wine for breakfast too?
c. John might have had wine for breakfast too.
d. If John had wine for breakfast too, the lunch meeting will go terribly.
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But, not all presupposition triggers share the same pattern of behavior (Chierchia
and McConnell-Ginet 2000, Simons 2001, Abbott 2006, Klinedinst 2010, Charlow 2009,
Chemla 2009, Fox 2012). The presuppositions of “soft triggers” (Abusch 2010) seem to
be more easily defeasible than that of other triggers (Abusch’s “hard triggers”). Examples
of soft and hard triggers are given in (23-24).
(23) Soft triggers: cognitive factives, change-of-state and achievement predicates
(24) Hard triggers: too, even, it-clefts, emotive factives(?)
Unlike hard triggers (those with the properties discussed above), the presupposed con-
tent of soft triggers can provide interlocutors with information that was not already com-
mon knowledge, and thus be uttered discourse initially (25), address the Question Un-
der Discussion (QUD) (26), and fail to project out of entailment-canceling operators
(27) (Karttunen 1971b, Stalnaker 1974, Gazdar 1979, van der Sandt 1992, Chierchia
and McConnell-Ginet 2000, Simons 2001, Beaver 2004, Abbott 2006 and Romoli 2011,
among many others).
(25) John hasn’t stopping drinking wine for breakfast.
(26) a. Has John had a drinking problem?
b. He stopped drinking wine for breakfast last week!
(27) John hasn’t stopped drinking wine for breakfast because he never, in fact, had a
habit of doing so.
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2.1.1.1 Cognitive vs. emotive factives
Factives can be roughly divided into two classes: ones that express cognitive states
and ones that express emotive states. Cognitive factives (e.g., realize, discover, forget)
take true complements, and the truth of the complement is furthermore typically pre-
supposed (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970, Karttunen 1971, Hooper and Thompson 1973,
Hooper 1975). Cognitive factives are a prime example of soft triggers, given that their
presuppositions are easily defeasible (see 28 from Karttunen 1971).
(28) If I realize later that I have not told the truth, I will confess it to everyone.
Emotive factives (e.g., regret, hate, be happy) have an additional entailment that the sub-
ject has an emotional attitude towards that complement. Emotive factives background
not only the truth of their complement, like cognitive factives, but also that their subject
believes the complement to be true. As we see in the following set of sentences, both (29)
and (30) presuppose (31a) and (31b).
(29) John hates that it is raining.
(30) If John hates that it’s raining.
(31) a. It’s raining
b. John thinks that it’s raining
While cognitive factives are generally assumed to be soft triggers, the status of
emotive factives is more controversial. Abbott (2006) assumes that they are hard triggers,
based on the fact that their presuppositions seem to survive in Karttunen’s (1971) contexts
(32), in contrast to cognitive factives (28).
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(32) If I am happy later that I did not tell the truth, I won’t confess it to everyone.
Simons (2007) and Abrusán (2011), however, assume that all factives are soft triggers.
Support for this comes from the fact that they seem acceptable in ignorance contexts, like
cognitive factives (compare 33a with 33b modified from Simons 2001).
(33) Upon noticing a couple arguing at the next table:
a. Perhaps she’s not happy that he’s having an affair.
b. Perhaps she’s discovered that he’s having an affair.
The status of know is also controversial. Its presupposition seems less easily cance-
lable than other cognitive factives (compare 34 to 28 and 32).
(34) If I know later that I have not told the truth, I will confess it to everyone.
Yet its presupposition is often not contextually-supported (35), at least in naturalistic
speech between adults. Utterances of x knows p can be used when the addressee has
no reason to take the truth of the complement for granted: discourse initial uses of x
knows p are felicitous and the majority of uses of x knows p in speech between adults are,
in fact, “informative” in that they provide hearers with new information (Spenader 2003).
Second, Simons (2007) shows that the complement of know can provide content which
addresses the QUD (36). Lastly, p does not always project out of family-of-sentences
contexts with x knows p, as in examples provided by Beaver (2010), including (37).
(35) a. Did you know that John won the lottery? (uttered discourse initially)
b. No, I didn’t. That’s amazing!
(36) a. Where was Louise yesterday?
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b. I know from Henry that she was in Princeton. (from Simons 2007)
(37) . . . I haven’t tried this with wombats though, and if anyone discovers that the
method is also wombat-proof, I’d really like to know. (Beaver, 2010, ex. 32)
The cluster of properties in (35-37) might make know seem no different from a non-
factive verb like think—at least with respect to its status as a presupposition trigger. To
compare with know, think has “assertive” or “evidential” uses (Urmson 1952, Hooper
1975, Simons 2007, see Section 2.3 for more details). As a result, it can be used to
provide new information (38), to address the QUD (39), and the complement of think can
even appear to project, even when the complement of know does not (see 40 modified
slightly from Simons et al. 2017).
(38) I think that Mary won the lottery! (uttered discourse initially)
(39) a. Where’s Mary?
b. I think she’s at home.
(40) Q: Why is it taking Phil so long to get back here?
A: He doesn’t know that the car’s parked in the garage! (while Phil is incorrectly
searching on the street)
A’: He doesn’t think that the car’s parked in the garage! (while Phil is stubbornly
searching on the street)
2.1.1.2 “Informative” presuppositions
Practically speaking, there are many ‘informative’ uses of soft presupposition trig-
gers (41), where the relevant presupposed content is not something that all interlocutors
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can take for granted (Karttunen 1974, Stalnaker 1998, 2008, Abbott 2000, 2008, Simons
2001, Spenader 2002, Spenader 2003, Gauker 1998, von Fintel 2008).
(41) a. We regret that children cannot accompany their parents to commencement
exercises. (Karttunen 1974)
b. I can’t come to the meeting because I have to pick up my cat at the veterinar-
ian. (Stalnaker 1998)
These informative cases provide interlocutors with new information: (41a) can be used
to inform attendees of the commencement exercises that children are not welcome, and
(41b) can be used to inform an interlocutor that the speaker has a pet cat. But these should
be considered presupposition triggers, because projection still obtains (42)1.
(42) a. It’s not true that we regret that children cannot accompany their parents to
commencement exercises.
b. If I can’t come to the meeting because I have to pick up my cat at the veteri-
narian, then they might fire me.
So these data present a puzzle. Under the classic view, felicitous use of a sentence
like (41b) or (42b) would require that the information that the speaker has a cat be part
of the common ground—so that all interlocutors can take it for granted—otherwise some
kind of infelicity should obtain. But the sentences in (41a-42b) can all be uttered felici-
tously even when their presuppositions are not supported in the common ground. What
should we do in the face of this puzzle? Abandon our definition of presupposition triggers
1Although see Tonhauser et al. 2013 for discussion of non-presuppositional phenomena which also
project.
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(Gauker 1998, 2008), or sweep these cases under the carpet as not truly presuppositional,
at least in the sense that hard triggers are presuppositional (Wilson 1975, Boer and Lycan
1976, Simons 2003, Abbott 2006, Simons et al. 2010, Tonhauser et al. 2012)? What we
make of these ‘informative’ cases will depend on how we tackle the triggering problem,
or how we think that presuppositions come to be associated with triggers in the first place.
2.1.2 The triggering problem
The literature on presupposition triggering asks how different expressions get to
be associated with their presuppositions, and the differences between soft and hard trig-
gers motivate different kinds of accounts. Under semantic accounts (Heim 1983, among
others), presupposed content is conventionally associated with its trigger. In contrast,
pragmatic accounts (Stalnaker 1974, among others) argue that presuppositions are con-
versationally derived from general conversational principles.
2.1.2.1 Semantic theories
Semantic accounts, following Strawson (1950) and Frege (1948), define presup-
positions according to patterns of entailment. For example, A is taken to presuppose B
just in case B is true whether A is true or false. If both A and ¬A entail B, then A pre-
supposes B. Under this kind of account, a presupposition can be seen as a precondition
for successful assertions. For example, if a sentence presupposes p, then the question of
the sentence’s truth can only arise if p is true. Adopting this perspective, authors such
as Karttunen (1974), Heim (1983, 1992) and Van der Sandt (1992) treat presuppositions
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as constraints imposed on the conversational context that are arbitrarily specified in the
lexicon.
According to Lewis (1979), following on suggestions by Karttunen (1974) and Stal-
naker (1974), there is a way to handle “informative” presuppositions, maintain semantic
theories such as the classic view and keeping triggers like regret and my X within the fam-
ily of presuppositional phenomena under semantic theories, but explaining away these
inconvenient cases: presupposition accommodation (43):
(43) If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and
if P is not presupposed just before t, then - ceteris paribus and within certain
limits - presupposition P comes in existence at t. (Lewis 1979, p340)
But accommodation is a powerful tool, and many authors have struggled with whether
or how to constrain it (Thomason 1990, Stalnaker 1998, von Fintel 2008, Roberts 2015).
One option discussed by Roberts (1996) constrains accommodation via presupposition
recognition; in order to accommodate a presupposition, one has to (i) recognize that there
was a presupposition, and then (ii) recognize what the content of that presupposition was
(as intended by the speaker). And it might also be true that one has to (iii) decide that
this is the kind of content that one should be willing to accommodate, in this context
(e.g., because the speaker is an authority, or because the information is not controversial).
As a result, presupposition failure should occur when presupposition recognition fails.
For competent adult speakers of the language, this first step should be trivial when a
presupposition trigger is used, so everyday cases of presupposition failure should hang on
(ii) and (iii).
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So the ease of accommodation and therefore the felicity of unsupported presuppo-
sitions should be correlated with the ease of (ii) and (iii). Holding (iii) constant, let’s
consider the effect of (ii). Accommodation is easier when the specific content of the pre-
supposition is easier to retrieve. We would predict that sentences with soft triggers like
know wear their presuppositional content on their sleeve (44), while sentences with hard
triggers like too would not (45).
(44) Did you know that John is having dinner in New York tonight?
(45) # Tonight, John is having dinner in New York, too. (Kripke 1990)
And this prediction holds up. The would-be presupposed content for (44) is carried in
the sentence itself, so knowing that know p presupposes p, a hearer could easily identify
what presupposition was intended. In contrast, the would-be presupposed content of (45)
is mostly extra-sentential. We know that the presupposition will be something along the
lines of “some other event parallel to John’s having dinner in NY also happened”, but
exactly what that event would be we cannot know without the discourse context (and
identification of the focus associate of too).
With respect to cognitive factives, any account must also capture the ease with
which their presuppositions are “canceled”, or fail to project. For semantic accounts, this
would mean that the presuppositions are often accommodated locally. In addition to this
mechanism of “global” accommodation where we can enrich the context to support an
unsupported presupposition, so-called “local” accommodation accounts for cases where
presuppositions do not project (Heim, 1983). Alternatively, for pragmatic accounts, can-
cellation is expected because presuppositions are conversationally derived.
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2.1.2.2 Pragmatic theories
In contrast to semantic accounts, pragmatic accounts sidestep the need for accom-
modation because they treat presuppositions as constraints on what the speaker can do
with a presupposition trigger and the conditions that must be met in order to felicitously
and successfully utter sentences with this trigger (Karttunen 1974, Kempson 1975, Wil-
son 1975, Boer and Lycan 1976, Karttunen and Peters 1979, Levinson 1983, Chierchia
and McConnell-Ginet 2000, Kadmon 2001, Simons 2001, 2004, Atlas 2005, Abrusan
2011). Under Stalnaker’s proposal, the constraints are based on the entailments associ-
ated with a presupposition trigger (Stalnaker 1973, 1974). Presuppositions arise, given
general conversational principles (Grice 1989), when what is uttered has too many con-
tributions to make. Since it is unorderly to make multiple contributions at once, one
contribution gets foregrounded (or asserted), the others backgrounded (or presupposed).
Stalnaker, however, fails to explain which contribution gets backgrounded. Subsequent
pragmatic accounts try to resolve this by aiming to derive which contributions tend to be
backgrounded, often using alternative-based accounts (Hamblin 1973, Rooth 1985).
For Abusch (2010), soft triggers bring to mind lexical alternatives. Given the ad-
ditional pragmatic assumption that one of the alternatives must be true, any entailment
shared by all the alternatives will be presupposed (see also Chemla 2010, Romoli 2015).
For example, the soft trigger win has as its alternative lose (46). Under Abusch’s account
one of the alternatives must be true. One thing that the alternatives in (46) share is the fact
that John participated in the race, which is the presupposition that we get for win (47).
Similar reasoning applies for other triggers, such as stop (48-49).
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(46) a. John won the race (presupposes: John participated in the race)
b. John lost the race (presupposes: John participated in the race)
(47) John didn’t win the race (presupposes: John participated in the race)
(48) a. John stopped smoking (presupposes: John used to smoke)
b. John continued smoking (presupposes: John used to smoke)
(49) John didn’t stop smoking (presupposes: John used to smoke)
For Simons and colleagues (e.g., Simons 2001, Simons et al. 2010, 2014), contributions
that do not address the QUD get backgrounded (and thus project). Accordingly, any
entailment can, in principle, be backgrounded. Abrusan (2011) keeps from Simons et
al. the idea that what projects is what is not at-issue (i.e., what is not “main point”), but
provides soft triggers a grammatically-based “default” main point.
Several pragmatic accounts of factivity (Stalnaker 1974, Simons 2001) propose that
factive sentences like (50) have (at least) two relevant entailments: a doxastic entailment
(x believes p) that is typically foregrounded (51a) and a veridical entailment (p) which is
typically backgrounded (51b).
(50) John knows that Mary is home.
(51) a. John has the belief that Mary is home.
b. Mary is home.
For Stalnaker (1974), both of these entailments cannot be put forward at once given that
they are independent of each other, so—to be orderly—one of the entailments gets back-
grounded. However, this account fails to predict that the p entailment is the one which
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is typically backgrounded. Following Stalnaker, several authors have tried to provide ac-
counts for why p gets backgrounded (Simons 2001, Abusch 2002, 2010, Abrusan 2011,
Tonhauser et al. 2013, Simons et al. 2017, among others). For example, Tonhauser et al.
(2013) propose that what gets backgrounded is anything that doesn’t address the QUD or
get presupposed by all the relevant alternative answers to the QUD. In response, Abrusan
(2011) points out that this may be too permissive, and argues for a default grammatical
main point: any entailment about the running time of the main event is “main point”. The
rest can be backgrounded, unless it is targeted by the QUD or focus. For Abusch (2002,
2010), be aware and know evoke the lexical alternative be unaware. Since both alterna-
tives entail p, it follows that p is true, under the defeasible assumption that at least one of
the alternatives is true. Simons et al. (2017) propose a similar account that derives the
relevant alternatives pragmatically instead of lexically.
While the original Stalnakerian view leaves open the possibility that all presupposi-
tion triggering is pragmatic, Stalnaker himself admits that some presupposition may need
to be arbitrarily specified in the lexicon. The recent pragmatic accounts of presuppositions
all concern soft triggers, and aim at capturing the ease with which their presuppositions
can be canceled, in comparison with those of hard triggers. Thus hard triggers may be
semantic presuppositions. One prominent view for hard triggers is that the presupposed
content is anaphoric (e.g., Roberts 1986). Hence presuppositions may form a heteroge-
neous class and be triggered form different sources (although see Abrusan 2016).
All of these accounts suffer some short-comings. The semantic theory requires
rampant local accommodation. Is this something that we should posit and why should
this occur with soft triggers but not hard triggers? As for the pragmatic accounts, lin-
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guistic expressions come with all kinds of entailments (e.g., event predicates entail that
the event takes place in time and space). What decides which of them should be part of
the backgrounding calculus and which of the entailments should be backgrounded? For
know, why the veridical entailment, rather than the doxastic entailment? As pointed out
by Abusch (2002, 2010), this is particularly dire, given the existence of a predicate like be
right which seems to have roughly the same entailments as know, but tends to background
the doxastic entailment (54a) and foreground the veridical entailment (54b).2
(52) John knows that Mary and Bill are having an affair.
(53) John is right that Mary and Bill are having an affair.
(54) a. John has the belief that Mary and Bill are having an affair.
b. Mary and Bill are having an affair.
2.1.3 Semantic vs. pragmatic accounts and implications for acquisition
What implications do these different accounts have for the language learning prob-
lem? Consider how the learner would discover that a lexical item triggers a presuppo-
sition. We can assume (not uncontroversially) that the learner knows antecedently that
presupposition triggers exist, and perhaps even which kinds of words might trigger pre-
suppositions. It is hard to imagine what kind of experience would reveal this, if it was
not already known by the learner. But the learner still has the difficult mapping task of
deciding exactly which lexical items trigger presuppositions, and this will have to come
2Note that this problem may not be fatal if be right and know are not fully symmetrical (see Schlenker
2010, Anand and Hacquard 2014, Anand 2016).
44
through their experiences with the lexical items.
For semantic accounts, the link between the presupposed content and the rest of the
trigger’s meaning would be arbitrary, so uncovering the presupposition would be inde-
pendent from learning about other aspects of the trigger. In fact, the learner would have
to directly observe that there is a speaker presupposition that is reliably associated with
the trigger in order to conclude that it is a trigger. Thus, triggers which are relatively
soft and occur in lots of ‘informative’ cases such as those in (41) would present a clear
challenge to the learner. Global accommodation helps to rescue the semantic theory from
these cases, but it cannot rescue the learner. You must recognize a presupposition in order
to accommodate it. If the learner does not already recognize the presupposition, they will
have no evidence for it in these ‘informative’ cases.
In contrast, pragmatic accounts would constrain the learning problem quite differ-
ently. Although it is still an active area of interest exactly how pragmatic accounts work,
they make the presupposition a consequence of other aspects of the verbs meaning. Thus,
uncovering the presupposition is not independent from learning other things about the
trigger, and thus ‘soft’ triggers would not pose such a challenge for the learner; they
might not be able to directly notice that these triggers reliably occur with speaker pre-
suppositions, but they would be able to notice other, more indirect consequences. And
‘informative’ uses of ‘soft’ triggers might even help to highlight the would-be presup-
posed content as an entailment.
And specifically for the case of know, pragmatic accounts might be the most ex-
planatory. ‘Informative’ uses are prevalent in speech between adults (Spenader 2003),
and might also be prevalent in speech to children. If so, these uses will obscure know’s
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underlying factivity. If they help to highlight that the complement is entailed, they might
help the learner to uncover the veridicality contrast with think. Would this be enough to
also get the factivity contrast off the ground? Can we derive factivity from veridicality?
2.1.4 Relationship between factivity and veridicality
At first blush, veridicality and factivity seem to be correlated. Predicates like
know and discover that entail (55a,56a) their complements, also presuppose (55b,56b)
them. And predicates like argue and be certain neither entail (57a,58a) nor presuppose
(57b,58b) their complements.
(55) a. John knew that Mary is a linguist [# but in fact Mary is not one]
b. Did John know that Mary is a linguist?
(56) a. John discovered that Mary is a linguist [# but in fact Mary is not one]
b. Did John discover that Mary is a linguist?
(57) a. John argued that Mary is a linguist [but in fact Mary is not one]
b. Did John argue that Mary is a linguist?
(58) a. John was certain that Mary is a linguist [but in fact Mary is not one]
b. Was John certain that Mary is a linguist?
But there are also predicates which suggest that veridicality and factivity are not
perfectly related. For example, both demonstrate and be right entail their complements
(59a,60a), but neither presupposes its complement (59b,60b).
(59) a. John demonstrated that Mary is a linguist [# but in fact Mary is not one]
46
b. Did John demonstrate that Mary is a linguist?
(60) a. John was right that Mary is a linguist [# but in fact Mary is not one]
b. Was John right that Mary is a linguist?
While these examples clearly show that not all veridicals are factive, Anand and
Hacquard (2014) have argued that there is a relationship between veridicality and fac-
tivity, at least within certain subclasses of attitudes. Within the class of doxastic—or
belief—predicates, all the veridicals are factive and the non-veridicals are non-factive,
while predicates like demonstrate and be right are not doxastic, but instead communica-
tive verbs. This perspective suggests that the link between veridicality and factivity may
be principled, as advocated by pragmatic theories of factivity. If so, the consequence
would be that the learning problem is simplified. Children would only need to discover
that know is veridical and think is not, in order to get the factivity contrast off the ground.
2.2 Syntax of know and think
Know and think have very similar meanings in the grand scheme of things, and the
syntactic distributions that they can occur in are relatively similar as well. Both verbs take
declarative complements (61) and prepositional complements (62), and neither verb can
occur with an indirect object even though other verbs can (63).
(61) a. John thinks that Mary is a linguist.
b. John knows that Mary is a linguist.
(62) a. John thinks about the rumor.
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b. John knows about the rumor.
(63) a. * John thinks Bill that Mary is a linguist.
b. * John knows Bill that Mary is a linguist.
c. John tells Bill that Mary is a linguist.
But there are also differences in the kinds of complements that they can take. Know,
unlike think, can embed both nominal (64) and interrogative (65) complements.
(64) a. * John thinks the rumor.
b. John knows the rumor.
(65) a. * John thinks whether is a linguist.
b. John knows whether Mary is a linguist.
2.2.1 Question embedding and relation to semantics
Verbs like know are “responsive” verbs, in that they can embed both declarative and
interrogative complements (Lahiri, 2002). To see this, we can compare know to similar
but non-factive and non-veridical verbs think and wonder:
(66) a. John knows that Mary is home.
b. John thinks that Mary is home.
c. * John wonders that Mary is home.
(67) a. John knows where Mary is/whether she is home
b. * John thinks where Mary is/whether she is home
c. John wonders where Mary is/whether she is home
48
Many authors have noted the correlation between factivity or veridicality and ques-
tion embedding3, (Hintikka 1975, Ginzburg 1995, Egré 2008, among others). Know, but
not think or wonder, is a responsive verb because it can embed both kinds of comple-
ments. And only know is a veridical verb, and it is veridical with respect to both of its
complements. Out of the sentences in (66), only (66a) entails that Mary is home. And
out of the sentences in (67), only (67a) entails that John knows Mary’s location. How-
ever, there are some counterexamples to the generalization that responsives are factives
or veridicals. For example, decide is responsive (68a), but it is does not entail (68b) or
presuppose (68c) its complement.
(68) a. John decided who is a linguist
b. John decided that Mary is a linguist [but in fact Mary is not one]
c. Did John decided that Mary is a linguist?
But this kind of example is not entirely surprising. Consider the kind of relations that
responsive predicates might express. When they embed declarative complements they
might express a relation between an individual and a proposition, which could be false
or true4. When they embed interrogative complements they might express an answer
to a question, which could be any old answer or it could be the true answer. If so, it
would make sense that responsive predicates could be either non-veridical or veridical,
depending on the type of relation that they express and the relationship between their
3This section largely sets aside discussion of emotive factives like regret, love. Including them would
substantially complicate the picture here, which is already quite complicated.
4We might also call true propositions “facts” (Fine 1982, Parsons 1993, Harman 2003, Moltmann 2003,
King 2007, among others.
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different kinds of complements.
How are the complements in (66a) and (67a) related? Three options have been
discussed in the literature for responsive predicates like know: (i) ambiguous accounts
that posit two lexical item which take different complements (Karttunen 1977, George
2011); (ii) reductive accounts that posit one lexical item which takes one kind of comple-
ment, where interrogative complements are reduced to declarative complements or vice
versa (Groenendijk et al. 1984, Spector and Egré 2015, Uegaki 2015); and (iii) uniform
accounts where the two complement types are posited to have the same denotation (Cia-
rdelli et al. 2013, Ciardelli et al. 2015, Theiler 2014, Theiler et al. 2016). If the two
complements are underlyingly related, as in the reductive or ambiguity accounts, knowl-
edge about instances of know Q would be informative about instances of know p and vice
versa.
2.2.2 Implications for acquisition
We have seen that know and think occur in some overlapping syntactic frames, but
not others. For example, both verbs can take declarative complements, but only know
can take interrogative complements. Furthermore, we have seen that responsive verbs,
which are those that can take both declarative and interrogative complements, are also
veridical and factive, at least within the subclass of doxastic verbs. What implications
do these facts have for the language learning problem? Essentially, these facts open up a
syntactic boostrapping approach to uncovering the underlying meaning contrast between
know and think. Syntactic bootstrapping (which is introduced in greater detail in Chapter
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3) is a learning strategy that exploits principled links between a word’s meaning and its
syntactic distribution (Landau and Gleitman 1985, Lasnik 1989, Gleitman 1990, Naigles
1990, Lidz 2006). If the links are not principled, than bootstrapping would not provide
much explanatory power, because it would require a story about how the unprincipled
links were uncovered by the learner. In the theoretical literature, it’s still not settled
whether these links between syntactic distribution and factivity are principled, or exactly
what they are (e.g., something as simple as responsiveness, or something more complex,
see for example White and Rawlins 2016). But without settling the theoretical debates,
we can still ask whether children are exposed to the right kinds of distributions to use a
syntactic bootstrapping approach with know and think. What would this approach look
like?
First, children might notice that know and think embed sentential complements,
such as in (66a), and infer that they are propositional attitude verbs that express a relation
between an individual and a proposition (as opposed to, for example, eventive verbs like
kick which express a relation between individuals). Next, they might notice that know and
think do not occur in contexts that communicative verbs occur in, such those in (69-70),
and infer that they are doxastic verbs. Finally, they might notice that know is a responsive
verb since it also takes interrogative complements, and infer that it is a veridical verb (and
thus also a factive, at least under pragmatic accounts of factivity).
(69) a. * The book knows that Mary is the murderer
b. * The book discovers that Mary is the murderer
c. * The book thinks that Mary is the murderer
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d. * The book wonders who the murderer is
e. The book is right that Mary is the murderer
f. The book demonstrates that Mary is the murderer
g. The book tells us that/whether Mary is the murderer
(70) a. * John thought/knew/discovered to us that Mary is the murderer
b. John said/demonstrated/argued to us that Mary is the murderer
This can give rise to a picture where there are many types of predicates, but only one
set of factives (see Figure 2.1). Or there could be a more complicated picture because
there could be a more complex set of linking principles where more than just question
embedding is at play (see White and Rawlins 2016).
2.3 Pragmatics of know and think
We rarely mean exactly what we literally say, and we often say things intending to
get our interlocutors to perform some kind of behavior. To illustrate, (71-72) can both
function as prompts for someone to shut the door to the seminar room.
(71) Would you be willing to shut the door?
(72) Can you shut the door?
What we infer the speaker to intend varies depending on what we know about the con-
versational context and the interlocutors, but there are some ways that this inference can
be constrained (Grice 1957, Searle 1975). For Searle (1975), the sentences in (71-72) can
52
Figure 2.1: Types of predicates
# predicates class factive? veridical? responsive?
I think privative no no no
II wonder privative no no no
III be certain privative no no yes
IV know privative yes yes yes
V argue communicative no no no
VI tell communicative no no yes
VII be right communicative no yes no
VIII demonstrate communicative no yes yes
serve as indirect speech acts, when uttered, because they express conditions on successful
performance of such an indirect speech act, including preparatory conditions, proposi-
tional content conditions and sincerity conditions. For example, (72) is a question about
the addressee’s abilities that can function as a request to have the door closed because
such a request could not be fulfilled if the addressee wasn’t able to do so (preparatory
condition).
We also perform indirect speech acts with like know and think (73-74). Literally,
(73) is a question about the addressee’s knowledge and (74) is a statement about the
speaker’s beliefs, but we tend to use these kinds of sentences to do more than talk about
beliefs and knowledge.
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(73) Do you know where the restrooms are? (intending: Where are the restrooms?)
(74) I think it’s time for lunch. (intending: It’s lunchtime.)
Like other so-called “assertives” (Hooper 1975), think can be used this way because it can
be used to report on the speaker’s belief or to proffer the content of the embedded clause
(see also Urmson 1952, Simons 2007). In principle, asserting something is different from
asserting that you believe it, but in practice, the difference is neutralized. To see the
difference, when we utter sentences like (74), out beliefs are not always at issue. Consider
(76) and (77) as answers to the question in (75).
(75) What time is it?
(76) I think it’s 3pm.
(77) I don’t know what time it is.
These seem like felicitous answers even though mental states weren’t raised as relevant
by the question. In fact, (77), or other references to ignorance, are potentially the only
felicitous way to respond to the question if no answer is available. Why? Well, an analysis
along the lines of Searle (1975) can naturally be extended here to say that even a direct
speech act like (75) could not be asked without meeting some preparatory conditions; we
can only truthfully, felicitously ask information-seeking questions of our interlocutors if
we assume they have the beliefs or knowledge about the answers. Notice how ubiquitous
this is: whether interpreting indirect speech acts or direct speech acts, the beliefs of our
interlocutors are always implicated.
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2.3.1 Implications for acquisition
We have seen that know and think have different sets of discourse functions. Know
can be used to ask (73) or answer (77) questions, while think can be used to proffer
information (74). What implications does this have for the language learning problem?
As discussed in Chapter 1, the ‘assertivity’ of think (Urmson 1952, Hooper 1975,
Simons 2007) might create some issues for the language learner who is trying to directly
observe consequences of the veridicality contrast between the verbs. If speakers regularly
use think sentences to proffer the complement, it might seem to the learner like they are
endorsing it, and therefore that it is true. If so, this might diminish the chances that
the learner would have to use discourse status of the complement cues to uncover the
veridicality contrast between know and think.
Such pragmatic enrichments with know and think could potentially create a further
acquisition challenge, as children need to untangle pragmatic from semantic contribu-
tions. However, under a pragmatic bootstrapping approach, these indirect speech acts,
if systematic enough, could in fact be a feature, and not a bug for the learner, as they
could provide valuable cues about the underlying meanings of know and think. This is
provided that children understand enough about what the speaker is trying to get across to
understand the illocutionary force of the indirect speech acts that they are exposed to (see
Chapter 3 for more details on why we believe that children can do this). However, there
are potential challenges to the pragmatic bootstrapping approach. Consider the nature of
parent-child conversations. Parents often use language to direct their children’s behavior,
and there is an inherent power imbalance between parents and children. In such cases,
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almost any type of utterance could function as a command (e.g., I want you to go to bed,
I think it’s time for bed, You know it’s bedtime, right?). But we would not want children
to conclude that want, think and know all have desire meanings. As discussed in Chapter
1, and revisited later in Chapters 5 and 6, pragmatic bootstrapping may work best when




When do children have the relevant abilities and mechanisms in place to be able to
use the four potential routes laid out in Chapter 1? In order to even solve the mapping
problem for know and think, they must have access to mental state concepts like belief
and knowledge. In order to use discourse status cues to veridicality, they must be able
to recognize what is true with respect to some standard, and in order to use discourse
status cues to factivity, they must be able to recognize what information they share with
others around them. If children are using the syntactic bootstrapping approach for know
and think, we would want some evidence that they use this approach for uncovering other
kinds of distinctions in the attitude verb domain. And finally, if they are to use the prag-
matic bootstrapping route, we would hope that they could somewhat flexibly recognize
the intentions of the speakers around them. So when do all these things fall into place?
3.1 Conceptual understanding
When do children have mental state concepts in place? This question has been ex-
plored extensively for the past three or four decades in the literature on children’s develop-
ing Theory of Mind, or mindreading abilities. Having a Theory of Mind entails being able
to represent the mental states of others, as well as being able to use those representations
in reasoning about behavior (Premack and Woodruff 1978 and associated commentary,
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Wimmer and Perner 1983, Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). For several decades, this litera-
ture was focused around so-called “explicit” or elicited-response tasks that test children’s
ability to make explicit judgments—through verbal and behavior responses—about an-
other agent’s false beliefs (which might differ both from reality and from the child’s own
beliefs).
One such task is the change of location task, where it is established that an agent
has a particular justified belief about an object (e.g., that it is in location A because they
placed it there) and then, while the agent is absent, their object is moved to a new location
(e.g., location B), making their belief inconsistent with the current state of reality. To test
their understanding of the agent’s false belief, children are asked questions about what
the agent would think, say or know about the location of the object and where they might
look for the object. The typical, well-replicated result here is that children who are at
least four years of age are able to acknowledge that the agent has the false belief that
their object is in location A, even while children themselves believe that the object is in
location B. In contrast, three-year-olds incorrectly insist that the agent believes the object
to be in location B (Wellman et al. 2001).
These results contributed to the orthodox view that children lacked a full Theory of
Mind before four years of age (Perner et al. 1987). But the orthodox view was challenged
by those who argued that these results were due to a competence-performance asymme-
try in mindreading abilities (Leslie 1994, Surian and Leslie 1999, Scholl and Leslie 2001,
Leslie et al. 2004, Yazdi et al. 2006), whereby children’s performance errors in the tra-
ditional elicited-response false belief tasks (such as the change of location task) could
be due to immature executive functioning (Leslie and Polizzi 1998, Carlson and Moses
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2001, Carlson et al. 2015) consistent with performance errors that adults have been shown
to make (Apperly et al. 2005); or pragmatic issues (Siegal and Beattie 1991, Sullivan and
Winner 1993, Pham et al. 2012 Rubio-Fernández and Geurts 2016, Rubio-Fernández and
Geurts 2013, Helming et al. 2014, Helming et al. 2016, Westra 2016, Westra and Car-
ruthers 2017, Lewis 2013, Lewis et al. 2017).
In the past few decades, these challenges have also been supported by a rising tide
of experimental evidence that children can attribute false beliefs, and predict behaviors
on the basis of them, well before their fourth birthday, when assessed via an appropriate
paradigm (see Baillargeon et al. 2016 for a recent review). This evidence comes from
multiple paradigms considered to be “implicit” measures of children’s Theory of Mind
because they do not require children to make explicit judgments about what other in-
dividuals believe, but instead measure their sensitivity to the beliefs of others via other
behaviors. These studies demonstrate that even infants as young as 6 months are sensitive
to the contents of others’ beliefs. Different paradigms that have been used to demonstrate
young children’s competence with false beliefs include: violation of expectation or look-
ing time studies (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005, Surian et al. 2007, Song and Baillargeon
2008, Poulin-Dubois and Chow 2009, Scott and Baillargeon 2009, Kovács et al. 2010,
Scott et al. 2010, Träuble et al. 2010, Yott and Poulin-Dubois 2012, Scott et al. 2015)
where children’s interest in novel or unexpected stimuli are gauged; anticipatory look-
ing measures (Clements and Perner 1994, Garnham and Ruffman 2001, Southgate et al.
2007a, Senju et al. 2011) which ask what children will spontaneously predict within an ex-
perimental context; helping paradigms (Buttelmann et al. 2009, Knudsen and Liszkowski
2012, Buttelmann et al. 2014, Buttelmann et al. 2015) where children assist other individ-
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uals; as well as affective measures (Moll et al. 2015, Moll et al. 2017); neural measures
(Southgate and Vernetti 2014, Kampis et al. 2015); and cross-cultural comparisons thereof
(Barrett et al., 2013). Given this new set of findings from “implicit” tasks, it is clear that
even children as young as 6 months have some ability to represent the beliefs of others,
and might therefore have conceptual understanding of beliefs.
3.2 Prerequisites for uncovering veridicality contrast
Around 2-3 years, children spontaneously confirm true statements and deny false
statements (Pea, 1982). While younger children are not speaking enough for us to mea-
sure this type of behavior, they also reject information that is not consistent with what
they believe to be true; at 16 months, children can recognize when familiar objects are
intentionally mislabeled and they try to correct the speaker who provides these incorrect
labels (Koenig and Echols, 2003). Thus, children are able to represent when information
is true or false relative to some standard (in this case the standard would be conventions
for names of objects).
However, up until the age of 3, children sometimes fail to recognize when others
make false statements, even when they have have access to information which allows
them to conclude that these statements are false. One study found that 2.5-year-old chil-
dren trust false testimony from others about the location of a hidden object even when
they themselves have seen the hiding event (Jaswal, 2010), and studies have found simi-
lar results in other contexts (for reviews see Mascaro and Morin 2014, Jaswal and Kon-
drad 2016). One interpretation of this kind of result would be that children are unable
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to represent false propositions (just as some interpret the findings in the Theory of Mind
literature to suggest that children are unable to represent false beliefs). But these errors
might have more to do with children’s understanding of authority or their pragmatic dif-
ficulty in the face of others’ assertions, than with semantic or representational errors with
truth. Perhaps they understand that these statements conflict with their own knowledge,
but conclude that the speaker must have information that they do not have access to which
motivates these claims. Or perhaps they recognize these statements as assertions and un-
derstand that there are conversational maxims which pressure speakers to only assert true
claims (Grice 1975). In fact, Mascaro and Morin (2015) and Mascaro et al. (2016) demon-
strate that children are able to understand false statements and false beliefs, even while
they trust the deceptive testimony of others. These authors propose that errors are merely
due to children’s trusting nature. Children might trust the deceptive statements of others
because they perceive them as assertions and assume that asserted content is true; the
apparently immature errors that children make are instead due to their understanding of
communication.
This pragmatic-error interpretation is supported by evidence that children are sensi-
tive to verbal and non-verbal signals of communicative cues and use these them in learn-
ing or reasoning about the world, such as when making generalizations about category
membership, as young as 10 months through preschool (Topál et al. 2008, Egyed et al.
2013, Király et al. 2013, Butler and Markman 2014, Kovács et al. 2016). Within the litera-
ture on children’s trust in testimony, studies have shown that children can reject deceptive
testimony when it is not associated with communicative or intentional cues (Jaswal et al.
2010, Heyman et al. 2013). And recent work by Mascaro and Kovacs (in prep, discussed
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in Mascaro and Sperber 2016) suggests that this trusting tendency in the presence of
communicative cues strengthens between 15 and 24 months of age before falling off at
3 years, which is consistent with the development of children’s immature expectations
about assertions and what they commit the speaker to.
3.3 Prerequisites for uncovering factivity distinction
3.3.1 Understanding of other presupposition triggers
With respect to presuppositions, the findings in the literature are mixed. But there
is some indication that children are aware of them quite early. Despite this early aware-
ness, children may not deploy their understanding of presuppositions in the full range
of contexts that adults do. Berger and Höhle (2012) show that German preschoolers are
aware of the presupposition associated with the focus particles auch ‘also’ and nur ‘only’.
Hamburger and Crain (1982) show that preschoolers’ performance on relative clause in-
terpretation is a function of the pragmatic use of relative clauses; children are able to
succeed at interpreting object relatives only when relative clauses are used to distinguish
two entities that are otherwise similar (e.g., the sheep that the lion bit vs. the sheep that
the dog bit). Syrett et al. (2009) find that three-year-olds are aware of the uniqueness
presupposition associated with the, and that they are able to use that information in an
online task. Trueswell and colleagues show that children fail to use the discourse context
in concert with the uniqueness presupposition of the in order to help them resolve a PP
attachment ambiguity (Trueswell et al. 1999), but that they are nonetheless able to use
one structure when the discourse demands it (Hurewitz et al. 2000).
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3.3.2 Understanding of shared bodies of knowledge
Children take into account a lot of information about the speaker across different
kinds of contexts. Young children understand ambiguous requests (Liszkowski, 2005),
and they take into account information they have about the speaker and the context in
determining how to resolve the ambiguity (Repacholi and Gopnik 1997, Tomasello and
Haberl 2003, Moll and Tomasello 2006, Babelot and Marcos 1999, Saylor and Ganea
2007, Liebal et al. 2009, Ganea and Saylor 2007, Salomo et al. 2010). To take one
example, in a helping paradigm (Warneken and Tomasello 2006, Warneken and Tomasello
2007), 21-month-olds rationalized about what a speaker intended (Grosse et al. 2010).
Did they want an object that was close to the child but far from them? When the speaker
was physically able to get the closer object, children assumed that the farther object was
the target of the request. When the speaker was otherwise occupied and could not retrieve
the closer object on their own, children assumed the closer object was the target of the
request.
3.4 Prerequisites for syntactic bootstrapping
Do children have the abilities needed to utilize the syntactic route to the contrast
between know and think? Linguistic contexts can be informative about the verbs that oc-
cur in them (Fillmore 1969, Fillmore 1970, Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970, among many
others). Verbs that occur in intransitive frames such as The girl gorped are less likely to
describe two-participant events or causal events than verbs that occur in transitive frames
like The boy blicked the ball. Likewise, verbs that take finite sentential complements,
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such as He daxed that the dog was outside, are more likely to describe mental states
of belief than verbs that take non-finite sentential complements, such as He thunted the
dog to go outside. This indicates that there are relationships between the formal prop-
erties of clauses and the semantic properties of verbs that the learner might be able to
take advantage of via syntactic bootstrapping. Verbs like think and know which have
been hailed as some of the “hardest” words to learn based on situational context alone
(Gleitman 1990, Gleitman et al. 2005). But the syntactic form of an expression is more
easily observable than the underlying meaning, so it can serve as a basis for children to
bootstrap themselves into the meaning. Syntactic bootstrapping is a learning strategy that
exploits principled links between a word’s meaning and its syntactic distribution (Landau
and Gleitman 1985, Lasnik 1989, Gleitman 1990, Naigles 1990, Lidz 2006). A growing
literature suggests that children are able to use some syntactic properties of clauses to
learn about the meaning of the verbs that occur in them. For instance, children interpret
verbs in transitive clauses as describing events that have at least two participants (Naigles
1990, Fisher et al. 1994, Naigles et al. 1993, Naigles 1996, Yuan and Fisher 2009, Fisher
et al. 2010, among many others). These preferential looking studies suggest that two-
year-olds know that novel verbs that appear in transitive clauses (like our blick) refer to
different kinds of events than novel verbs that occur in intransitive clauses (like our gorp),
but what about the novel attitudes dax and thunt? The literature on syntactic bootstrap-
ping with attitudes in still in its infancy because children’s sensitivity to relationships
between syntactic frame and verb meaning have not been fully explored outside of the
action verb domain. What kind of syntactic bootstrapping strategy could be employed for
attitudes? And do children bootstrap the meanings of attitude verbs from their syntactic
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distributions?
With respect to attitude verbs, the syntax and semantics literature argues that there
are systematic relationships between the syntactic properties of biclausal sentences and
the semantic classes of attitude verbs that occur in them (see for instance Bolinger 1968,
Hooper 1975, Stowell 1981, Farkas 1985, Grimshaw 1990, Pesetsky 1991, Giannakidou
1997, Villalta 2008, Anand and Hacquard 2013).
For example, attitudes divide most broadly into two semantic classes: dubbed “rep-
resentationals” (e.g., think, discover) and “non-representationals” (e.g., want, entice) by
Bolinger (1968). Representational verbs like think tend to embed finite complements
(78a) while non-representational verbs tend to embed non-finite complements (78b).
(78) a. I think it’s time for bed.
b. I want you to go to bed.
As a result, early syntactic bootstrapping hypotheses for attitude verbs were tied
very closely to the finiteness of their complements. But this approach runs into trouble
as soon as we look to languages besides English. In languages like German and Spanish,
the complements of both kinds of verbs are tensed. And in languages like Mandarin,
tense-marking is absent.
There are however other properties which correlate with the split. In Romance
languages like Spanish, belief attitudes take complements with indicative mood while
desire attitudes take complements with subjunctive mood. In English, belief attitudes
allow preposing of their complements while desire attitudes do not (His mom went to
the store, John thought/*wanted). So cross-linguistic comparisons highlight a more ab-
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stract generalization which unifies these different cases: that representational verbs are
those that embed complements which are similar to unembedded declarative clauses and
non-representational verbs are those that embed other kinds of complements (Dayal and
Grimshaw 2009, Hacquard 2014, Hacquard and Lidz. in prep). For example, the com-
plement of (78a) looks like the main clause in (79a) which is a declarative clause. The
complement of (78b) is similar to (79b) which is an imperative clause.
(79) a. It’s time for bed.
b. Go to bed!
To set the groundwork for developmental studies of this approach, previous work
has found that adults are aware of relationships between the meanings of attitudes and
their syntactic frames (Gillette et al. 1999, White et al. 2014a, 2016) and evidence from
computational modeling shows that a virtual learner can discover information about the
semantics of an attitude verb from the kinds of sentences it occurs in (White et al. 2014b,
White 2015, White et al. 2016).
Research on bootstrapping attitudes in children is still rare, but recent studies have
started to show that children are sensitive to the kinds of complements that an attitude
verb embeds when figuring out its meaning. Even before children understand verbs like
think and want in adult-like ways, they are distinguishing the verbs along the same lines
as theorists would. Children seem to master want at a very young age (around 2-3 years)
and they understand that someone’s desires can conflict with reality (Moore et al. 1995,
Rakoczy et al. 2007, Harrigan et al. 2016). In contrast, as reported in previous sections,
children seem to make typical mistakes with think (until 3-4 years) where they apparently
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fail to respond as though beliefs can conflict with reality (John and Maratsos 1977, de Vil-
liers 1995, de Villiers 2005, De Villiers and De Villiers 2000, Perner et al. 2003, Sowalsky
et al. 2009, Lewis et al. 2013, Lewis 2013, Lewis et al. 2017). As discussed further in
Chapter 4, these mistakes are consistent with the view that children can distinguish think
from want and understand that verbs like think can be used to proffer for foreground the
proposition expressed by their complement.
And when we consider the role that complement clauses play in this process, there
are a few recent studies which provide support, specifically for the role of finiteness in
English. Focusing on children’s understanding of hope, which is a relatively unfamiliar
verb for children, Harrigan et al. (2016) found that children’s responses differed based
on the kind of complement it occurred with (hope that vs. hope to). And findings from
Asplin (2002) and Lidz et al. (2016) have suggested that the complement plays a role in
deciding what meanings a novel attitude verb might have.
3.5 Prerequisites for pragmatic bootstrapping
3.5.1 Understanding speakers’ intentions
When do children have the abilities that underlie the pragmatic route to the contrast
between know and think, such as the ability to reason about what speakers intend? Long
before using presupposition triggers—and in some cases, even before speaking—young
children show sophisticated pragmatic abilities. Very young infants can interpret the be-
havior of others as goal-directed, even in some of the same situations where adults would
(Gergely et al. 1995, Csibra et al. 2003, Woodward 1998). And, when they are older, they
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can sometimes understand how those goal-directed intentions related to the language that
a speaker uses (Reeder 1980, Bloom 2002a, Halberda 2006). 12-month-olds seem to un-
derstand that speakers can try to achieve certain goals only through language and not other
non-linguistic vocalizations (Vouloumanos et al., 2012). Between 12-24 months, children
demonstrate that they understand communicative exchanges (both verbal and non-verbal)
where information is requested by one interlocutor, given by another interlocutor and
then used by the requester. Young children participate in such communicative exchanges
themselves (Behne et al. 2012, Begus and Southgate 2012, Southgate et al. 2007b), and
they express surprise when other interlocutors violate their expectations about such com-
municative exchanges (Song et al., 2008). They even understand that attitude verbs such
as know can be used in such communicative exchanges (Harris et al. in press: e.g, Q:
Where are the keys? A: I don’t know or Q: Do you know where my keys are? A: I don’t).
3.5.2 Understanding requests
Language can be used to perform actions or get others to perform actions, through
more or less indirect means (Searle 1975). Children have a lot of experience with this
phenomenon, given that most utterances that parents direct at children are intended to
direct their behavior (Gelman and Shatz, 1977). Shatz (1978a) found that 2-year-olds
respond appropriately to indirect requests. In fact they tend to respond with action/some
behavioral response whether the request is a direct one (Pick that up!) or an indirect one
(Can you pick that up?) (see also Bates 1971).
One debate in the literature is about whether these are behavioral rules that chil-
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dren employ, or whether they actually have adult-like understanding of the relationship
between the form of utterance and the speaker’s intentions from a young age? Is this
just an action strategy or some pragmatic process that derives the speaker meaning from
literal meaning? One answer lies in how flexibly children apply this kind of reasoning.
Some authors argue that children respond only to a limited set of indirect forms (Shatz,
1978b). But others respond that we should not necessarily expect children to be as flexible
as adults in understanding these discourse moves. Even if the mechanism for reasoning
(Grice 1975) is the same, the inputs that are considered relevant to the reasoning could
differ, leading children to make a different set of conclusions from adults.
3.5.3 Understanding questions
With respect to questions, ambiguity arises because there are two different read-
ings of questions such as Do you know what time it is? and Do you know your teacher’s
name?. One reading is as a request for information (this is the indirect speech act) that is
paraphrasable with an unembedded question (What time is it? or What’s your teacher’s
name?). Another is as a knowledge question (direct speech act). Do children understand
these different readings? Questions serve many purposes in communication with children
(Shatz 1979), and these purposes are sometimes contextually dependent (Garvey 1975,
Walker and Armstrong 1995). Grosse and Tomasello (2012) find that children can dis-
tinguish genuine information-seeking questions from knowledge-testing question, but we
know from other studies that they still respond to both kinds with a behavioral response
which can either indicate their knowledge or offer up the requested information. They do
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seem to understand know questions as information-seeking because they do not just affirm
or deny their own knowledge in response to these questions (Yes, I know it); instead they
give similar rates of ‘elaborative’ responses (It’s three pm) to do you know Q questions
as they do to unembedded wh-questions. But they do recognize the direct speech act as




When does the contrast between know and think emerge in development? Children
seem to produce the verbs from a relatively early age (around 2.5 years) but the previous
literature suggests that adult-like understanding of the contrast is more delayed (until 4
years or older). Is this an accurate picture of children’s understanding, or can the produc-
tion and comprehension findings be brought more in line with each other?
The experiments reported in this chapter suggest that the contrast can be figured out
much earlier than 4. They demonstrate that children understand think to be non-factive
from as early as their third birthday. We also find that some children understand know to
be factive early on in the third year, but there is more individual variation in understanding
of know than of think.
4.1 Production of know and think
With respect to production, factives emerge quite early. Shatz et al. (1983) was
one of the first studies to look at child productions of attitude verbs over time, using the
Abe corpus (Kuczaj, 1978). Shatz et al. find that know is the most frequent doxastic
verb in children’s productions and uses of it emerges around 30 months. Think occurs
almost half as often as know and emerges a few months later. According to analyses by
Shatz et al., know is used across a wider range of functions than think. They found that
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think was most often used to describe the mental states of others or to modulate the force
of an assertion (hedging) while know was more often used to draw the attention of an
interlocutor, to request information, or in utterances such as I don’t know and You know
what? One of the most frequent uses of know was in the “idiomatic negative expression”
I don’t know, but this use decreased over time (65% of all attitude tokens at two and a half
years to 6% at the end of the third year). According to Shatz et al. these early productions
were phrase-centric and thus not indicative of a flexible adult-like understanding (see also
Diessel and Tomasello 2001). But their analyses placed high requirements on children
because utterances like (80) were needed to demonstrate true “mental state” talk with the
verbs, because they suggest that the child is aware of the difference between the mental
state concepts that think and know express.
(80) Before I thought this was a crocodile; now I know it’s an alligator. (Shatz et al.
1983; 309)
Using parent report data, Bretherton and Beeghly (1982) also found that know is one of
the most common attitude verbs produced by children, but it is because of the frequency
of I don’t know. And focusing on factives in particular, Schulz (2003) has argued that
the first unambiguous productions of know to refer to mental states just before the third
birthday, and the first productions that involve unambiguously true complements emerge
around the fourth birthday (Schulz 2003). As a result, this literature suggests that the
verbs are used for limited functions and that uses which are flexible and adult-like do not
emerge until around the 4th birthday. But perhaps having analyses that require utterances
like (80)—which are rare even in adult speech—and ignore the most frequently occurring
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utterance-types like I don’t know place the bar too high for children to demonstrate their
understanding.
New studies confirm that these older analyses do not capture the sophistication of
children’s uses for words like know. Older analyses underestimate how early children
develop a mature understanding of know because they exclude utterances like I don’t
know from analyses, arguing that they are merely used “to demur or withdraw from a
conversation” (Shatz et al. 1983, Harris et al. 2017). Instead, Harris and colleagues
find that I don’t know is actually used in an adult-like manner to respond to information
seeking requests before the third birthday, much in the same way that adults use the verbs
(see data in Chapter 5).
4.2 Studies of comprehension
4.2.1 Understanding of think
Previous studies show that children have difficulty with think until at least four years
of age (Johnson and Maratsos 1977; Wellman et al. 2001; De Villiers and Pyers 2002; de
Villiers 2005; Sowalsky et al. 2009; Lewis et al. 2012; a.o.). For example, consider the
scenario in (81):
(81) False belief scenario: Mary has already made it home for the day, but John
wrongly believes that she is at the office.
a. John thinks that Mary is at the office.
b. Mary is at the office.
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In this scenario, adults and older children assent to (81a), but three-year-olds reject
it. Three-year-olds seem to respond based on the truth of the complement clause (81b)
(false in this scenario), instead of the entire sentence. What explains these early errors?
There are a few possible explanations:
1. Conceptual Hypothesis: Children’s initial difficulty with think reflects difficulty
with the belief concept that think expresses or the corresponding representations.
They reject sentences like (81a) because of their inability to attribute the right belief
to John. John’s belief could be problematic either because it conflicts with reality or
with the child’s own beliefs. This could boil down to representational issue (beliefs
can be false but I fail to represent them) or a conceptual issue (representations can
conflict, but not belief representations). See Johnson and Maratsos (1977), Tardif
and Wellman (2000), Perner et al. (2003), among many others.
2. Syntactic Hypothesis: Three-year-olds’ errors come from a syntactic mis-analysis
of think sentences. They fail to understand the that-clause to be embedded under
think, so they treat it as an independent clause. This could be due to something like
a conjunctive analysis (p and John thinks it) or an analysis that does not include the
think at all (p). As a result, they only attend to the embedded clause.
3. Semantic Hypothesis: Children’s non-adult responses are due to a failure to rec-
ognize the non-factivity of think. Instead, children may represent think as either
factive or veridical. See Johnson and Maratsos (1977), Abbeduto and Rosenberg
(1985).
4. Pragmatic Hypothesis: Children’s difficulty with think is merely pragmatic in na-
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ture. The reason children respond to the truth of the complement clause in (81a) is
the same reason adults sometimes respond to the truth of the complement of think.
As discussed in Chapter 2, verbs like think can be used to proffer the content of
its complement by endorsing the subject’s beliefs, in which case the complement
clause carries the main point of the utterance, and the matrix clause get demoted
to parenthetical status (p because John thinks so). Children’s failures are due to a
tendency to assume such endorsement readings for think sentences, even in situa-
tions where adults do not. See Lewis et al. 2012, 2017; Lewis 2013, Urmson 1952,
Hooper 1975, Rooryck 2001, Simons 2007, Westra 2016, Westra and Carruthers
2017.
Lewis et al. (2012, 2017), and Lewis (2013), provide initial evidence against the
Conceptual and Syntactic Hypotheses. They show that three-year-olds are not attending
solely to the complement clause, and argue that children respond to the truth of the com-
plement clause only in contexts in which they assume that it is being proffered by the
speaker. In contexts in which parenthetical interpretations are disfavored, or in scenarios
where the literal meaning is false, three-year-olds respond to the truth of the entire clause,
in an adult-like way, even in false belief scenarios. Consider the variant of scenario (81)
in (82):
(82) False belief scenario 2: Mary is at the office, but John wrongly believes that she
is at home.
a. John thinks that Mary is at the office.
b. Mary is at the office.
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In this scenario, the sentence (82a) is false, even though the complement clause
(82b) is true. In such cases, three-year-olds reject sentences like (82a), just like adults.
Lewis et al. argue that the reason three-year-olds’ performance improves in this kind of
false belief scenario is that parenthetical interpretations in which the speaker endorses the
reported belief are blocked: the speaker cannot endorse a belief of John’s that he does not
hold. If children are sensitive to the literal meaning, they can reject these sentences based
their falsity. These results argue against the Syntactic Hypothesis. Indeed, children’s
adult-like responses are unexpected if children merely respond to the truth of the com-
plement: they should accept the sentence, since the complement is true. Furthermore,
it shows that three-year-olds are able to provide adult-like responses, even in contexts
in which the subject has a false belief, suggesting that their difficulty is not conceptual,
contra the Conceptual Hypothesis.
Lewis’s results, however, are still consistent with the last two hypotheses (Seman-
tic and Pragmatic): children’s difficulty with think could either be due to a (cancelable)
tendency to assume that speakers typically endorse the truth of the complement, or to
a factive/veridical understanding of think. Note that in the scenario in (82), we would
typically reject the sentence “John knows that Mary is at the office”. Do three-year-olds’
responses then reflect a factive or veridical understanding of think?
4.2.2 Understanding of know
This literature suggests that children do not learn how know is different from think
until 4 years or older, but there are some conflicting findings that make it difficult to
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draw conclusions about children’s understanding of know. Some studies find that think is
understood well earlier, and children struggle to figure out that know is different from it.
Other studies suggest that know is the better-understood verb and that children mistakenly
treat think as if it meant something like know. As a result, it is hard to know what conclu-
sions to draw from this body of research. Moreover, these studies use different methods
to probe different aspects of children’s competence with different sets of research ques-
tions. Perhaps considering the different kinds of tasks can help us to better understand
what children know about these verbs before their 4th birthday?
There are two main types of questions that researchers are attempting to address
in this literature: complement-oriented research questions and attitude oriented research
questions. Complement-oriented designs test children’s understanding of the comple-
ments in know and think sentences. These designs are the most informative about chil-
dren’s understanding of factivity, especially when they involve entailment-canceling op-
erators. In contrast, attitude-oriented designs are more concerned with children’s un-
derstanding of what mental states can be attributed using these verbs and under which
conditions they can be felicitously used. As a result, they are not necessarily informa-
tive about factivity distinctions because they actually test meta-awareness of meanings,
looking for children’s explicit understanding of the differences in meaning that think and
know express. While informative about children’s holistic understanding of the verbs and
their usage patterns, attitude-oriented tasks do not readily distinguish between children’s
understanding of factivity and their understanding of other dimensions which distinguish
know and think. Consider the sentences in (83-85). When we hear (83) we may have
the intuition that John is certain about his belief. But this intuition is not correlated with
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factivity, given that be certain also expresses similar levels of certainty, but is non-factive
(85).
(83) John knows that Mary is home [# but she isn’t]
(84) Bill thinks that Mary is home [but she isn’t]
(85) David is certain that Mary is home [but she isn’t]
Without hearing the second clause in these examples, we might think that John or David
are better sources of information about Mary’s location than Bill. But we may think
this because we might have some scalar understanding of knowledge such that it implies
belief. Or because those who know something will have better justification than those
who merely think something. Or because speakers who use the word know are more
certain about the truth of the belief that they are ascribing than those who use think. Thus,
it can be hard to pin conclusions from these tasks to differences in factivity, as opposed to
any other differences.
There are also two main families of dependent measures that are used in this lit-
erature: inference-based tasks and felicity judgment tasks. These two families of tasks
are interestingly different because they both test the relationship between sentences and
situations that those sentences can describe, but in different directions. In inference-based
tasks, participants are asked to infer something about the experimental situation, given
some linguistic stimuli that prime their inferences. In contrast, felicity-based tasks ask
participants to judge whether some sentence is an adequate description of an experimen-
tal situation. Felicity-based judgments are related to truth-value judgment tasks (TVJTs)
in that they are better for testing aspects of meaning that are tied to truth, such as entail-
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ments from asserted content. But inference-based tasks are more appropriate for testing
other aspects of meaning that are more contextually based or backgrounded, such as im-
plicatures and entailments from presupposed content.
Although these two dimensions are orthogonal in principle, they tend to be corre-
lated in the literature. Most complement-oriented tasks use inference-based paradigms,
and most attitude-oriented tasks use felicity-based paradigms, with the exception of stud-
ies by Moore and colleagues which use inference-based paradigms. Given these con-
nections between research questions and paradigms, there is a third issue to consider in
evaluating their findings: how naturalistic the experimental context is. For example, with
inference-based tasks, care must be taken to ensure that the paradigm is age-appropriate
because there are certain inferences we wouldn’t expect children to make at particular
ages—even without considering their knowledge of mental state terms—given that they
do not have the same world knowledge as adults.
Attitude-oriented tasks with felicity judgments include those by Macnamara et al.
(1976), Johnson and Wellman (1977), and Abbeduto and Rosenberg (1985). In these
tasks, children are presented with stories that involve beliefs which may be true or false,
justified or unjustified. After the stories children are asked to make explicit judgments
about whether attitude reports involving know or think are good descriptions of the events
in the story. Target responses include “yes” or “no” answers to polar questions (e.g. Does
the character in the story think/know that...?) or judgments about whether knowledge
reports are more apt than belief reports (e.g., Does the character know that... or does he
think that...?). These authors concluded that three-year-olds had not achieved mastery of
the verbs but that four- and seven-year-olds had. However, three-year-olds’ poor perfor-
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mance may be due to the metalinguistic nature of these tasks and to difficulty comparing
the relative acceptability of two sentences.
Complement-oriented tasks with inferential judgments include those by Harris (1975),
Hopmann and Maratsos (1978), Abbeduto and Rosenberg (1985) and Léger (2008). These
tasks look at whether children understand the verbs to be factive by measuring whether
they tend to infer that their complements are true. Harris and Abbeduto and Rosenberg
present minimal contexts and ask children to provide an explicit judgment about the com-
plement to know or think when it is an independent sentence (86). While these tasks re-
quire explicit judgments, they can be considered inference-based tasks because the judg-
ment would be impossible without making the relevant inference. In these tasks, children
do not begin to respond in expected ways until much older than 4 years.
(86) If I told you that:
a. The teacher did not know that Tim was absent.
b. Was Tim absent?
Hopmann and Maratsos and Leger, however, do not require explicit judgments because
they ask children to act out the inferences that they have made with a set of toys. Hop-
mann and Maratsos found that some children responded as if the complement was true,
regardless of the attitude verb, and that this tendency was stronger with the youngest chil-
dren. Leger compared understanding of cogntive factives (87) to emotive factives (88)
and found that children were more adult-like on emotive factive items in that they re-
sponded as if the complement was true more often. However, these findings could be due
to the nature of the act out tasks involved; children could behave like adults for a different
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reason, namely that they want to make the doll happy.
(87) a. The doll knows that she has a turtle.
b. The doll knows that she doesn’t have a turtle.
c. The doll doesn’t know that she has a turtle.
d. The doll doesn’t know that she doesn’t have a turtle.
(88) a. The doll is happy that she has a turtle.
b. The doll is happy that she doesn’t have a turtle.
c. The doll isn’t happy that she has a turtle.
d. The doll isn’t happy that she doesn’t have a turtle.
Moore and colleagues (Moore et al. 1989, Moore and Davidge (1989)) tried to bring
these two different families of tasks into conversation with each other. They recognized
that inference-based tasks might require fewer abilities that are orthogonal to verb un-
derstanding, but they want to test hypotheses about attitude-oriented research questions.
The participants’ job was to determine which box contained the toy after hearing two
puppets utter sentences like “I know it’s in the red box” and “I think it’s in the blue box.”
The studies by Moore and colleagues all found that three-year-olds were unable to re-
liably use the know statement over the think statement (or any other contrast between
attitude verbs for that matter), but that children four and over could. While these results
demonstrate that four-year-olds can do something that three-year-olds cannot, it does not
demonstrate that three-year-olds do not understand that know is factive. Perhaps they do
not pick the more informative know statement because they have trouble computing the
implicature (by noticing that the puppet who used the think sentence could also have used
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know and reasoning that the puppet did not because they did not actually know, or have
good justification for their belief).
Given this large body of studies, are there any remaining questions that we could
ask about children’s understanding of the verbs? Yes. These studies tend to conclude that
children do not understand the distinctions between know and think until well into grade
school, and the earliest age at which competence is found is 4 years. But these studies
test meaning distinctions which are distinct from factivity, such as certainty (Macnamara
et al. 1976, Johnson and Maratsos 1977, see also discussion of examples in 83 and 85), or
involve task-specific actions which are neither familiar nor natural for children younger
than 4 (Harris 1975, Hopmann and Maratsos 1978, Abbeduto and Rosenberg 1985, Leger
2008). Would it be possible to find that children have an adult-like understanding of the
factivity difference between know and think at 3 years if we controlled for these task
artifacts?
4.3 Research questions
What kind of representations do three-year-olds’ have for think and know? Is their
think factive or non-factive? Is their know factive or non-factive?1
To preview the results reported in the following studies, we find that from 3 children
understand think to be non-factive (Study 1) and that they are figuring out the factivity of
1While it would also be informative to test children’s understanding of the (non-)veridicality of the
two verbs in addition to their (non-)factivity, we will see in later sections that this task is not the best
tool to assess veridicality understanding, given that it asks participants to infer what is true they trust the
experimenters involved.
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know during this age range (Study 1,2). Furthermore, we find that there is significant
individual variability in when children figure out the factivity of know which is not well
correlated with age (Study 2), suggesting that there is a role for the quality of experience
as well as the quantity of experience in learning this meaning contrast.
4.4 Study 1
In order to assess three-year-olds’ understanding of the factive and non-factive verbs
know and think and the inferences that they license, we designed a simple task2 that allows
them to demonstrate their knowledge without being hindered by orthogonal difficulties.
This was a complement-oriented, inference-based task which asked participants to make
inferences in a more naturalistic context than previous tasks. Using clues in the form of
attitude reports about the location of a toy, the participant’s goal is to infer its location.
4.4.1 Methodology
Participants were seated in front of two boxes (one red and one blue). They were
told that the experimenter would hide one toy in either of the boxes and their task was
to find the toy, after the experimenter gave them a clue. Participants were also informed
that a puppet (Lambchop) would be joining the game as well, but was too shy to do
anything but whisper to the experimenter. An occluder kept participants from seeing
where the experimenter hid toys and there was always a toy hidden in each box, despite
what participants were told. This was done in order to avoid participants learning from
2This study was previously reported in Dudley et al. 2015.
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negative evidence.
On each trial, the occluder would rise and the puppet would whisper in the exper-
imenter’s ear before the experimenter delivered a clue in the form of an attitude report
(test sentence). Upon hearing the clue, participants were asked to select the box that they
thought the toy was in. We manipulated two factors within subjects: verb-type (think,
know) and negation-type (none, matrix, embedded). Accordingly children heard think
and know sentences, with or without negation, as in (89).
(89) a. No negation
i. Lambchop thinks that it’s in the red box (think-none)
ii. Lambchop knows that it’s in the red box (know-none)
b. Matrix negation
i. Lambchop doesn’t think that it’s in the red box (think-matrix)
ii. Lambchop doesn’t know that it’s in the red box (know-matrix)
c. Embedded negation
i. Lambchop thinks that it’s not in the red box (think-embedded)
ii. Lambchop knows that it’s not in the red box (know-embedded)
Participants were given three trials for each of the sentence types in (89), as well
as three control trials with the test sentence It’s not in the red/blue box. Responses were
coded as selections of the box mentioned in the test sentence, or as selections of the other
box.
Note that this task requires children to accommodate the presupposition when it is
not in the common ground. We decided that this was a necessary trade-off in order to
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better assess young children’s knowledge, using a natural, non-metalinguistic task. How-
ever, this task may still underestimate their knowledge of presupposition. Even if children
recognize know’s factivity, they may still have difficulty accommodating the presupposi-
tion that the complement clause is true in order to pick the mentioned box, as we discuss
later.
4.4.2 Hypotheses and predictions
There are four logical possibilities for children’s understanding of these verbs: (i)
children understand the (non-)factivity of these verbs in a fully adult manner but previous
tasks have obscured their competence; (ii) children lack the understanding that know is
factive, thereby treating both verbs as non-factive; (iii) children understand know in an
adult manner but also treat think as a factive, which is why they tend to assume that its
complement is true; or (iv) children fail to recognize the factivity of know, but incorrectly
treat think as a factive.
These possibilities make the following predictions, which are summarized schemat-
ically below in Figure 4.1:
(i) If children are adult-like, they will only pick the mentioned box when they hear
sentences with no negation or know-matrix sentences.
(ii) If children treat know as a non-factive, they should only pick the mentioned box
when they hear sentences without negation.
(iii) If children treat think as factive, they should pick the mentioned box when they
hear sentences with no negation or with matrix negation.
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(iv) If children understand both verbs incorrectly, then they should pick the men-
tioned box for sentences with no negation and for think-matrix sentences.
Hypothesis (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Lambchop thinks that it’s in the red box 3 3 3 3
Lambchop knows that it’s in the red box 3 3 3 3
Lambchop doesn’t think that it’s in the red box 7 7 3 3
Lambchop doesn’t know that it’s in the red box 3 7 3 7
Lambchop thinks that it’s not in the red box 7 7 7 7
Lambchop knows that it’s not in the red box 7 7 7 7
Figure 4.1: Summary of predictions by sentence-type: selections of the mentioned box
As shown in Figure 4.1, the matrix negation trials will be the crucial ones for distin-
guishing between hypotheses in determining participants’ understanding of the factivity
of the two verbs.
4.4.3 Participants
Child participants were 40 three-year-olds (age range: 3;1 - 3;11 years;months,
mean age: 3;6, 19 boys). All children were reported to be monolingual speakers of
English by their parents and all were recruited from the University of Maryland Infant
Studies Database. Ten adults also participated. They were recruited from an undergradu-





Control items were three trials with the following clue: It’s not in the red/blue box.
For these trials, participants needed to choose the other box (not the mentioned box) at
least two out of three times in order to be included in the analyses. Nine out of the ten
adult participants chose the other box on every trial. The tenth participant failed to choose
the correct box on these trials, and was excluded from analyses. Out of the 40 three-year-
old participants, 9 of them failed the control items (by picking the other box only once or
never), and were therefore excluded from analyses. Additionally, three child participants
were excluded due to experimenter error, leaving a total of 28 children (age range: 3;1 -
3;11, mean age: 3;6, 12 boys).
4.4.4.2 Adult results
Adult data (n=9) is given in Figure 4.2. Adults always chose the mentioned box for
think-none sentences know-none trials. They never chose the mentioned box for think-
embedded and know-embedded trials. Finally, adults chose the mentioned box on 4% of
think-matrix trials and 74% of know-matrix trials.
4.4.4.3 Child results
Child participants’ performance (n=28) is given in Figure 4.3. Overall, children
tended to pick the mentioned box for think-none and know-none trials. They picked the
other box for think-matrix, think-embedded and know-embedded trials. On know-matrix
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Figure 4.2: Adult performance, Study 1
trials, they picked the mentioned box about 40% of the time.
Figure 4.3: Three-year-olds’ performance, Study 1
A 2x3 ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of verb-type (F(1,21)=28,p<0.017)
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and negation-type (p<2.0e-16) and a significant interaction between verb-type and negation-
type (p<.0072). Planned comparisons revealed that children treat think-matrix sentences
different from know-matrix sentences (p<.017) and that they treat know-matrix sentences
differently from know-embedded sentences (p<.0088). Out of all conditions with nega-
tion, children only pick the mentioned box when they hear sentences like Lambchop
doesn’t know that it’s in the red box.
4.4.4.4 Performance in think conditions
All child participants performed completely adult-like on think trials; both child
and adult participants picked the mentioned box when they heard think-none sentences
but they picked the other box for both kinds of think sentences with negation. See Figure
4.4 for a comparison of adults’ and three-year-olds’ performance on think trials.
Figure 4.4: Performance on think across age groups, Study 1
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Note that the performance of both adults and children in this task is consistent with
the assumption that Lambchop was a reliable source of information. Neither adults nor
children seemed to compute a quantity implicature from the use of think p in the context
of know p and p: they always picked the mentioned box with affirmative think sentences.
Given previous results from the literature, we expect that children would do so, but we
had no such expectation for adult participants because an adult-like understanding of
sentences like Lambchop thinks that it’s in the blue box is consistent with the toy being
in either the red or the blue box. We take the apparent lack of implicature computation
in this task to be due to the “clue” status of the utterance: participants do not necessarily
assume that the speaker is going to make her contribution as informative as possible, but
that she will provide just enough information to help them guess the correct location of
the toy.
4.4.4.5 Performance in know conditions
Children appear to perform like adults in some know conditions, but not others; they
pick the same box as adults when they hear know-none and know-embedded sentences,
but not know-matrix sentences. See Figure 4.5 for a comparison of adults’ and three-year-
olds’ performance on know.
On know-matrix trials, which is where their behavior differs, adults tend to pick
the mentioned box (consistent with a factive interpretation), but three-year-olds only pick
the mentioned box about 40% of the time. An examination of individual performance on
this measure suggests that this 40% performance is not due to chance performance (e.g.,
90
Figure 4.5: Performance on know across age groups, Study 1
if children did not know which box to pick, they would alternate between picking the
mentioned box and the other box). If all three-year-olds were guessing where to look for
the toy when they heard these sentences, we would expect to see children’s performance
distributed normally around a mean accuracy of approximately 50%. However, children’s
performance on know-matrix sentences is distributed bimodally, and not normally around
the mean, as it is in other conditions. There is a group that seems to perform below
chance (consistent with a non-factive interpretation) and a group that seems to perform
above chance (consistent with a factive interpretation). See Figure 4.6 for an individual
measure of performance.
Figure 4.6 shows that some three-year-olds always picked the mentioned box (con-
sistent with a factive representation of know), but other three-year-olds always picked the
other box (inconsistent with an adult-like understanding of know).
91
Figure 4.6: Individual performance in know-matrix condition, Study 1
4.4.5 Discussion
These results show that three-year-olds, as a group, differentiate the factive verb
know from the non-factive verb think, based on their significantly different responses to
think and know sentences with matrix negation. This finding contrasts with previous find-
ings in the literature where three-year-olds tested on the distinction between these verbs
systematically failed (Johnson and Maratsos 1977; Abbeduto and Rosenberg 1985), or
were found to be at chance (Moore and Davidge 1989; Moore et al. 1989). Unlike those
studies, this one did not require participants to explicitly compare think and know sen-
tences to decide which was a better description of the events, or to provide definitions of
the verbs. Instead, this task required children to make choices in a game based on some
linguistic stimuli. We believe that the nature of the previous tasks masked children’s un-
derstanding of these verbs, and that our task was better able to assess their understanding.
92
Three-year-olds’ high accuracy in all think conditions indicates that they have an
adult-like understanding of think. Given their performance on the think-matrix sentences,
we can conclude that three-year-olds, just like adults, understand think to be non-factive.
When they hear sentences like (90), they do not infer that the toy is in the red box (which
would be the expected outcome for a factive verb), but rather that the toy is in the blue
box.
(90) Lambchop doesn’t think [ that it’s in the red box ]
These findings also suggest the need for a more sophisticated analysis of the de-
velopmental trajectory of verbs like know than was previously thought. A factive under-
standing of know may emerge earlier than four years of age. Some three-year-olds (about
43%) consistently behave like they have an adult-like understanding of know. However,
other three-year-olds (about 57%) reliably treat know exactly like they treat think, namely
as if it were non-factive. The apparent chance performance of three-year-olds in the
know-matrix condition could result from averaging the performance of the adult-like and
non-adult-like children together. Therefore, past studies which found three-years-olds
to be at chance know conditions, like the studies by Moore and colleagues, might have
yielded similar results if individual performance were measured.
To the extent that children’s performance on our task is a direct reflection of their
semantic representations for know, our data suggest that some children understand know
to be factive by age three, but that others do not. It is, however, possible that even this sim-
plified task is still obscuring three-year-olds’ performance and that the failure of some to
behave as if they understand know to be factive derives from an additional factor masking
93
their knowledge (some of these factors are discussed further in the following section).
4.4.6 Remaining questions
Is performance with know really variable? Are there different populations of chil-
dren who understand know differently? If so, what explains that difference? Is under-
standing of know something that changes with age? Or do we have reason to think that it
would be better related with other factors?
The results of Study 1 are suggestive that there are different populations of know-
knowers, but there are several aspects of the study design which do not allow us to be sure
about this:
• Too few observations per condition: In Study 1, we have three observations per
condition per participant. This doesn’t give us enough power to identify sources
of variation. Another concern is that three items in each condition were too few
to distinguish between chance-level performance and a small error rate. Since the
children in our study were so young, they can make 1-2 errors for any number of
irrelevant reasons (e.g., they were distracted by the toys), which would lead to 33%
or 67% accuracy. In order to better distinguish between chance-performance and a
few errors, we would need to increase the number of items in each condition.
• Puppet as attitude holder: In an inference-based task like Study 1, the inferences
that a participant might make will be impacted by what is known about the speaker
and the subject of the attitude reports. Perhaps children do not take puppets to be
the kind of agents who could have epistemic access, or they do not trust the ‘beliefs’
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of a puppet the way that would trust the beliefs of an adult. Alternatively, they could
over-empathize with the puppet and take it to be insulting when the experimenter
says that the puppet “does not know” the location of the toy in front of the puppet
herself. As a result, they could have an interpretation of the sentence where no
projection obtains (which is possible for adults given the right contextual factors
or intonation). This concern goes away if the adult holder were to be an adult
experimenter and if they would be absent when the test items are delivered.
• Role of puppet in game is unclear: Recall that the puppet always whispered some-
thing to the experimenter, and after listening to the puppet, the experimenter gave
the clue (e.g., Lambchop knows it’s in the red box). Participants never heard what
the puppet actually said. So, the participant may have made inferences not about
the puppet’s beliefs about the location of the toy, but instead about what the puppet
said. One possibility is that the puppet uttered statements of the form “It’s in the
red box”. The experimenter, who was aware of the actual location of the toy, would
then report what the puppet knows or thinks based on what it said. However, it’s
also possible to imagine that the puppet instead whispered statements such as “I
think it’s in the red box” or “I know it’s not in the blue box”, in which case, the
experimenter would merely serve as translator for the shy puppet by reporting “She
thinks it’s in the red box” or “She knows it’s not in the blue box.” This conception
of the interaction between the puppet and experimenter would lead to the expected
‘adult-like’ behavior in every condition but the know-matrix condition. In that case,
the experimenter would be perceived to be relating the puppet’s message: “I don’t
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know that it’s in the red box.” But then the expected inference that the toy is in
the red box would not be licensed. Possible continuations of “I don’t know that p”
include “I don’t know that p because p is not true”, “I don’t know that p because
I know that q” or “I don’t know that p because I don’t have enough evidence.”
While this possible interpretation of the experimental materials may have affected
some participants, most adults and at least half of the children however behaved in
a way consistent with the experimenter being responsible for giving the clue, and
not serving as a mere translator. In order to be completely sure, the role withing the
game of the person whose beliefs and knowledge are reported on could be clarified
in further experiments.
• Infelicitous delivery of test items: Another possibility that was motivated by our
post-experiment consultations with the adult participants was that the test sentences
were delivered with a child-directed prosody, which can lead to a different pattern
of inferences based on the fact that focal stress on know can cancel its presupposi-
tion. In the future, the experimenter should deliver the clues in a more naturalistic
manner, taking care not to produce infelicitous stress patterns.
• Positive feedback: In Study 1, participants always got positive feedback because
there would be a toy hidden in both of the potential locations, despite what an
adult-like understanding of the clue would suggest. Perhaps children with initial,
or weak representations of know were unsure which box they should pick, and they
guessed the first time they heard the relevant sentence. If they then found the toy
in the non-adult-like location, perhaps they took this a feedback and updated their
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representation to be non-factive. In order to control for this possibility, we should
only hide toys in the locations that are consistent with adult behavior in the task.
• Confusing labels for hiding locations: In Study 1, our toy hiding locations were
two boxes covered in polka dots. One box was a deep red color, which could be
considered a relatively prototypical red. However, the “blue” box was actually
closer to an aquamarine color. Thus, both the patterns and the colors of the boxes
were not necessarily described as expected in the test items. Given that children
are still mastering the extension of color terms in the preschool years, they might
have been confused about the application of the terms red and blue to describe these
boxes. Future studies would need to use more prototypical colors with no patterns.
• Short age range: In study 1, we test participants between their 3rd and 4th birth-
days. Perhaps no development in understanding of the know occurs within this age
range. In order to determine what kind of age effect might hold, we should extend
the age range to include ages at which we know children have mastered the factivity
of know, such as over 4 years.
4.5 Study 2
Despite trying to control for task artifacts that arose in the previous literature, Study
1 still failed to create a completely felicitous task. Furthermore, the task was not entirely
appropriate to determine the nature of individual variation in understanding of know.
Study 2 was designed to improve the paradigm by controlling for these issues and ar-
tifacts to determine whether children’s performance changes.
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4.5.1 Methodology
The methodology for Study 2 is largely adopted from Study 1, with some changes.
Experimenter 1 (E1) hides a toy in one of two boxes for the participant to find while an
occluder blocks the participant’s view. The hidden toys ‘belong’ to Experimenter 2 (E2,
“Chris”) but he is not very invested in the game, so he may or may not see where they are
hidden. When E2 ducks into a cupboard to pick a toy for the next trial, E1 stage whispers
test items to the participant as ‘secret’ clues to the toy’s location. The test items are the
same as in Study 1, with the exception of having a different subject (91).
(91) a. Chris doesn’t know that it’s in the red box.
b. Chris doesn’t think that it’s in the red box.
c. Chris knows that it’s in the red box.
d. Chris thinks that it’s in the red box.
e. Chris knows that it’s not in the red box.
f. Chris thinks that it’s not in the red box.
In order to address the issues with Study 1, we changed the following aspects of the
paradigm:
• Number of observations: doubled to six trials per condition.
• Identity of attitude holder: changed to adult experimenter, who is absent when
test sentences are uttered.
• Role of attitude holder: to keep track of the toys that are played with and decide
which toys to hide next. This experimenter keeps notes about the toys on coding
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sheet, so could have seen where toys were hidden, or could be distracted with book-
keeping task. At test, this experimenter is occupied with picking toy for next trial.
• Delivery of test items: clues are delivered in a whisper, and stress patterns are
controlled.
• Feedback: toys are hidden only in the location that adults look for them (verified
by norming study, n=12).
• Location labels: locations are more appropriate given labels blue box and red box.
Solid hues that are vivid and prototypical.
• Age range: increased to 4.5 years.
4.5.2 Participants
Child participants were 28 three-year-olds (age range: 3;0-4;6 years;months, mean
age: 3;8). All children were reported to be monolingual speakers of English by their
parents and all were recruited from the University of Maryland Infant Studies Database.
Seven adults also participated and were paid at a rate of $10/hour.
4.5.3 Results
4.5.3.1 Adult results
Adult data (n=7) is given in Figure 4.7. Adults always chose the mentioned box
for think-none, know-none, and know-matrix trials. They never chose the mentioned box
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Figure 4.7: Adult performance, Study 2
for think-embedded, know-embedded, and think-embedded trials. This is the expected
pattern of responses.
4.5.3.2 Child results
Child participants’ data (n=28) is given in Figure 4.8. Children overwhelmingly
pick the mentioned box when they hear think-none (87%) and know-none (95%) sen-
tences. They predominantly pick the other box when they hear think-matrix (80%), think-
embedded (80%) and know-embedded (90%) sentences. In the know-matrix condition,
children only picked the mentioned box on 52% of trials. Notice that adult performance
and child performance are comparable in all conditions expect know-matrix, where chil-
dren’s performance is similar to Study 1.
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Figure 4.8: Children’s performance, Study 2
4.5.3.3 Age effects
What explains the group’s performance on know-matrix trials? Are children merely
guessing in this condition, or are there systematic differences in children’s performance?
If different children understand the verbs differently, then what explains that variation?
Are children’s responses in the critical conditions (know-matrix and think-matrix) con-
sistent with an age effect? Plots of individual variation in performance on these trials are
given in Figure 4.9 and 4.10, respectively. Similiar plots for the other conditions are given
in Appendix A.
Figure 4.9 shows that there is variation across the entire age range in children’s
performance on know-matrix trials. Children do not seem to be clustered around 52%
accuracy, which would be consistent with the entire group of children guessing. Instead,
some children are clustered around 100% accuracy, others are clustered around 0% accu-
racy and there are a range of different patterns of response in between. What explains this
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Figure 4.9: Individual performance in know-matrix condition, Study 2
systematic variation? There seems to be a correlation between age and how often chil-
dren infer that the complement is true, as measured by their selections of the mentioned
box. But this correlation doesn’t explain too much of the variation in children’s perfor-
mance given the spread of the data. In contrast, Figure 4.10 shows that there is almost no
age-related variation in how likely children are to infer that the complement is true with
think-matrix items.
Using age (continuous) and sentence-type (think-matrix/know-matrix) as predic-
tors, multiple regression analysis indicated that the two predictors and their interaction
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Figure 4.10: Individual performance in think-matrix condition, Study 2
term explained some of the variance (R2 = .1528, F3,332 = 19.96, p«.01). Age (β=.009,
p«.01), sentence-type (β=.606, p<.04), and their interaction (β=.014, p«.01) significantly
predicted performance. Children were more likely to pick the mentioned box when they
heard know-matrix sentences than when they heard think-matrix sentences and this ten-
dency increased with age. Selections of the mentioned-box were correlated with age in
the know-matrix condition, but only with marginal significance (r = .34, p<.08), and were
not correlated with age in the think-matrix condition (r = -.01, p<.97).
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4.5.4 Discussion
The purpose of Study 2 was to confirm the findings of Study 1. The results of Study
1 suggested that children had all mastered the non-factivity of think by 3 years, but that
the factivity of know was mastered gradually by different children across this age range.
Study 2 finds slightly better performance within particular conditions, but the pat-
tern of responses is similar to that of Study 1. Perhaps controlling for all the potential
task artifacts leads to a more felicitous experimental context, or perhaps this increased
performance is more related to the slightly older age of children in Study 2.
Children as a group have a non-factive representation of think and this representa-
tion does not significantly change across the preschool years. In contrast, representations
of know show substantial variation across this age range. Some children seem to have
a factive know and others seem to have a non-factive know. Given that conceptual un-
derstanding emerges at much younger ages, these differences between children’s under-
standing of know are probably more related to how much experience they have with the
verb.
This individual variation in understanding of know is not well related with age,
so the relevant aspects of experience with know that differ may not be related to a child’s
age. We only found a marginal effect of age on performance in the know-matrix condition.
But there are two possible explanations of why this effect is only marginal: perhaps age
is truly a factor in developing adult-like representations of know and a larger sample
would help us find this, or perhaps the effect looks marginal because younger children are
underrepresented within the sample, and a few noisy data points bring down the average
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performance within their age range. In order to distinguish between these options, we
would have to more evenly sample children across the different age ranges.
4.6 Remaining questions
Setting aside whether there is a true effect of age on children performance and there-
fore their developing representations, these results raise big questions about children’s
representations of know in the preschool years. What accounts for the unexpected behav-
ior in this task? Why do some children fail to pick the mentioned box when they hear
know-matrix sentences? There are several possibilities that this series of studies cannot
rule out:
• Non-factive know: these tasks get at exactly what is intended with adults. Some
children have not developed a factive representation of know. Instead it may be
merely veridical, or even non-veridical.
• Know as hard trigger: children represent know as hard trigger, unlike adults. In-
felicity results when the speaker presuppositions of the know test items are unsup-
ported in the discourse and they fail to accommodate it.
• Know as even softer trigger: children represent know as an even ‘softer’ trigger
than adults would. As a result, presuppositions are very easily cancelable for them.
But this seems implausible, given that a trigger which is any ‘softer’ would hardly
be a trigger.
• Failure to accommodate the presupposition: children have an adult-like repre-
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sentation of know, but fail to globally accommodate the unsupported presupposition
in this particular case. This presupposition failure happens the same way it would
with adults. Perhaps children have different limits in how willing they are to ac-
commodate (Hamburger and Crain 1982, Crain et al. 1993). Adults are generally
less likely to accommodate informative presuppositions when the stakes are high
(e.g., presupposing election results on election day). Perhaps finding the toy is so
important to children that they are unwilling to take the experimenter at her word
(especially because she is the one hiding the toys and might be interpreted as try-
ing to keep the child from succeeding). This cannot be the whole story, however,
because reluctance to accommodate should lead to non-adult performance across
know conditions and it only does in the know-matrix condition.
There must be some additional reason that the matrix negation sentences
do not lead to accepting the truth of the complement while the others do. Future
work should directly test whether children can perform adult-like on tasks that do
not require accommodation, although this might be difficult considering children’s
Theory of Mind abilities at this age. In order to set up a task that doesn’t require
accommodation, the child has to be aware of the truth of know’s complement but
respond to some other aspect of sentence in context. However, past studies with
similar test sentences have found that children at this age have a hard time putting
aside what they know to be true in order to respond to the truth of the sentence
(Wellman et al. 2001, Sowalsky et al. 2009, Lewis et al. 2013, Lewis 2013, Harri-
gan et al. under review).
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• Local accommodation failure: these children have an adult-like semantics for
know. They differ from adults in this task by favoring local, rather than global ac-
commodation of the presupposition. However, work by Bill et al. (2014) suggests
that this is not likely since those authors find that children do not locally accommo-
date in their study.
• Processing failure: children have to represent presupposition, entailment-canceling
operators, and the accommodation inference has to go through, and children have to
plan a behavioral response. Perhaps children have the right representations, but fail
to put all these pieces together in these tasks (see Hamburger and Crain 1984)? As
children get older, executive functioning abilities develop and this process is more
likely to succeed.
Consider the processing demands to succeed on our task. Children hear clues
in the absence of context. Upon hearing the sentence “Lambchop doesn’t know
that it’s in the red box”, they have to realize that the speaker used a factive verb,
which presupposes the truth of its complement. They then have to infer from her
use of ‘know’ that the speaker takes it for granted that the toy is in the red box. If
the speaker takes it for granted that it’s in the red box (and is in a good position to
be justified in doing so, since she hid the toy), it must be that it is in the red box.
Children should then choose the red box. It is possible that for some children, this
inference process is too demanding. In effect, they would have all the right pieces
but they would be unable put them together in this task.
• Multiple sources of performance: two or more of the above possibilities co-exist,
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in different groups of children.
4.7 Outlook from behavioral studies
What does the broader literature, including Study 1 and Study 2 tell us about the
representations that children develop for know and think?
For think, previous studies suggest that the adult-like non-veridical and non-factive
representation is in place by 4 years. But what is happening at 3? Two types of hypotheses
were consistent with that literature: semantic and pragmatic ones. Under a semantic error
hypothesis, children might have either a factive or veridical representation of think. If
they had a factive representation, it would be very similar to adult understanding of know.
If they had a veridical representation, they might assume that think can only report on
true beliefs, but we would not expect to see projection. Under a pragmatic error account,
children would have an adult-like representation, but they would assume that speaker
intended to proffer the truth of the complement in uttering attitude reports with think.
The results of Study 1 and 2 rule out the possibility that typical errors with think
in false belief scenarios are due to a factive representation for think. But that leaves us
with the veridical version of a semantic error and the pragmatic error. Can these be dis-
tinguished at all? Many other accounts (such as those from Lewis and colleagues) appeal
to pragmatic explanations of these errors, and they can be taken to explain a broader set
of facts within the literature, including typical errors that children make in false belief
tasks without think, as well as the order that children seem to master different Theory
of Mind tasks (Wellman and Liu 2004, Westra 2016, Westra and Carruthers 2016). Prag-
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matic accounts also provide possible explanations of why explicit knowledge access tasks
are passed earlier than explciit false belief tasks, given that the test questions in knowl-
edge access tasks do not present the same pragmatic issues as those in explicit false belief
tasks. Furthermore, an account based on a veridicality error would be somewhat inconsis-
tent with children’s early successes on diverse belief tasks (see Wellman and Liu 2004 for
discussion of these tasks). As a result, pragmatic accounts of early think errors seem to
be most explanatory, but can we get any further evidence for such accounts if we examine
children’s input with think and consider what kinds of representations that input would
make available? What would it mean for children to make the initial representational
mistake that think is veridical and could they ultimately correct it by 4 years?
For know, the previous literature indicated that understanding of factivity did not
emerge before 4 years, but Study 1 and Study 2 suggest that it does for some children,
assuming that these studies are a straightforward assessment of the underlying represen-
tations. Theses studies show that adult-like behavior emerges during the preschool years,
but at different times for different children. For some children, a factive representation
emerges as early as 3, and for some later than 4.5 years. But what is puzzling is the dif-
ference in the amount of individual variation for the two verbs. Can children’s input with





How available are these different routes to the contrast? Are veridicality and factiv-
ity cues from the discourse status of the complement available, despite the ‘softness’ or
know and the ‘assertivity’ of think? How available are syntactic and discourse function
cues? Are these different kinds of complements or different speech acts present in linguis-
tic input? If so, does the child use these kinds of cues in acquiring the difference between
know and think? As of yet, there are no empirical findings showing that distributions of
these verbs differ in speech to children at this level of granularity, nor that children utilize
these kinds of cues in acquiring (non-)factivity.
5.2 Methods
To investigate which cues are made available to children, we examined tokens of
know and think in child ambient speech from the Gleason corpus in CHILDES (Masur and
Gleason 1980, MacWhinney 2000). The Gleason corpus is comprised of conversations
between 24 target children and their families recorded in the late 1970s in the Boston
area. The families are all White and middle- or upper-middle-class1. The ages of the
1This specific corpus was chosen with the ultimate goal being a comparison with corpora of families
from different demographic groups in future work.
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target children in this corpus range from 2-5 years, but the average age is about 3.5.
The corpus includes dinner conversations in the home, as well as two separate play
sessions in a laboratory setting between the child and each parent in turn. The content of
the dinner conversations was left up to the participants and varied across families, but the
play sessions were somewhat more uniform because each parent was required to complete
three activities with their child during the session: working with a toy car that could be
taken apart and put back together; reading a picture book with no words; and playing with
a grocery store set. Together these four activities—dinner conversations, take-apart car,
picture book, and grocery set—should lead to a naturalistic sample of speech and allow
for a good look at the typical distribution of our target verbs in the input.
Know and think were relatively frequent in this corpus. We identified 1231 tokens
of know and 1156 tokens of think. On average, each child might hear know sentences 17
times per conversation and think sentences 16 times per conversation. Know occurred in
3.7% of all child ambient utterances and think occurred in 3.5% of them.
5.3 Coding scheme
Our coding scheme was designed to capture syntactic features of know or think to-
kens as well as their relationship to the surrounding discourse. We examined the types
of subjects (92-94), tense (95-97), negation (98-99), complements (100-104) and types of
clauses (105-107) that the verbs occur with, as well as the projective contexts that they
occur in (108-111) and the status of the information that their declarative complements
express (112-114). The possible codes for each category are illustrated below with ac-
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tual examples from the Gleason corpus. Syntax-level codes (i.e., subject, tense, negation,
complement, clause, projective contexts) were made based on examining the utterance
in isolation and therefore in the absence of any information about the surrounding dis-
course. Discourse-level codes (i.e., status of information in complement clauses) were
made on a subset of the utterances, as applicable. For these codes, 50 lines of the preced-
ing discourse and 5 lines of the following dialogue were examined in order to establish a
discourse context against which the utterance was evaluated. In most cases, this was more




a. I know we’ll find a place. (father of Charlie, aged 2;11 years;months,
play context)
b. I think so too. (father of Theresa, aged 4;2 years;months, dinner
context)
(93) 2nd
a. You know them pears that was there? (sister of Guy, 3;0, din-
ner)
b. You think you’re a little pig. (mother of William, 2;3, din-
ner)
(94) other (3rd person subjects, definites, null subjects, etc.)
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a. She knows I’m going away. (mother of Victor, 2;4, dinner)
b. He thinks it’s a good place. (father of Susan, 3;2, play)
2. tense-types
(95) present
a. You know this room very well, huh? (father of Wanda, 4;0, play)
b. I think this is called a wrench. (mother of Patricia, 2;5, play)
(96) past
a. I thought you liked it? (mother of Helen, 4;4, dinner)
b. Knew you would. (mother of Nanette, 2;2, dinner)
(97) other (infinitive, future, etc.)
a. I wanted to know if I’d heard of her doctors. (father of
Martin, 2;6, dinner)
b. I’m trying to think of what we have here. (mother of David,
4;2, dinner)
3. negation-type
(98) absent: no negation present in attitude clause
a. I think the only thing to eat is mustard. (mother of Guy,
3;0, play)
b. I know it’s not a big favor. (mother of Victor, 2;4, dinner)
(99) present: negation present in attitude clause
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a. I don’t think there was a single Republican who had no
opposition. (father of John, 4;2, dinner)
b. I didn’t know you sold books here. (mother of Xavia, 4;0, play)
4. complement-type
(100) declarative (both finite and non-finite)
a. I know they better get a second car. (mother of Patricia, 2;5,
dinner)
b. Do you think he’ll do it? (father of William, 2;3, play)
(101) interrogative
a. You know what those are? (mother of Charlie, 3;0, dinner)
b. I don’t know if it matters. (father of Martin, 2;6, play)
(102) noun phrase
a. I know it. (father of Laurel, 3;0), dinner)
b. Do you know any of the numbers? (father of Patricia, 2;6, play)
(103) preposition phrase
a. She doesn’t know about it yet. (mother of Katie, 3;2, dinner)
b. I just thought of something else I needed. (father of Frank,
5;2, play)
(104) null
a. I just don’t know. (mother of David, 4;2, dinner)




a. I don’t know. (mother of Victor, 2;4, dinner)
b. Because they think they’re too young. (mother of Nanette,
2;2, dinner)
(106) polar interrogative:
a. Ya know what happened? (mother of Bobby, 4;2, dinner)
b. Do you think you can tell Rachel what you’re doing? (fa-
ther of Helen (4;11, play)
(107) wh-interrogative
a. How do you know that? (mother of William, 2;3, dinner)
b. What do you think? (mother of Eddie, 4;3, play)
6. projective contexts
(108) negation
a. I don’t think there was a single Republican who had no
opposition. (father of John, 4;2, dinner)
b. I didn’t know you sold books here. (mother of Xavia, 4;0, play)
(109) questions
a. Ya know what happened? (mother of Bobby, 4;2, dinner)
2Imperatives are not included in this coding scheme because they did not occur with know and think is
this corpus.
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b. Do you think you can tell Rachel what you’re doing? (fa-
ther of Helen (4;11, play)
(110) modals
a. Perhaps he thinks the pipe is too small for them. (father
of Susan, 3;2, play)
b. Then you probably know how it works. (mother of Wanda, 3;11,
play)
(111) conditionals
a. How are you gonna call if you don’t know what his name
is? (father of Charlie, 2;11, play)
b. So if Wanda thought about something, she went like this.
(father of Wands, 4;0, dinner)
Discourse contexts
vii. status of information in complement clause
(112) old: information that has been previously mentioned in the discourse and
accepted into the common ground
a. conversation with John (4;2) at dinner, participants include the target
child, his mother, his father and his sister:
mother: That’s true.
mother: Jimmy Carter would win.
father: I just wanted to make sure last time.
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mother: That what?
sister: I going in there.
mother: I don’t think so.
mother: Because they’re working in there.
mother: And they don’t want you to come there now.
mother: After when they’re finished you can come there.
father: They will be happy to have you.
sister: And me finished.
mother: I know you’re finished, Rachi.
sister: Please.
(113) new: information that has not been previously mentioned, or is uttered out-
of-the-blue
a. conversation with Isadora (3;7) during grocery-set play interaction, par-
ticipants include the target child and her father:
father: But we’re gonna do shop for some breakfast food.
father: Right?
father: I wanna good cereal.
father: Can you find a good cereal in your store for me?
child: Mhm.
father: Which kind of good cereal is that?
child: Um there’s drinks in here too.
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father: There’re drinks too?
child: You could have hot dogs.




father: I know I want some milk.
father: Can I have one of these?
(114) unclear: information that has not been explicitly mentioned and accepted
into the common ground, but which could be shared by the interlocutors,
because of world knowledge, family routines, children’s habits and prefer-
ences, or which could be inferred from the previous discourse
a. conversation with Victor (2;3) during picture-book play interaction,
participants include the target child and his mother:
mother: Okay.
child: Are dey in dere?
mother: I don’t see them in the front.






mother: May I see?
child: Don’t take a peek.
mother: Take a peek?
child: No.
mother: Don’t take a peek.
mother: Would you like a story?
child: What, Mama?
mother: Would you like a story?
child: Yeah.
mother: I saw a little tiny book over here.
mother: And I know you like little books.
All utterances were coded using this scheme and a subset were checked by one of
two undergraduate research assistants. Different procedures were carried out for syntax-
level codes and discourse codes due to the sample sizes available. For the majority of
the syntax-level coding categories, 98% or more of the tokens were included in the reli-
ability check. Since the reliability statistics were so high for each category, only 80% or
more of the tokens were included for the last two syntactic-level categories to be checked
(tense-type and complement-type). For all syntax-level categories, intercoder agreement
was high (.99 < κ < .80). For the one discourse-level category, 100% of the relevant
tokens were included in the reliability check, given that only approximately 11% of the
entire sample was eligible for discourse-level coding. For this discourse-level category,
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intercoder agreement was not high (κ = .44). Arguably, this reflects how hard it is to track
propositions within a naturalistic parent-child discourse and determine whether they ex-
press information that is part of the common ground or new to (some of) the interlocutors.
We return to this issue in the results section.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Veridicality cues
First, we examined whose beliefs were under discussion in using know and think
by tracking the subjects that occur with each verb—as an indication of whether the con-
versational participants took them to be true or false. The results are given in Figure 5.1.
We find that the verbs are most often used with subjects that refer to the conversational
participants, given that subjects which were not first or second person occurred in less
than 10% of tokens for either verb. This indicates that the beliefs under discussion are
typically those of the interlocutors: the speaker (usually a parent, but sometimes another
family member or experimenter) and an addressee (sometimes the target child and some-
times another person present); the beliefs of someone external to the conversation are
rarely discussed. Furthermore, know occurs primarily with second person subjects (61%
of all know tokens), think occurs primarily with first person subjects (61% of all think
tokens). These data also suggest that there is a difference in whose beliefs are discussed
with know vs. think. A chi-square test of independence was performed to determine the
relationship between subject-types and verbs. The relation between these variables was
significant, χ2 (2, N = 2387) = 236.1, p < .00001. Speaker’s beliefs were discussed most
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with think and addressee’s beliefs were discussed most with know.
Figure 5.1: Subject-types within the Gleason sample, as a proportion of each verb
Given that think is most often used to express the speaker’s beliefs, we next asked
how often these beliefs are described as currently held beliefs—and might thus be true, as
far as a naive hearer might assume—or formerly held beliefs—which might seem false to
the hearer. We thus looked at the types of tense that occurred with the verbs. The results
are given in Figure 5.2. We find that both verbs occur most often in the present tense
(95% of know tokens and 91% of think tokens). Past tense tokens of either verb were
infrequent; these forms occur in only 4% of know tokens and 8% of think tokens. This
indicates that the beliefs under discussion when using either verb are most often beliefs
that are currently held, as opposed to formerly held.
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Figure 5.2: Tense-types within the Gleason sample, as a proportion of each verb
Pulling together the data discussed in this section, a particular picture of children’s
experience with think emerges. Think is often used in first person tokens in the present
tense. These I think p tokens (which make up 47.6% of children’s input with think) cannot
be used to report a false belief. What about the rest? We’ve already seen that there are
very few third person subjects, but 30% of all think tokens have second person subjects.
Out of these think tokens, there are some questions, but these are unlikely to report false
beliefs either. 13.6% of think tokens are questions like What do you think? which clearly
do not report false beliefs. And another 11.9% of think tokens are questions like Do you
think that p?, which are often used to ask p? with the assumption that the addressee
might have the answer. Given the the majority of think tokens (approximately 75%) are
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these I think p or what do you think? or do you think p? tokens, there are very few
opportunities to observe think as reporting a false belief overall. See Figures 5.6 and 5.7
and accompanying discussion in Section 5.4.4 for more details on questions in the sample
and the relationship to subject-types.
5.4.2 Factivity cues
To determine how often speakers presuppose p with x thinks p vs. x knows p, we
first had to isolate the relevant think and know tokens, namely those with declarative
complements.3 In our corpus there were 796 x thinks p tokens and only 131 x knows p
tokens.4 For more details on what other complements occur in the corpus, see Section
5.4.3.
Given that we had only 131 x knows p tokens (only 11% of all know tokens in the
sample), we used all of them in the subsequent analyses, as well as an equivalent sam-
ple of x thinks p tokens (128 tokens or 11% of total think tokens). For these tokens, we
examined the transcripts that they came from to determine how often p expressed infor-
mation that was part of the common ground, using the discourse-level coding categories
discussed above. Due to disagreement between coders, data for this coding category was
re-categorized to provide the most generous estimate of what information was old. As
3Declarative complements were isolated because factives do not entail the truth of their complement
when the complement is a noun, preposition or embedded question, and because we could not be sure to
recover the right complement type for null, or non-expressed, complements.
4We also filtered out tokens with declarative complements if they were in wh-questions or if part of
the complement was unintelligible (marked in CHILDES transcripts as “xxx”) such that the corresponding
proposition was unrecoverable.
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reported here, “old” data includes the union of utterances which either coder marked as
old; “new” data includes the intersection of utterances which both coders marked as new,
and “unclear” data includes all other utterances (i.e., those that were marked as new by
one coder and unclear by the other coder). The resulting data are provided in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Status of the complements within the Gleason sample, as a proportion of x
verbs p tokens for each verb
Even with this generous classification, we found that the complements of both x
thinks p and x knows p tokens rarely expressed information that had been previously
mentioned in the conversation and accepted into the common ground. In our sample, p
described old information in only 15% of all x knows p tokens and 14% of all x thinks
p tokens. Unclear and new tokens were far more frequent, and occurred in different
124
proportions for the two verbs. For x thinks p tokens in our sample, p most often described
new information (59% of the tokens), while x knows p tokens were most often unclear
tokens (47% of the tokens). A chi-square test was performed to determine the relationship
between the two verbs and the status of their complements. The relation between these
variables was significant, χ2 (2, N = 259) = 12.59, p < .002. Declarative complements
more often expressed new information with think than with know.
However, we might want to ask if these patterns—while statistically significant—are
also cognitively significant for children or can help them learn something about the factiv-
ity of know vs. the non-factivity of think. Does this kind of input distribution support the
learning strategy that factives have complements which express common ground infor-
mation, given that x knows p tokens are so rare, that x thinks p tokens are so frequent, and
p expresses “old” information at similar rates for the two verbs? To determine this, we
analyzed the cue validity of a complement expressing “old” information for determining
which verbs are factive. A cue validity statistic expresses the reliability of a particular cue
for identifying some category as a conditional probability with a value ranging between 0
on the low end and 1 on the high end (Brunswik 1956, Gibson 1966). In our sample, the
probability of getting a know token given an “old” token is only .15, while the probability
for think is .85. Thus our sample suggests that using declarative complements which ex-
press common ground information as a cue to factivity would lead the learner to sooner
conclude that think is factive than that know is factive, due to the similar rates of “old”
tokens for the two verbs and the fact that such cases are overwhelmingly more frequent
for think than know.
Furthermore, to give a sense of what children are dealing with if they rely solely
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on this kind of cue, we can look at how often cues like this occur. Less than 20 tokens
in the entire sample were x knows p tokens that could be evaluated for whether p is “old”
information. This corresponds to 1.5% of all know tokens in this sample. If this is indica-
tive of the representative of children’s experience, then children could expect to observe
5-6 such informative examples in every 10,000 utterances that they hear. Given estimates
by Akhtar et al. (2004) based on Hart and Risley’s (1995) data, this would amount to
approximately 1,500 such utterances by the point that children are beginning to differen-
tiate between know and think at age 3. But such calculations should be taken with a grain
of salt given the kinds of sampling issues that arise with corpus data and the size of our
sample here.
However, if we want to be more generous to these kinds of cues, we can include
the “unclear” cases (114) as tokens that can be classified as common knowledge from the
perspective of the child. If so, we find that know occurs more often with known informa-
tion (old/unclear in 62% of x knows p tokens) whereas think occurs more often with new
information (new in 59% of x thinks p tokens). Think tends to be used with complements
which express new information while know tends to be used with complements that ex-
press known information. However, the cue validity statistic does not improve much with
this generous grouping: the cue validity for know only rises to .20 while think’s lowers to
.80.
Finally, we also examined how often these x knows p tokens occurred in p-family
contexts which could be informative about the projection behavior of know. We found that
out of the 131 x knows p tokens, only 50 of them (36%) occurred in projective contexts
and they were exclusively under negation and question operators (with no conditional
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or modal contexts). Negation data is presented here in Figure 5.4 and question data is
presented in Figure 5.6 in Section 5.4.4.
Figure 5.4: Negation-types within the Gleason sample, as a proportion of each verb
Now, there are some important caveats in considering our data. Our discourse-level
coders failed to become reliable (κ = .44). This could be taken to suggest that our coding
scheme was not appropriate to handle this task. It could also be taken to suggest that this
task—tracking whether propositions are new or known given some prior discourse—is
actually quite difficult given the kinds of discourses that parents and children participate
in. It is suggestive that children might have similar difficulty—or more difficulty for that




In order to look at the viability of a syntactic bootstrapping approach to learning the
contrast between know and think, we examined the kinds of complements that occur with
each verb. The results are shown in Figure 5.5.
Know takes declarative complements, as we saw before in Section 5.4.2, but it more
often occurs with interrogative complements (52% of all know tokens). In contrast, think
occurs primarily with declarative complements (85% of all think tokens). NP comple-
ments are very rare in this sample, occurring in 6% of know tokens and 1% of think
tokens (which are likely speech errors). PP complements are also rare, occuring in 4% of
all think tokens and less than 1% of all know tokens. Null, or un-expressed, complements
are relatively frequent, occuring in 26% of know tokens and 10% of think tokens. These
are typically answers to questions (e.g., A: Where are the keys? B: I don’t know) and
responses to statements (e.g., A: You left the keys in the kitchen B: I know!) but some are
speech errors or refer to the process of thinking (e.g., She’s thinking right now). This kind
of distribution would support a syntactic bootstrapping route to the contrast assuming a
principled link between responsive predicates (those which embed both interrogative and
declarative complements) and factivity (or veridicality).
5.4.4 Discourse function cues
To determine the viability of a pragmatic bootstrapping approach to learning the
contrast between know and think, we examined aspects of the verb’s discourse functions
in speech to children.
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Figure 5.5: Complement-types within the Gleason sample, as a proportion of each verb
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First, we examined the kinds of direct speech acts that the verbs are used to perform
as measured by the types of clauses that the verbs occur in. See Figure 5.6 for the results.
We find that declarative clauses are the most prevalent, followed by polar interrogatives
and then wh-interrogatives. But there are differences in the kinds of clauses that occur
most frequently with each verb. Think is used primarily in declarative clauses (64% of all
think tokens) while know occurs almost equally in declaratives (50% of all know tokens)
and polar interrogatives (49% of all know tokens). Interrogative clauses are rarer with
think; only 20% of all think tokens are polar interrogatives and 17% are wh-interrogatives.
A chi-square test of independence was performed to determine the relationship between
clause-types and verbs. The relation between these variables was significant, χ2 (2, N =
2387) = 310.83, p < .00001. This indicates that think is used primarily to make assertions
while, in contrast, know is used more often in asking questions. In further analyses, wh-
interrogatives and polar interrogatives are collapsed into one interrogative category.
Furthermore, when we compare the types of clauses and subjects in the sample, we
see that the kinds of subjects that occur in utterances are not unrelated to the clause-types
(data in Figure 5.7). The vast majority of tokens with first person subjects are declaratives
(45% of the entire sample) and the vast majority of tokens with second person subjects
are interrogative (39% of the entire sample). In contrast, interrogative clauses with first
person subjects (2% of the entire sample) and declarative clauses with second person
subjects (7% of the sample) are both rare. This may not be surprising, at least within the
domain of belief verbs like think and know; when we speak, we may be more likely to
assert our own beliefs than question them, and we may be more likely to ask about others’
beliefs that claim what they are. A chi-square test of independence was performed to
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Figure 5.6: Clause-types within the Gleason sample, as a proportion of each verb
verify this relationship between clause-type and subject-type within our sample of belief
verbs. The relation between these variables was significant, χ2 (2, N = 2387) = 1445.57,
p < .00001. In talking to children, we do tend to ask questions about the beliefs of
others and assert things about our own beliefs, instead of interrogating our own beliefs
and declaring others’ beliefs.
The data presented here suggest that know is used typically with (i) second per-
son subjects (Figure 5.1), (ii) interrogative clauses (Figure 5.6), and (iii) interrogative
complements (Figure 5.5), while think is typically used with (i) first person subjects, (ii)
declarative clauses, and (iii) declarative complements. This data is reflective of the kinds
of indirect speech acts that know and think can be used to achieve. We know that there is
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Figure 5.7: Clause-types by subject-types, as a proportion of entire Gleason sample
a relationship between subject-types and clause-types (Figure 5.7). How do the different
complement-types distribute across these categories? How often do second person know
questions also have interrogative complements, compatible with indirect requests for in-
formation (as in 16a)? And how often do first person think assertions have declarative
complements, compatible with indirect assertions (as in 17)?
In our sample, know is frequently used to ask indirect questions (29.7% of all know
tokens are polar questions with second person subjects and embedded questions) such as
(115) or to answer questions (33.5% of all know tokens are assertions with first person
subjects) as in (116). In contrast, think is most often used to make indirect assertions
(41.3% of all think tokens are assertions with first person subjects, present tense, declara-
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tive complements and no negation) as in (117). This suggests that, in speech to children,
know is most often used to request information or to answer requests for information,
while think is used to express commitment to some proposition.
(115) conversation with Helen (4;11) during play interaction, participants include the
target child and her mother
mother: Well, do you know what the story’s about?
child: What?
mother: Well, we’ll see.
(116) conversation with Laurel (3;0) at dinner, participants include the target child, her
mother and her father:
child: What’s the other baby’s name?
father: I don’t know. (addressed to child)
father: What’s the other baby’s name? (addressed to mother)
(117) conversation with Bobby (4;2) at dinner, participants include the target child, his
mother, his father and his sister:
father: What are you doing, mixing it all up?
child: That’s for it can get warmer.
father: I think it’s pretty warm now.
In addition to the kind of example in (115), parents often use Do you know Q? questions
not as genuine information-seeking questions but as knowledge questions. But the chil-
dren’s responses indicate that they take these questions as indirect questions because they
133
respond with the answer, or they say What?, rather than expressing ignorance or saying
that they do know:
(118) conversation with Helen (4;11) during grocery-set play interaction, participants
include the target child and her mother
mother: Do you know what this is?
child: Powder.
mother: Yea, that’s right. Soap powder.
Now, to consider the relevance of these kinds of speech act cues for distinguishing
between know and think, we can calculate the validity of a speech act as evidence for
a verb category. First taking potential indirect assertion tokens (those with first person
subjects, in declarative clauses, with declarative complements and present tense), the cue
validity for think is .95 given that 95% of such tokens are think ones instead of know
ones. For potential indirect questions (with second person subjects, in polar interrogative
clauses with interrogative complements), the cue validity for know is 1, given that think
is incompatible with interrogative complements. Thus, these indirect speech acts are not
only informative about the underlying meanings of the verbs, but provide an exceedingly
clear signal. Furthermore, if we abstract away from the complement types of the tokens,
and just look at the role of subjects and clauses cues (see Figure 5.7) in differentiating the
verbs, the cue validity values remain higher than those discussed for the discourse status
cues to factivity in Section 5.4.2. The probability of having a think token given a first
person assertion is .61 and the probability of having a know token given a second person
question is .77. These four cue validity values suggest that indirect cues—given by the
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kinds of speech acts speakers use know and think for—provide a clearer signal than the
discourse status cues—given by what speakers presuppose when using know and think.
5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 Discourse status cues
With this corpus study, we investigated the reliability of discourse status cues to
the veridicality and factivity distinctions between know and think in children’s linguistic
input. We asked two specific questions: (i) how often is think used to describe false beliefs
as compared to know and (ii) how often is know used to describe known information as
compared with think.
To answer the first question, we find that think is most frequently used to discuss
the speaker’s beliefs (see Figure 5.1). Moreover, these first person think sentences were
rarely used in the past (Figure 5.2) or with negation (see Figure 5.4). Thus, in children’s
experience, speakers are often committed to the truth of the complements of think (see
also Diessel and Tomasello 2001, Lewis 2013, among others). As a result, there may be
very few instances where a child could observe that think can be used to describe false
beliefs and is thus non-veridical.
To answer the second question, we found that there was a difference in how often
know vs. think was used to describe discourse-old vs. new information. But this differ-
ence (approx. a 40% - 60% split under the most generous estimates) was not of the kind
that we would expect if children need to use the discourse status route. In fact, our analy-
ses suggest that this kind of learning strategy might lead the learner to conclude that think
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is factive over know, which is not consistent with findings in the acquisition literature
(Dudley et al. 2015, Hacquard et al. 2016, and see studies reported in Chapter 4). And
we find that projective contexts are rare with these x knows p tokens, suggesting that they
might not be the most readily available contexts from which to learn about the factivity
of know.
5.5.2 Syntactic cues
These results suggest that, in children’s experience, the overall syntactic distribution
of know differs from that of think. Furthermore, these distributions would support the
generalization underlying a syntactic bootstrapping approach to factivity given that know
occurs with both declarative and interrogative complements while think does not take both
kinds.
However, problematic to the generalization that factivity correlates with the abil-
ity to embed declarative and interrogative complements are its various counterexamples:
Proffering verbs (say, tell) take questions but they are not factive (though, they can have
“factive” uses, see Schlenker 2010, Spector and Egre 2014, Anand and Hacquard 2014);
decide and be certain can also take questions, but they are not factive. Some of these
counterexamples may not be too problematic since they are not verbs that children learn
early on, and could thus be acquired piecemeal later on. However, they suggest that the
ability to embed interrogatives and declaratives may only be indirectly connected with
factivity, and that additional syntactic and semantic properties may be at play.
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5.5.3 Discourse function cues
We have seen that the way speakers use think and know, notable in the kinds of
indirect speech acts these verbs are routinely used for can provide cues as to their under-
lying meaning. Think is mainly used for indirect assertions with 1st person subjects. If
the child understands that the speaker is indirectly asserting the content of the comple-
ment with these I think p utterances, she may infer that think expresses a commitment to
the truth of the complement by the subject. In contrast, know is mainly used for indirect
questions with 2nd person subjects. If the child understands that the speaker is indirectly
asking the addressee Q? through these Do you know Q? questions, the child may infer
that know relates the subject to the true answer to Q.
5.6 Comparing cues
With the corpus study described above, we find that know and think occur at similar
rates in speech to children. Neither verb is frequently used to talk about beliefs outside
of the conversational context: they rarely describe the beliefs of a non-interlocutor, pre-
viously held beliefs or beliefs that the conversational participants do not hold. But that is
about where the similarities between the verbs’ use end. Know is primarily used to ask
questions about the addressee’s beliefs, often with the intention to request information. In
contrast, think is used to assert what the speaker believes, often with the intention to prof-
fer the content of that belief. The verbs also have distinct syntactic distributions in terms
of the complements they occur with. Think takes primarily declarative complements,
while know embeds both interrogatives and declaratives.
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As for discourse status cues to their (non-)veridicality and (non-)factivity, the verbs
are distributed in ways that are distressingly similar. The ability for think to report false
beliefs could be obscured from children given the frequency of think assertions about
the speaker’s beliefs. And any requirement that know report beliefs which are taken for
granted would be obscured by the fact that x knows p tokens are not systematically used
in contexts where p is common knowledge.
In order to use the discourse status route for a trigger like know, children must:
(i) track the common ground, (ii) track the propositions expressed in know and think’s
declarative complements, (iii) compare these propositions to the common ground, (iv)
evaluate these propositions for truth in the conversational context, (v) sort through noisy
input distributions to (vi) discover an association for know where the propositions are
true and common knowledge, whereas they aren’t for think, and (vii) conclude that this
association is a matter of convention that should be encoded into the representation of
know. In principle, this process is possible. But in reality, any of these steps can fail.
We know that the relevant data is made available, but is very sparsely distributed across
children’s experience and the relative differences between know and its comparison case
think are small. We know that these small differences are statistically significant, but we
do not know if they are cognitively significant, or salient, to children. Speaker presup-
positions are backgrounded such that children might fail to attend to them, and many
speaker presuppositions are not candidates for conventional encoding in lexical represen-
tations. When children do attend to them and notice associations with particular words,
they must then decide that this information needs to be conventionally encoded. While
this is possible, much further work is needed to verify that the discourse status route is
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taken, as opposed to the other possibilities that we lay out here. If the pragmatic view
of the triggering problem is right for know, the pressure might be alleviated somewhat:
perhaps all the child would need to discover is that know is veridical while think isn’t.
But, as we have seen, the evidence for such a distinction is also sparse, given that think is
rarely used to report false beliefs in speech to children.
Another possible route exploits earlier-developing syntactic knowledge to bootstrap
into lexical semantic knowledge. In order to use this syntactic route, children must: (i)
track syntactic distributions in their input, (ii) notice differences in the distributions of
know and think and (iii) reason about the explanation of this difference via principled
syntax-semantics links. Can children do this? We have growing support from other cases
of attitude verb acquisition that syntactic bootstrapping is at play (see Harrigan et al.
2016, Lidz et al. 2016, more discussion in Chapter 3), but not for a contrast of this grain
size, let alone this particular contrast. Furthermore, counterexamples that challenge the
principled nature of the link between factivity and question embedding still remain.
Finally, the discourse function cues allow children to use pragmatic bootstrapping
to discover the factivity contrast for know and think. In order to use this route, children
must: (i) track the intentions of their interlocutors, (ii) track the words that are used by
their interlocutors, (iii) notice relationships between them and (iv) reason about the nature
of those relationships via pragmatics-semantics links. Do we have evidence that children
can do this? In some ways, the information required for the pragmatic route is the most
salient information, given that it has social importance. As mentioned in Chapter 3, there
is some evidence that children are sensitive to the assertivity of think (Urmson 1952,
Hooper 1975; Shatz et al. 1983, Diessel and Tomasello 2001, Lewis et al. 2012, 2017)
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and to the speaker’s intentions in performing other indirect requests, but we have not
previously had the same evidence for know. This corpus suggests that children do do this,
as in the example in (118). However, it is not unreasonable to think that children would be
able to do so, especially if there are some constrained contexts with good extralinguistic
and paralinguistic cues to their parents’ intentions. However, over-weighting these cues
could lead the children to make certain errors, like mapping desires meanings for think
and know, when they are used to make indirect commands in parent-child dialogues (e.g.,
I don’t think you should touch that!).
5.7 Remaining questions
We examined a corpus of child-directed speech to determine which direct and in-
direct cues to the (non-)factivity of know and think are made available to children. With
respect to direct cues to presupposition, our data suggest that children do not have many
opportunities to observe that speakers presuppose p, when they hear know. This is because
X knows p utterances are relatively rare. When they occur, they are not systematically used
when p is in the common ground, and when compared with think p sentences, the rates
of known vs. new information differ, but not very starkly. As a result, the child may not
have reliable opportunities to observe that know is used to talk about established informa-
tion—or facts—whereas think is not. If these data are reflective of children’s experience
generally, then there is some signal in the relatively few instances they get to learn from,
but this signal is very noisy. If a child could use these cues, it would be via probabilistic
reasoning about slight differences in proportions within their experience; children would
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have to actively entertain factivity as a hypothesis and the learning trajectory would be
slow because the data would have to accrue over a long period of time.
However, know and think have different syntactic distributions in children’s experi-
ence, and they are used to perform different discourse moves. Think most often embeds
declarative complements whereas know embeds both declarative and interrogative com-
plements. Know is used most often to ask or answer information-seeking questions (i.e,
Do you know where. . . ? No, I don’t know) whereas think is used to proffer or hedge as-
sertions (i.e., I think that. . . ). Given that both types of cues (from syntactic distributions
and discourse functions) are available to children, could they provide alternative routes to
the factivity contrast?
Could syntactic bootstrapping alone be sufficient? Perhaps not, given all the coun-
terexamples to the generalization that only factives take both interrogative and declarative
complements. Perhaps so, but the appropriate generalization may be more complicated
that just embedded these two kinds of complements (White and Rawlins, 2017a, 2017b).
Could pragmatic bootstrapping alone be sufficient? Probably not, because it might back-
fire. While indirect assertions and indirect questions are routine with think and know
respectively, these verbs can also be used in other kinds of indirect speech acts. An ut-
terance like I think it’s time for bed can be used as an indirect command to send one’s
child to bed. From this, we wouldn’t want the child to conclude that think expresses some
kind of desire. But here is where the syntax might help constrain pragmatic bootstrap-
ping. These two sets of cues might be made even stronger together (see Hacquard 2014,
White et al. in prep, Hacquard and Lidz under review, as well as discussion in Chapter
sec:developmental). The syntactic information could help by filtering out the unruly cases
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when the embedded clause type does not match the indirect speech act.
5.8 Outlook
When we consider the types of representations that children might develop for know
and think, what kind of outlook do these input analyses leave us with? The connection
between evidence and representations may not be straightforward, but what could we
infer about the underlying representations if we assumed that it was straightforward?
Direct cues to factivity are relatively sparse in the input, and we have reasons to
doubt whether children would even try to use them in the first place. Direct cues to veridi-
cality are also sparse, but potentially more informative given that less evidence is needed
to make a decision about non-veridicality (in principle—on the assumption that children
wouldn’t just think the speaker was mistaken, one false complement would serve). As a
result, children may not be able to develop representations of know that are factive, unless
we have a theory that derives factivity from veridicality, such as a pragmatic theory. And
preliminary statistics suggest that if they were to learn that know is factive, they would
also conclude that think is factive. And this doesn’t seem likely, given the behavioral
results discussed in Chapter 4.
Direct cues to veridicality are very sparse, but one or two cases could help a child
figure out that think is non-veridical. Given the sparsity of such cues, not all children
would get the relevant evidence, so we might not want to endorse these cues as the route.
Particular because a child with exclusively “assertive” uses of think would be likely to
conclude that it is a veridical verb, which is a conclusion that they wouldn’t necessarily
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be able to back away from by the time that they are 4 years old.
Can these results inform the debate between semantic and pragmatic theories of
factive presupposition? Again, we must assume that the connection between evidence and
representations is straightforward. But, if we do, than these data place a higher burden on
semantic accounts. Since there is no evidence for the factivity of know (but only evidence
for its veridicality), semantic accounts seem less tenable.
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Chapter 6
Investigating the relationship between input and understanding
What kind of evidence do children use to uncover the factivity distinction between
know and think? If we can we put corpus methods and behavioral methods together,
we can measure the relationship between linguistic inputs and and behavioral outcomes
which are proxies for underlying knowledge of the word meanings. This chapter lays
out a novel corpus study that we conducted and an accompanying behavioral task which
compare children’s experiences with and understanding of know and think. While only
preliminary analyses have been finished, the results suggest that pragmatic sources of
evidence from discourse function cues, potentially when used in conjunction with syntac-
tic cues from the verbs’ distributions, are most related to children’s understanding of the
underlying distinction between the verbs.
While laid out in great detail in Chapter 1, we can review the potential routes and
corresponding input cues that are available in principle: cues from the discourse status of
the complement, from syntactic distributions, and from discourse functions.
(119) Discourse status cues to (non-)veridicality: Pay attention to everything that
speakers say in using know and think, as well as what is true in the context of
utterance. Observe that p is always true when x knows p is uttered, but not nec-
essarily when x thinks p is uttered. Conclude that know entails the truth of its
complement and that think does not, and infer that know but not think is factive.
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(120) Discourse status cues to (non-)factivity: Pay attention to everything that speak-
ers presuppose in using know and think. Notice that whenever x knows p is used,
p is always common knowledge but not whenever x thinks p is uttered. Conclude
that p is a presupposition triggered by x knows p but not x thinks p.
(121) Syntactic cues via syntactic bootstrapping: Pay attention to the syntactic distri-
butions of know and think. Notice that know is a responsive verb which embeds
both interrogative and declarative complements, while think isn’t. Conclude that
know but not think is factive.
(122) Discourse function cues via pragmatic bootstrapping: Pay attention to the dis-
course moves that speakers use know and think to achieve. Notice that know is
regularly used to ask and answer questions, while think is used to proffer informa-
tion. Conclude that know is a veridical verb which expresses a relation between
the subject and the true answer to the embedded question, and infer that it is
also factive. Conclude that think is a verb which expresses a commitment of the
speaker to the embedded proposition, and is neither veridical nor factive.
Results from the Gleason corpus of child-ambient speech, discussed in Chapter 5
provide more support for the bootstrapping routes than for routes which focus on dis-
course status cues, but do not rule out the possibility that the learner uses these discourse
status cues. When we match input and performance on an individual basis, can we get a
clearer picture of the relationship between the two?
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6.1 Relationships between input and outcome
Attitude verbs are relatively infrequent in naturalistic speech; they are produced in
around 10% of utterances both cross-linguistically and in different types of conversational
contexts (Adrián et al. 2007, Furrow et al. 1992, Slaughter et al. 2007, Tardif and Wellman
2000). However, out of this relatively infrequent class of verbs, know and think are two
of the most common ones, occurring approximately 53 thousand and 35 thousand times
respectively in the CHILDES database (MacWhinney 2000), which equates to about 1-2
tokens per 100 utterances.
Studies which look at the relationship between input and child productions of atti-
tude verbs find that quantity of input is related to quantity of child productions (Jenkins
et al., 2003). But we know that linguistic input can differ both in quantity and in “qual-
ity” (Hart and Risley 1995, Hoff 2003, Hoff 2006, Huttenlocher et al. 2007, Huttenlocher
et al. 2010), and that aspects of input quality might ultimately relate to differences in ac-
quisition outcomes, or ages of acquisition (Hoff and Naigles 2002). When we consider
such analyses for attitude verbs, it seems that quality of the input is also related to chil-
dren’s productions, both when we consider linguistic and non-linguistic measures. Know
is first used to talk about the self and then about others, both in the input that children
receive and in children’s own use of know (Booth et al. 1997) and other aspects of parent-
child relationships, such as attachment style, can be related to the relative frequency of
different attitude verbs during a goal-oriented interaction between mothers and their chil-
dren (Becker Razuri et al., 2017). But these measures are coarse-grained and are not
directly informative about the role of input in developing representations of the verbs’
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(non-)factivity.
As a first step in the right direction, Howard et al. (2008) studied the relationship
between aspects of input quality with know and think and children’s understanding of
differences between the verbs. The tasks that they used required the three-year-old par-
ticipants to decide whether a know statement or a think statement was more informative
when the two statements conflicted, similar to the methodology of Moore and colleagues
(Moore et al. 1989, Moore and Davidge 1989):
(123) A toy is hidden in one of two boxes and the child must find it. They receive the
following clues:
a. Puppet A : I think it’s in the blue box.
b. Puppet B : I know it’s in the yellow box.
While we have already discussed why this kind of measure is not necessarily infor-
mative about children’s understanding of the factivity distinction between know and think
(Chapter 4), there results are somewhat suggestive. They found that input with attitude
verbs does differ between groups of children, and certain aspects of the input were related
to performance on this kind of task. First, hearing know in questions predicted higher
accuracy in the task. Second, hearing know occur with first person subjects lead to worse
performance. While these are very coarse measures of input quality, they are suggestive
that cues such as discourse function ones (Do you know what time it is?, see Chapter 5)
are related to understanding distinctions between know and think.
Using finer-grained measures of distributional cues in input with know and think and
a task designed to measure understanding of projection, is there evidence that individual
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differences in quantity or quality of input lead to individual differences in understanding
of factivity at three years? If so, can we determine the relative informativity of discourse
status cues to factivity and veridicality vs. indirect cues from syntactic distributions and
discourse functions?
6.2 Methodology
For our main input measure, families were asked to record conversations that they
had with their children in the home. We recommended that they record during dinnertime,
under the assumption that this would be a time when most members of the family were
together and participating in conversation. But we allowed parents to record at other times
if they were more convenient.
In our lab, we collected two more input measures that were more controlled and
therefore more comparable across different families. For these measures, we recorded
conversations between the target child and one parent during two joint activities. The
first activity was a goal-oriented puzzle task where children and parents were directed
to use puzzle pieces (of different shapes, sizes, colors and patterns) to recreate images
from flashcards (see Figure 5 in Appendix B for a picture of the puzzle board). Each
parent-child dyad was given five flashcards with puzzles of increasing difficulty, but they
were allowed to complete them in any order that they wished, or to use the puzzle set
in a different way if they so desired. This activity was chosen because it provided an
opportunity for parents to produce indirect speech acts in order to guide their child’s
behavior. The particular puzzles were chosen so that they were of different levels of
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difficulty, but also so that there would be a mix of familiar objects (turtle, crab, train,
bus). One puzzle in particular was chosen because it was more open to interpretation
and could be viewed in multiple ways (e.g., giraffe, doll, robot, mask) and might thus
encourage more belief- or opinion-centric discussion. The second activity was an open-
ended play session with a set of cooking and food toys (see Figures 6 and 7 for sample
pictures of the toys). Parents and children were directed to play with the toys as they saw
fit, including pretend grocery shopping and pretend cooking.
These measures were chosen so that they would be comparable with previous cor-
pus analyses (Chapter 5). Our input measures were chosen so that they would approxi-
mate three of the four interaction-types from the Gleason corpus. Our home conversations
were picked to match Gleason’s dinner conversations, our puzzle task was supposed to
match Gleason’s take-apart car game, and our cooking task was supposed to be similar
to Gleason’s grocery game. However, unlike Gleason, we did not include a picture-book
context in this study.
6.3 Behavioral task
Between the two lab input activities, children participated in a behavioral task de-
signed to assess their understanding of the (non-)factivity of know and think. This task
was based on the paradigm developed for Study 2 (Chapter 4) with two adjustments: (i)
the number of trials in the two matrix-negation critical conditions was increased to 9 (oth-
ers left at 6 trials/condition), and (ii) we introduced a familiarization phase before the test
phase where children were given trivial clues of the form It’s in the red/blue box, in order
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to familiarize them with the structure of a trial. The test items from the studies in Chapter
4 are repeated here in (124) for convenience.
(124) a. No negation
i. Chris thinks that it’s in the red box (think-none)
ii. Chris knows that it’s in the red box (know-none)
b. Matrix negation
i. Chris doesn’t think that it’s in the red box (think-matrix)
ii. Chris doesn’t know that it’s in the red box (know-matrix)
c. Embedded negation
i. Chris thinks that it’s not in the red box (think-embedded)
ii. Chris knows that it’s not in the red box (know-embedded)
As before, we will be most concerned with children’s performance in the know-
matrix and think-matrix conditions. In these two conditions, the target verbs occur in
projective contexts so we can ask whether children understand that the truth of the com-
plement should project with the factive know, but not the non-factive think. If they un-
derstand this, they should infer that the complement is true under know and search in the
mentioned box. And they might tend to infer that the complement is false under think,




Participants were 60 target children and their families. Target children were be-
tween 3 and 4.5 years of age, with an average age of 3 years and 8 months. 28 of the
target children were female and 32 were male. All target children were reported to be
monolingual speakers of English by their parents and all were recruited from the Uni-
versity of Maryland Infant Studies database, or at the University of Maryland Center for
Young Children.
Some target children were excluded from preliminary analyses reported here: 9
children failed to achieve control criteria; 1 child failed familiarization trials; 2 children
received parental direction during the task; 2 children demonstrated a clear color prefer-
ence for one hiding location; for 5 children, preliminary coding of input measures has not
been completed. These exclusions leave a final sample of 41 target children (21 males),
mean age = 3;9 years;months, age range = 3;1-4;5.
6.3.2 Results
Children’s performance as a group is represented in Figure 6.1. Children tend to
pick the mentioned box when they hear think-none (91%) and know-none (92%) sen-
tences. They tend to pick the other box when they hear think-matrix (74%), think-
embedded (90%) and know-embedded (84%) sentences. In the know-matrix condition,
children only picked the mentioned box on 48% of trials. Notice that these group means
are approximately the same as those from Study 1 and Study 2 (Chapter 4). This sug-
gests that adding extra trials in the critical condition did not have a great effect of per-
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Figure 6.1: Children’s performance across conditions, by negation-type
formance, and that the children in this study are drawn from a similar distribution of
factivity-knowers vs. non-factivity-knowers as previous studies.
Now to turn to the critical trials, what kind of individual variation do we find?
Individual performance in the know-matrix condition (e.g., Chris doesn’t know that it’s
in the red box) is given in Figure 6.2 and individual performance in the think-matrix
condition (e.g., Chris doesn’t think that it’s in the red box) is given in Figure 6.3.
Using age (continuous) and sentence-type (think-matrix/know-matrix) as predic-
tors, multiple regression analysis indicated that the two predictors explained some of the
variance (R2 = .1466, F2,79 = 6.784, p«.01). Sentence-type significantly predicted per-
formance (β=-.217, p«.01) and age marginally predicted performance (β=-.145, p>.10).
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Figure 6.2: Children’s performance on know-matrix trials
Figure 6.3: Children’s performance on think-matrix trials
Children were more likely to pick the mentioned box when they heard know-matrix sen-
tences than when they heard think-matrix sentences, and they were less likely to pick the
mentioned box as they got older, across all 6 types of trials. Selections of the mentioned-
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box were correlated with age in the think-matrix condition, but only with marginal signif-
icance (r = -.27, p<.08), and were not correlated with age in the know-matrix condition (r
= -.12, p<.45).
These results are similar to those from Study 1 and Study 2 but suggest that the
age effects which were found in previous studies were spurious. With a larger sample,
we no longer have any evidence for age-related variation in know. This is suggestive
that qualitative aspects of the input—which may vary across different families more than
across different ages—are related to uncovering the distinction between know and think, in
addition to quantitative aspects of input or other other factors that would be more related
to age, such as executive function.
6.4 Input measures
When we look at the rate with which these two verbs occur in the input, we see that
there are no age-related differences (Figure 6.4), but that the occurrence of verb tokens
is well-related to the length of recordings which contribute to the input measures (Figure
6.5). Furthermore, the data in Figure 6.5 suggests that some parents use greater propor-
tions of the verbs than others. However, some of the home recordings include long periods
of silence when the families are in another room. In future analyses, we can control for
this issue by considering how talkative parents are: once we factor out these periods of
silence, do parents have similar rates of utterances that contain the verbs?
Average length of home recordings that contribute to home input measure is 114
minutes, or about 2 hours per family, although different families recorded between 22
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Figure 6.4: Count of verb tokens as a function of target child age
and 187 minutes. For lab activities that contribute to input measure, families were able
to decide when they were ready to move on to the next task. Around 15-20 minutes into
each activity, families were prompted to move on if they wanted to. All of these activities
lasted around 5-30 minutes.
We do find interesting differences in use of the verbs across these different contexts
(see Figure 6.6). Unsurprisingly, the verbs occur more frequently in home recordings, but
these recordings are 8 times longer than the lab recordings on average. But, more surpris-
ingly, we find that the verbs are used differently within the two contexts. A chi-square
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Figure 6.5: Count of verb tokens as a function of home recording length
Interaction know think Total
home 1476 (91.1%) 1380 (72.6%) 2856 (81.1%)
puzzle-lab 145 (8.9%) 521 (27.4%) 666 (18.9%)
Total 1621 (100%) 1901 (100%) 3522 (100%)
Figure 6.6: Count of verb tokens by interaction context
156
Speaker know think Total
mother 1042 (64.3%) 1410 (74.2%) 2452 (69.7%)
father 329 (20.3%) 341 (17.9%) 670 (19.0%)
other adult 84 (5.2%) 51 (2.7%) 135 (3.8%)
sibling 158 (9.7%) 93 (4.9%) 251 (7.1%)
media 8 (1.3%) 6 (0.3%) 14 (0.4%)
Total 1621 (100%) 1901 (100%) 3522 (100%)
Figure 6.7: Count of verb tokens by speaker
test of independence was performed to determine the relationship between interaction
context and verb. The relation between these variables was significant, χ2 (2, N = 3522)
= 194.5, p < .00001. Think is used more within the puzzle context than know. This could
be because the puzzle task encourages parents to use more indirect speech acts with think
(which serve to provide information or direct behavior) than with know (which serve to
request information or answer questions) because they are leading children through the
activity.
We also find differences in which kinds of speakers provide the most input to chil-
dren (see Figure 6.7). Mothers supply two-thirds of the tokens within our sample. But
without further analyses that look at speaker-talkativeness, we do not know whether this
is because mothers use the verbs of interest more than other speakers, or because moth-
ers are more involved in the recordings than other speakers. Another interesting fea-
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ture of the mother’s speech is that they use think more frequently than know, while all
other input sources favor know over think. This difference may be related to the dif-
ferences across interaction contexts (Figure 6.6) given that more mothers than fathers
participated in lab tasks, and mothers have been found to speak differently to children
(Gleason 1975, Tomasello et al. 1990, Rowe et al. 2004), including using more indirect
language (McLaughlin et al. 1980).
6.4.1 Group input results
To get some idea of what kinds of input children receive on average, we applied
the coding scheme developed for our Gleason corpus analyses to this dataset. For more
details about the coding scheme, please see examples in Chapter 5. Full coding of the
sample is not yet complete, but syntactic proxies for the other cues are reported here as
preliminary data.
6.4.1.1 Proxies for discourse status cues
Discourse status of complement cues to factivity and veridicality come from ob-
serving the relationship between the discourse context and the propositions expressed
by the complements of know and think. As a result, the utterances which will provide
such cues are limited to those that embed declarative complements. As shown in Fig-
ure 6.8, there are more of such relevant utterances for think (74% of all think tokens)
as compared to know (15% of all know tokens), which are similar amounts to those of
the previous corpus. In order to determine whether these cues are informative about the
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Figure 6.8: X verbs p tokens within the sample, as a proportion of each verb
verbs’ (non-)factivity, there are no further proxies; we would have to code the status of
the complement proposition with respect to what is known in the discourse.
But as reported in the previous corpus analysis, we can look at further proxies for
discourse cues to veridicality. As discussed in Chapter 5, the kinds of utterances that
would be informative about the non-veridicality of think are those that occur with 3rd
person subjects or past tense (8-9). These kinds of utterances are informative because
they could potentially describe beliefs which contrast with the beliefs of the interlocutors
in the discourse context, and therefore signal that these beliefs might be ones that the
interlocutors take to be false.
And similar to the conclusions drawn from the previous input sample, there would
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Figure 6.9: Subject-types within the sample, as a proportion of each verb
seem to be few cues to the non-veridicality of think. Think occurs most frequently with 1st
person (72% of all think tokens) and 2nd person (26% of the tokens) subjects, suggesting
that it is rarely used to contrast the beliefs of interlocutors with the beliefs of others. And
it is rarely used in past tense form (10% of all think tokens), suggesting that it is not often
used to contrast previously held beliefs with current beliefs.
6.4.1.2 Proxies for syntactic cues
We can also look at syntactic cues within this input sample (Figure 6.12). We find
that think occurs most frequently with declarative complements (86% of all think tokens).
In contrast, know occurs very rarely with declarative complements (16% of all know to-
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Figure 6.10: Tense-types within the sample, as a proportion of each verb
kens). Instead, the two most frequent complement-types for know are interrogatives and
null complements, which both occur in 37% of know tokens. These results diverge from
the previous sample from the Gleason corpus in that there are more null complements
with know, and fewer interrogative complements.
6.4.1.3 Proxies for discourse function cues
The biggest difference between this sample and the Gleason sample can be seen in
the data which serve as proxies for the availability of discourse function cues (data for
this sample given in Figure 6.13). If we recall the findings from Chapter 5, there was
a difference between know and think as far as the types of utterances that they tended
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Figure 6.11: Negation within the sample, as a proportion of each verb
to occur in. Know occurred more frequently in questions while think occurred more
frequently in assertions. In this sample of input, the difference in utterance-types between
the two verbs is effectively neutralized. Both verbs occur most frequently in assertions
and the proportions of assertions are comparable across the two verbs; 70% of know
tokens were assertions while 74% of think tokens were assertions. This difference was
also related to differences in whose beliefs were discussed with the two verbs (see Figure
6.14).
At first blush, these results suggest that discourse function cues to the distinction
between know and think are not reliable within this new input sample. If true, this would
call into question the tentative conclusions that we made at the end of Chapter 5 about
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Figure 6.12: Complement-types within the sample, as a proportion of each verb
the relative importance of discourse function cues. Recall that we took know questions
with 2nd person subjects to be indicative of the kinds of indirect speech acts that know
should be used with under the pragmatic route (i.e, indirect questions such as Do you
know where the keys are). While assertions with 1st person subjects would be most useful
in learning to map think to THINK (i.e., indirect assertions such as I think the keys are in
the kitchen). Within this sample of input, there are no difference between know and think
with respect to these two different kinds of tokens. Know occurs in 2nd person questions
28% of the time while think occurs in such tokens 25% of the time. And know occurs
in 1st person assertions 61% of the time while think occurs in such tokens 71% of the
time. However, we should not be concerned about the availability of the pragmatic route
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Figure 6.13: Utterance-types within the sample, as a proportion of each verb
given these results. In fact, this data gives us a chance to re-evaluate the types of tokens
that we take to be informative under the pragmatic route, and to generalize away from the
particulars of one specific corpus.
To see this, consider the differences between the two corpora that we have seen so
far. First, know occurs with more 1st person subjects and more assertions in this sample
(Figures 6.9,6.13,6.14). These changes neutralize the distributional differences between
know and think. But know also occurs in the presence of negation (Figure 6.11) more
in this sample, and takes more null complements (Figure 6.12) in this sample. So, while
there are fewer occurrences of tokens like Do you know where the keys are? in this sample,
there are more occurrences of tokens like I don’t know (see Figure 6.15). These I don’t
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Figure 6.14: Subject-types by utterance-types within the sample, as a proportion of each
verb
know tokens are informative under the discourse function because they allow children to
observe that know is used to ask and answer questions. These I don’t know tokens are
used to express ignorance in answer to questions (125), so they are the complement to
tokens like Do you know where the keys are?. And if we compare the two input samples
(Gleason from Chapter 5, and this sample) we see that decreases in the number of Do you
know where the keys are? tokens are accompanied by increases in the number of I don’t
know tokens.
(125) a. Where are the keys?
b. I don’t know where the keys are
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Figure 6.15: Indirect speech acts within the sample, as a proportion of each verb
6.4.2 Discussion
Zooming back out to take into consider the proxies for each route discussed here,
what does our new input sample suggest about the cues that are available to children, on
average? We saw that children have a similar amount of chances to look for discourse
cues to factivity as they did in the Gleason corpus. If the distribution of those cues is any-
thing like what we observed in the Gleason corpus, then we would expect those cues to be
less useful. We also saw that discourse cues to veridicality are similar in the two samples.
Finally, we saw differences in the distributions of the two verbs across the two samples.
At first blush, these differences challenge the availability—and therefore the utility—of
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syntactic, pragmatic and pragmatic-syntactic routes. But, upon consideration, the two su-
perficially different distributions share deep similarities: for both samples, know clearly
embeds both declarative and interrogative complements while think only embeds declara-
tives; and know is used primarily to answer or ask questions while think is used to proffer
information. So, we have much the same perspective on direct vs. indirect routes that we
did with the previous sample. But which routes are actually used by children? To address
this question, we need to know more about the kinds of input distributions that individual
children are exposed to, and their relationship to individual children’s performance in the
behavioral task.
6.5 Input-performance comparisons
6.5.1 Sample for comparison
For this preliminary analysis, children were sorted by their performance in the
know-matrix condition. High-performing children regularly picked the blue box—the
mentioned box—on trials where they heard the clue Chris doesn’t know that it’s in the
blue box, and low-performing children regularly picked the other box, which was the
red box, in this condition. With respect to their verb knowledge, we can assume that
high-performing children are aware that know is a factive verb, and that low-performing
children are either not aware of this fact or regularly make performance errors.
From this performance ranking, we separated the top quarter of participants and
the bottom quarter of participants and analyzed small samples of their input, in order
to compare the average input of high-performing children and low-performing children.
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The high-performing group includes 13 children (age range: 3;1-4;5 years;month, mean
age: 3;9, 6 boys). On average, these children picked the mentioned box on 92% of
know-matrix trials, but the range was 78% to 100% selections of the mentioned box. The
low-performing group includes 12 children (age range: 3;2-4;4 years;month, mean age:
3;10, 7 boys). On average, these children picked the mentioned box on 5% of know-matrix
trials, but the range was 0% to 11% selections of the mentioned box. Preliminary analyses
compared these groups based on age and gender and found no statistically significant
differences, suggesting that these groups differ only in their understanding of the verbs
and not in demographic dimensions as well.
For each of these children, we collected and coded all child-ambient tokens in the
first 10-minute chunk of conversation that took place during the home recordings. More
details on the coding scheme that was used are provided in the next two sections. It is
important to note that this is a very small input sample, as compared to the whole corpus of
speech that was collected. 10 minutes accounts for less than 10% of a family’s recording
time, on average, and we have only sampled 10 minutes from half of the families, so the
data reported later on in this section is less than 5% of the entire sample which we will
ultimately analyze.
6.5.2 Proposed composite variables for comparison
In order to better understand the role of input in uncovering the contrast between
know and think, we need to move away from the proxies that this coding scheme provides
us. What kinds of measures will help us disentangle discourse status of complement cues,
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syntactic cues and discourse function cues?
Figure 6.16: Expected composite score for discourse status of complement cues to veridi-
cality, by verb
• Veridicality discourse status of complement cue composite: a measure of how
often children could notice that the content of the reported belief is true. Discourse
coding schemes from Chapter 5 will be extended to ask how often the comple-
ment proposition expresses information that is true in the discourse or false in the
discourse. For this preliminary sample, we examined all know p and think p to-
kens and decided whether the proposition expressed by the complement seemed
true within the conversation context, or whether it seemed false because of some
disagreement or debate. To create the composite variable we computed a difference
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score by subtracting the proportion of false complement tokens from the proportion
of true complement tokens. We might expect know to score very high on this vari-
able, with a value around 1, and we might expect think to score lower, with a value
around 0 or a negative value. An idealization of these veridicality composite scores
in given in Figure 6.16.
Figure 6.17: Expected composite score for discourse status of complement cues to factiv-
ity, by verb
• Factivity discourse status of complement cue composite: a measure of how of-
ten children could notice that the speaker presupposes the truth of the complement
proposition. Discourse coding schemes that were developed for the corpus analysis
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in Chapter 5 will be used for this variable. For this preliminary sample, we exam-
ined all know p and think p tokens and decided whether the proposition expressed
by the complement was part of the common ground—either because it was estab-
lished in or inferable from the previous discourse, or because it was the kind of
information that an average parent and child would share—or whether it expressed
new information within the discourse. To create the composite variable we com-
puted a difference score by subtracting the proportion of new complement tokens
from the proportion of established complement tokens. We might expect know to
score relatively high on this variable, with a value around 1, and we might expect
think to score lower, with a value around 0 or a negative value. An idealization of
these factivity composite scores in given in Figure 6.17.
• Syntactic cue composite: a measure of the variation in syntactic distributions that
children are exposed to. Existing syntactic codes will provide the basis for this mea-
sure, but we would need to take into account the relative contributions of different
complements that know and think embed. For example, interrogative complements
are only informative when they occur in addition to declarative complements. If
children only had experience with declarative complements, they would not be able
to distinguish the distribution of know from that of think. And only observing in-
terrogative complements would make it difficult to distinguish the distribution of
know from the distribution of wonder. To create the composite variable we com-
puted a difference score by subtracting the proportion of tokens with declarative
complements from the proportion of tokens with interrogative complements. We
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Figure 6.18: Expected composite score for syntactic cues, by verb
might expect a verb like wonder to score high on this variable, with a value around
1, while a verb like know would have a small positive value or one around 0, and a
verb like think would score very low, around -1. An idealization of these syntactic
composite scores in given in Figure 6.18.
• Discourse function cue composite: a measure of the kinds of conversational goals
that parents use know and think utterances to achieve. Based on discourse coding,
we will need to distinguish between utterances that are intended to (i) request infor-
mation, (ii) provide information, or (iii) direct behavior. Existing syntactic proxies
do not provide enough information because one utterance can be used for multiple
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Figure 6.19: Expected composite score for discourse function cues, by verb
purposes. For example, Don’t you know where the keys are? could be used to re-
quest information about the keys or to direct the addressee to retrieve the keys. And
I think it’s time for bed can serve as a direction to go to bed as well as a statement
about the time. For know, we computed this variable by calculating the propor-
tion of tokens that speakers used to request or provide information, and for think
we calculated the proportion of tokens that speakers used to proffer information.
We would expect know and think to both score relatively high for this pragmatic
composite variable. An idealization of these scores in given in Figure 6.19.
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6.5.3 Average input by group
In this sample, there are relatively few tokens; just 45 know and 48 think tokens
occur in the sample for the high-performing group, and 27 know and 39 think tokens in
the sample from the low-performing group. But even with this small sample, preliminary
analyses might start to provide suggestions of what we will see with the full sample.
For all these tokens, we coded that discourse status of the proposition expressed by the
complement clause with respect to veridicality and factivity, the syntactic frames, and the
discourse functions of the verbs. The average number of times that each of these things
occurred is given in Figure 6.20.
Veridicality cues from discourse status of complement: from this sample, we find
that no children hear know p tokens where p expresses information that is false, because
they all express information that seems true, or non-controversial in in the context. In
contrast, p expresses both true and false information in think tokens for both groups.
Under the hypothesis that children need to observe true p tokens for know and false p
tokens for think, we might expect to see more false p tokens than true p tokens for think.
However, our high-performing group receives the opposite kind of distribution, where
true think p tokens are more prevalent that false think p tokens. If this is representative
of the larger sample, it suggests that children do not directly learn about the veridicality
distinction between the two verbs by observing direct consequences of it.
Factivity cues from discourse status of complement: from this sample, we see
that both groups are exposed to know p tokens where p expresses established information
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Figure 6.20: Average tokens in 10-minute window, by verb, performance group, and cue-
type
High-performers Low-performers
Type of cue know think know think
veridicality
true p 2.0 2.8 1.6 2.0
false p – 1.5 – 3.2
factivity
established p 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.5
new p 1.0 3.0 – 3.7
syntactic
CP +Q 1.9 * 1.7 *
CP -Q 1.9 3.8 1.8 4.4
discourse function
question 1.6 1.0 1.5 2.3
assertion 2.2 3.4 1.7 2.5
as well as new information, and that the same holds for think p tokens. Furthermore,
the distribution of established p tokens vs. new p tokens skews in the right direction for
both groups. But, since there are no big differences between the input for the two groups,
these data suggest that children do not uncover the factivity contrast between the verbs by
observing its direct consequences either.
Syntactic cues from distributions: from this sample, both groups of children are
exposed to distribution of syntactic frames for the two verbs that would allow them to
conclude that know is a responsive verb while think is not. For both groups, know oc-
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curs in tokens with interrogative and declarative complements, while think only occurs
in tokens with declarative complements. However, if these cues played a central role in
learning about the differences between the two verbs, we might expect to see more of
a difference between the values for the high-performing and the low-performing group,
which we do not see.
Pragmatic cues from discourse functions: from this sample, we can see that the
high-performing group is exposed to more know tokens is questions that in assertions,
and more think tokens in assertions that in questions. Under the hypothesis that dis-
course functions like asking and answering questions are related to having a know-like
semantics, while discourse functions like proffering information are related to having a
think-like semantics, the high-performing group gets exactly the right distribution of dis-
course functions in their input. In contrast, the low-performing group has no chance to
observe that there is a difference in the kinds of discourse functions that know and think
play, because they occur in equal numbers for the two verbs in that group. This sug-
gests that pragmatic bootstrapping from discourse function cues may play a central role
in uncovering the contrast between the verbs. In addition, it may be possible that good
distribution of discourse function cues that the high-group receives comes at the cost of
veridicality cues from the discourse status of the complement; since think is mostly used
to proffer the complement proposition in this group, there is also less debate about the
controversiality of that proposition within the discourse.
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6.5.4 Results for composite variables
We also compute our composite variables from the group averages in Figure 6.20.
these scores are presented below in Figures 6.21, 6.22, 6.23, and 6.24. Mann-Whitney
tests were performed comparing each of these composite variable scores for the high-
performing vs. low-performing samples. None of the scores for the two groups were
statistically significantly different (all p > .15), but this may be due to small sample sizes.
Figure 6.21: Composite score for discourse status of complement cues to veridicality, by
performance level in behavioral task and verb
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Figure 6.22: Composite score for discourse status of complement cues to factivity, by
performance level in behavioral task and verb
6.5.5 Discussion
As discussed above, even with such a small sample, the differences in average input
for the two groups is suggestive about which routes are most likely used by the learner.
The data discussed above suggest that children in the low-performing sample receive in-
put that more clearly signals the (non-)veridicality and (non-)factivity of the two verbs;
the discourse status cues do vary across the two groups, but the kids who get the better dis-
tribution of these cues actually perform worse in the behavioral task, suggesting that these
routes are not the ones that children use to uncover the distinction. However, children in
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Figure 6.23: Composite score for syntactic cues, by performance level in behavioral task
and verb
both samples receive clear syntactic cues which differentiate the verbs, and children in the
high-performing sample receive very clear signals about the different discourse functions
of the two verbs, suggest that a bootstrapping approach to uncovering the contrast is most
likely, either pragmatic or pragmatic-syntactic bootstrapping.
However, we cannot conclude too much from these preliminary results, because our
statistical tests indicate that the differences in the sample were not reliable. Perhaps this
comes from not having enough power, given that we have analyzed less than 5% of the
whole sample. Alternatively, because this preliminary sample is so small, it might not be
representative of the distributions in the entire sample.
179
Figure 6.24: Composite score for discourse function cues, by performance level in behav-
ioral task and verb
If we continue to find no statistically significant differences between groups after
analyzing the full sample, we will have to go back to the drawing board and consider some
alternative ways of addressing the relationship between experience and word learning. For
one, our behavioral measure might not be as reflective of underlying word knowledge as
we hope. It is likely that other factors like attention play a role in succeeding at this task,
and they may outweigh the effects of word knowledge. It’s also possible that we have not
measured enough child-centric or parent-centric variables, in order to be able to control
for the effect that these other variables play on language development. For example, two
children might recieve the exact same linguistic input but have different understanding
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of the verbs because they are at different stages in the acquisition process. It’s likely an
extended process where different information matters at different points. And there might
be non-linguistic aspects of parent-child interactions which help to mask or to highlight
different linguistic aspects of experience. For example, differences in joint attention or
parental engagement might lead children to make different conclusions about whether a
proposition was established within a discourse, or what their parents are trying to achieve
by talking to them. Additionally, it may be that there is a more complex interplay between
aspects of the linguistic input that we have been able to measure thus far, meaning that




7.1 Contributions of the dissertation
This dissertation took the first few steps to answering when and how children figure
out that know is a presupposition trigger, while think isn’t, as well as what the acquisition
path can tell us about the presuppositions of know. Chapter 1 laid out the possible routes
that children might use to solve the know-think mapping problem, and what kinds of
input these routes would require. Chapter 2 discussed the semantic, syntactic and prag-
matic properties of know and think that underlie the routes from Chapter 1, as well as
semantic and pragmatic theories of presupposition. Chapter 3 reviewed findings from the
developmental literature which suggest that children have in place all the representational
abilities and mechanisms to take the routes laid out in Chapter 1. Chapter 4 demonstrated
that children figure out the factivity contrast between 3-5 years. Chapter 5 presented a
corpus analysis which addressed which kinds of routes from Chapter 1 are most likely,
given the types of input that children receive. Chapter 6 developed a method for testing
the relationship between input and comprehension of the verbs. This chapter concludes
the dissertation by reviewing what this tells us about know and think and their acquisition.
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7.1.1 Methodological implications
With respect to addressing when questions in the development of semantic and
pragmatic abilities, we should take care to choose behavioral methods which are sensitive
to the right distinctions. Truth-value judgment tasks are an important methodological tool
because they are sensitive to asserted content, which is what is at issue in judgments of
truth. But there are other dimensions of meaning, such as implicated or presupposed con-
tent, which have different properties and for which there may be different trajectories of
acquisition. Implications from implicated or presupposed content need not arise on every
use of a sentence, the way that implications from asserted content might, because they are
more defeasible. As a result, particular contextual factors contribute to these implications,
and those factors should be controlled for, such as in inference-based paradigms.
When addressing how questions in language acquisition, corpus methods should be
part of the toolkit of developmentalists, experimentalists and theoreticians. When taken
together with behavioral methods, corpus methods can help us to have a more nuanced
understanding of the types of evidence that are available to a language learner and this
can inform which ones of a theoretical set of representations children would be likely
to develop. In particular, corpus methods are mandatory for addressing poverty of the
stimulus cases for semantics. We are able to start addressing such cases, but addressing
them requires an understanding of the kinds of evidence that children are exposed to
in the input. Theoretical advances might suggest what stock of possible representations
are available (e.g., as in semantic vs. pragmatic theories of presupposition), but corpus
analyses can help us start to rule out some of the possibilities.
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7.1.2 Empirical implications
Children have non-factive representations of think as early as 3 years. There is
either minimal individual variation in figuring this out, or it comes well before 3. Children
develop adult-like representations of know between 3-5 years. There is a lot of individual
variation in this development and it is not well-related to age.
Linguistic experience is implicated in children’s developing representations of know.
While the quantity of such experience plays a role, the quality of such experience may
also be crucial, insofar as particular uses of know are more informative about its under-
lying meaning. Direct, discourse status cues to distinctions of factivity and veridicality
are available, but only sparsely so. These cues require observing that the propositions
expressed in the complement of know are true or express information that is part of the
common ground in order to observe that know entails its complement or places restric-
tions on the common ground when it it uttered, but that think places neither of these
requirements on its complement.
However, much of the contrast in veridicality and factivity between know and think
is effectively neutralized, because (i) children rarely have the chance to observe the status
of know’s complement propositions; (ii) know is often used ‘informatively’ when the
complement proposition is not part of the common ground, since it is a soft trigger; and
(iii) think is often used to proffer the truth of its complement proposition, such that these
complements are not clearly false in the context of utterance.
On the other hand, indirect, distributional cues are readily available. Assuming a
principled link between attitude verb meanings and the syntactic distributions that they
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occur in, children can infer that these verbs are doxastic verbs because they embed sen-
tential complements—which express propositions—and they do not take the same kinds
of subjects and objects as communicative verbs. They can observe that know is a respon-
sive verb because it embeds both interrogative and declarative complements, while think
does not. They can also infer that know is veridical because it can be used to ask or answer
questions, while think is not because it occurs in different kinds of speech acts.
7.1.3 Conceptual implications
The data discussed here suggests that the contrast between know and think may not
be learned directly through discourse status cues about their (non-)factivity. If not, then
understanding of know is developed through distributional cues which are informative
about its veridicality (and not its factivity).
The learning theory laid out here does not preclude the use of discourse status cues
or the direct route to discovering presupposition triggers. The literatures described in
Chapter 3 suggest that children could in principle notice the kind of information that is
relevant to veridicality, to factivity, and to understanding speaker presuppositions more
generally. Instead, the learning theory advocated here would argue that this information
may not be widely used for another reason. These conceptual arguments suggest that
concepts like belief, knowledge and truth are so ubiquitous that children it might be hard
for children to clearly see when they are relevant for the meaning of specific words. So
the use of such routes might be restricted in practice.
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7.2 Broader outlook
7.2.1 Theories of presupposition
This dissertation presents the first body of evidence about children’s linguistic ex-
periences with a presupposition trigger and arguments about how they might develop
an adult-like representation from that experience. Different theories of presupposition
contrast the kinds of representations of triggers that children would need to develop in
order to capture their presuppositional nature. Semantic accounts stipulate that a trigger’s
presupposition in its representation (Karttunen 1974 and following), whereas pragmatic
accounts aim to avoid such a lexical stipulation (Stalnaker 1974 and following).
If we assume a straightforward relationship between evidence and the representa-
tions that are developed, then semantic accounts—by definition—require a higher burden
of proof for representation of presuppositional phenomena than pragmatic accounts. And
one of the empirical contributions of this dissertation is to demonstrate that this high bur-
den of proof might not be met for a soft trigger like know. Instead, pragmatic accounts
of factive presupposition allow the learner to arrive at know’s factivity via its veridicality.
But that isn’t to say that semantic presuppositions are un-acquirable.
Consider the presupposition trigger too. Its presuppositional status is acquired at
roughly the same age as know (Dudley et al. 2017), but the evidence for it is different
in kind. Discourse status cues to the presupposition are very available, given that too’s
presupposition rarely goes unsupported within a discourse, and these cues often come
from salient aspects of a discourse such as propositions that have recently been expressed
verbally or visual stimuli that is present (Dudley et al. 2017). Furthermore, there do not
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seem to be any clear indirect cues to the presupposition of too. This all suggests that
triggers like too would meet the burden of proof required for semantic presuppositions,
and supports the view that only the hardest or least accommodatable triggers (i.e., focus
particles such as too) will provide best cues for semantic representations and thus be the
limited set of triggers for which children develop semantic representations.
7.2.2 Precocious preschoolers?
This dissertation contributes to a growing body of research which suggests that
children develop Theory of Mind and associated pragmatic abilities early than was once
assumed. Theorists might have been reluctant to attribute sophisticated pragmatic abili-
ties to children because it was assumed that (i) children could not attribute the beliefs or
intentions to others (either in principle or in practice) that serve as inputs to pragmatic
reasoning (Perner et al. 1987, Gleitman 1990), and that (ii) they did not have the requi-
site cognitive abilities to perform the complex steps of logic involved in theories of such
reasoning (Grice 1975). But, in fact, children can recognize mental states like beliefs and
their content as early as the first year of life (Scott and Baillargeon 2017). And the reason-
ing mechanisms and steps that children employ to understand a speaker’s message need
not be as complicated as those written down by theorists (Geurts and Rubio-Fernández
2015). Young children can even master some presupposition triggers by 2-3 years of age
(Syrett et al. 2009, Jasbi 2015, Dudley et al. 2015).
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7.2.3 Acquisition of “hard” words
But children’s pragmatic sophistication and their abilities to parse environmental
cues, including socio-pragmatic ones about speakers intentions, should not be taken to
indicate that the environment and children’s experience of it are the only contributors to
word learning. This evidence is generally only helpful in light of some expectations about
possible meanings. In fact, a child who was purely motivated by their experiences of the
world around them (with no antecedent hypotheses about what words could mean) would
not be able to learn the meanings of hard words.
To illustrate why, let us consider the learning perspective advocated in this disserta-
tion. This perspective is most closely related to that of Gleitman (1990) but differs in that
the explanation of difficulty with hard words is not due to their elusive nature, but rather
their quotidian or ubiquitous nature. Children engage in spontaneous belief tracking and
they constantly use what they know about other people’s beliefs/desires to explain their
behavior. Consequently, the difficulty with these verbs cannot be due to the unobserv-
ability of beliefs and desires. They are hard because they are related to concepts which
are not salient hypotheses which we readily entertain for word meanings; they have low
informational value since that are always part of the explanation of what people mean
when they say something. The problem is particularly insidious for “hard” words that
token belief concepts. Because they are able to attribute beliefs to those around them,
and use those beliefs in figuring out what others mean to say, children are factoring such
beliefs out of literal meaning all the time. So they need extra evidence to help them factor
belief concepts back in when they are learning belief verbs. The kind of evidence that
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cues children into the right answer are distributional cues, for example from the syntax.
But this information is only useful in light of principled links between meaning
and distribution, because there are all kinds of possible meanings which we do not see
attested. Consider two possible words: the factive, veridical and responsive verb know
and its hypothetical non-factive counterpart shknow. Children would not get the necessary
evidence to distinguish between the two hypotheses, because their experiences do not give
away the factivity of know. Instead they can only observe that know is veridical, and they
must have some principles which help them derive factivity from veridicality. Do children
even entertain a word meaning like that of our hypothetical shknow?
7.3 Extensions
Future work can be done to provide support for this conceptual arguments laid out
in this dissertation. The force of such claims should extend across lexical categories
within a language, across different communities of speakers within a language and across
languages. This work would involve verifying that the signal for discourse status cues
is clear in the case of hard triggers, and noisy in the case of soft triggers; as well as
verifying that indirect cues are available the case of soft triggers and not in the case of
hard triggers. And this perspective on learning would predict that if differences in the
types of cues available are found across triggers, communities or languages, then these
differences should lead to different acquisition paths.
How will KNOW and THINK be mapped in other languages or cultures? The
availability of theses cues might differ across different communities, either due to cultural
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differences in how we speak to children or to linguistic differences. Discourse status cues
might be more prevalent in communities where beliefs or truth are more often salient
topics of conversation. Factives embed interrogatives and declaratives cross-linguistically,
but are both types of complements available in the input? And the use of speech acts with
know and think are likely to differ across speech communities. But there might be other
pragmatic reflexes of the contrast which are superficially different but underlyingly similar
in that they reflect the information-seeking nature of know and the assertivity of think.
How will other cognitive factives be mapped? These discourse function cues do not
extend straightforwardly to the use of other cognitive factives like realize (e.g., Do you
realize where the keys are? can not be easily understood as a request for information), but
the syntactic ones do (e.g., John realizes that Mary is home/where Mary is). Perhaps know
is learned first, given its frequency in speech to children (often orders of magnitude more
than other cognitive factives) and factivity is generalized to the others through overlap in
their syntactic distributions with know’s.
How are other presuppositional meanings mapped? Alternative cues play a role
when discourse status cues are unreliable. Alternative cues will be important in learning
other soft triggers, and maybe even hard triggers, but not for anaphoric triggers. For




Figure 1: Individual performance in think-none condition, Study 2
Figure 2: Individual performance in know-none condition, Study 2
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Figure 3: Individual performance in think-embedded condition, Study 2
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Figure 4: Individual performance in know-embedded condition, Study 2
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Appendix B
Figure 5: Puzzle set used in puzzle task
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Figure 6: Stove toy used in cooking toy set
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Figure 7: Type of food toys used in cooking toy set
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